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[原创]Windows NTFS本地提权漏洞 CVE-2021-31956
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发表于: 2023-6-28 18:05
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参考链接：
92aK9s2c8@1M7s2y4Q4x3@1q4Q4x3V1k6Q4x3V1k6J5k6i4y4W2j5i4u0U0K9q4)9J5k6h3&6U0j5$3N6J5L8%4g2H3i4K6u0W2j5$3!0E0i4K6u0r3x3U0l9J5x3g2)9J5c8U0l9%4i4K6u0r3x3e0g2Q4x3V1k6U0N6X3g2Q4x3X3b7J5x3o6t1I4i4K6u0V1x3K6p5&6y4e0k6Q4x3X3c8W2P5s2m8D9L8$3W2@1K9h3&6Y4i4K6u0V1N6r3S2W2i4K6u0V1N6$3W2F1k6r3!0%4M7#2)9J5k6r3E0W2M7X3&6W2L8q4)9J5k6r3&6@1k6Y4y4Q4x3X3c8%4K9i4c8Z5i4K6u0V1N6$3&6X3i4K6u0V1M7r3q4J5N6q4)9J5k6o6q4Q4x3V1j5`.
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使用PipeAttribution构造任意地址读后，修改_WNF_NAME_INSTANCE结构体内的指针_WNF_STATE_DATA实现任意地址写
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使用使用NtQueryWnfStateData和NtUpDateWnfStateData API来造成任意地址的读写（需要构造AllocateSize和DataSize成员）
https://bbs.kanxue.com/thread-271140.htm
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漏洞在windows的NTFS文件系统驱动上(C:\Windows\System32\drivers\ntfs.sys)的NtfsQueryEaUserEaList函数中
NTFS文件系统允许为每一个文件额外存储若干个键值对属性，称之为EA(Extend Attribution) 。可以通过ZwSetEaFile为文件创建EA，ZwQueryEaFile查询文件EA
泄露的NT5.1中有NtfsQueryEaUserEaList的源码
NtfsQueryEaUserEaList从 循环遍历文件的每个 NTFS 扩展属性 (Ea)，并根据ea_block->EaValueLength + ea_block->EaNameLength + 9的大小从 Ea 块复制到输出缓冲区。
有一个检查确保ea_block_size小于或等于out_buf_length - padding。然后，out_buf_length会减去ea_block_size及其填充的大小。填充是通过((ea_block_size + 3) 0xFFFFFFFC) - ea_block_size来计算的。因为每个EA块应该填充为32位对齐。
假设文件的扩展属性中有两个扩展属性
第一次迭代
因此18 < out_buf_length - 0，数据将被复制到缓冲区中
第二次迭代
在文件中添加一个具有相同值的第二个扩展属性。
由于缓冲区太小，第二次内存复制将不会发生。
第一次迭代
检查结果为:
18 <= 18 - 0 // is True and a copy of 18 occurs.
第二个扩展属性具有以下值：
结果检查将是：
ea_block_size <= out_buf_length - padding
137 <= 0 - 2
发生下溢，137 个字节将被复制到缓冲区末尾，从而损坏相邻内存。
查看NtfsQueryEaUserEaList函数的调用者NtfsCommonQueryEa，我们可以看到输出缓冲区是根据请求的大小在分页池上分配的
NtfsCommonQueryEa函数可通过ZwQueryEaFIle函数调用
可以看到输出缓冲区Buffer以及该缓冲区的长度都是从用户空间传入的。这意味着我们根据缓冲区的大小控制内核空间的内存分配。
该漏洞对攻击者来说：
溢出拷贝时数据和大小均可控。
可以覆盖下一个内核池块
内核池分配时大小可控，并且可以进行堆布局。
Windows10引入了新的方式进行堆块管理，称为Segment Heap，具体可看以下论文
716K9s2c8@1M7s2y4Q4x3@1q4Q4x3V1k6Q4x3V1k6%4N6%4N6Q4x3X3g2K6M7%4c8A6j5#2)9J5k6h3!0J5k6#2)9J5c8X3#2W2k6r3W2S2i4K6u0r3f1#2y4f1d9f1x3J5x3o6t1H3i4K6u0r3f1#2y4f1d9f1y4Q4x3X3c8S2j5%4c8W2M7#2)9J5c8Y4m8G2L8$3I4Q4y4h3k6G2N6X3g2J5k6X3I4G2N6#2)9#2k6X3g2^5M7r3I4G2K9i4c8S2N6r3W2G2L8W2)9#2k6Y4y4A6L8X3y4W2i4K6g2X3N6$3W2F1k6r3!0%4M7#2)9#2k6U0p5H3i4K6g2X3x3e0W2Z5x3g2)9J5c8W2y4e0g2p5W2o6x3U0l9J5x3q4)9J5k6p5q4J5N6r3W2U0L8r3g2Q4x3X3c8H3L8$3!0D9i4K6g2X3L8%4k6W2M7X3k6D9L8%4N6Q4y4h3k6W2P5s2m8D9L8$3W2@1j5i4c8A6L8$3&6Q4y4h3k6K6K9h3&6U0k6g2)9#2k6Y4N6A6L8X3c8G2N6%4y4Q4y4h3j5I4x3q4)9#2k6U0p5&6K9o6q4Q4x3X3c8T1j5i4W2W2N6q4)9#2k6X3k6S2M7X3W2W2L8r3I4G2i4K6u0W2M7r3c8X3
EXP:0a2K9s2c8@1M7s2y4Q4x3@1q4Q4x3V1k6Q4x3V1k6Y4K9i4c8Z5N6h3u0Q4x3X3g2U0L8$3#2Q4x3V1k6S2j5i4A6Z5N6h3I4A6j5h3&6Y4i4K6u0r3b7#2k6q4i4K6u0V1x3U0l9J5x3g2)9J5k6o6x3I4z5e0f1$3i4K6u0V1c8g2S2b7
仿照EXP改的可以触发溢出的POC
可以看到整数下溢
Windows10引入了新的方式进行堆块管理，称为Segment Heap
详见：129K9s2c8@1M7s2y4Q4x3@1q4Q4x3V1k6Q4x3V1k6%4N6%4N6Q4x3X3g2K6M7%4c8A6j5#2)9J5k6h3!0J5k6#2)9J5c8X3#2W2k6r3W2S2i4K6u0r3f1#2y4f1d9f1x3J5x3o6t1H3i4K6u0r3f1#2y4f1d9f1y4Q4x3X3c8S2j5%4c8W2M7#2)9J5c8Y4m8G2L8$3I4Q4y4h3k6G2N6X3g2J5k6X3I4G2N6#2)9#2k6X3g2^5M7r3I4G2K9i4c8S2N6r3W2G2L8W2)9#2k6Y4y4A6L8X3y4W2i4K6g2X3N6$3W2F1k6r3!0%4M7#2)9#2k6U0p5H3i4K6g2X3x3e0W2Z5x3g2)9J5c8W2y4e0g2p5W2o6x3U0l9J5x3q4)9J5k6p5q4J5N6r3W2U0L8r3g2Q4x3X3c8H3L8$3!0D9i4K6g2X3L8%4k6W2M7X3k6D9L8%4N6Q4y4h3k6W2P5s2m8D9L8$3W2@1j5i4c8A6L8$3&6Q4y4h3k6K6K9h3&6U0k6g2)9#2k6Y4N6A6L8X3c8G2N6%4y4Q4y4h3j5I4x3q4)9#2k6U0p5&6K9o6q4Q4x3X3c8T1j5i4W2W2N6q4)9#2k6X3k6S2M7X3W2W2L8r3I4G2i4K6u0W2M7r3c8X3
中文翻译：439K9s2c8@1M7s2y4Q4x3@1q4Q4x3V1k6Q4x3V1k6H3j5i4m8W2M7W2)9J5k6i4y4W2k6h3u0#2k6#2)9J5k6h3!0J5k6#2)9J5c8U0p5%4y4o6x3`.
POOL_HEADER 在池中，适合单个页面的所有块都以POOL_HEADER结构开头，POOL_HEADER包含分配器所需信息和Tag信息。当试图在Windows内核中利用堆溢出漏洞时，首先要覆盖的就是POOL_HEADER结构。攻击者有两个选择：重写一个正确的POOL_HEADER结构，并用来攻击下一个块的数据，或者直接攻击POOL_HEADER结构。
PoolType是一个位域,存储若干信息：
使用的内存类型，可以是NonPagedPool、PagedPool、SessionPool或NonPagedPoolNx；
如果分配是关键的（bit 1）并且必须成功。那么当分配失败，就会触发BugCheck；
如果分配与缓存大小对齐（bit 2）
如果分配使用了PoolQuota机制(bit 3)
其他未文档化的机制
WNF Windows Notification Facitily 是 Windows 中的一个通知系统。应用程序可以订阅特定类型的事件（StateName标识），在每次状态更改时可以进行通知。
WNF 利用相关文章
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结构体_WNF_STATE_DATA大可以由用户自定义
用户可以通过NtCreateWnfStateName创建一个WNF对象实例，实例的数据结构为_WNF_NAME_INSTANCE；WNF对象大小为0xb8(WNF_NAME_INSTANCE + POOL_HEADER )
NtUpdateWnfStateData可以往对象里写入数据，使用_WNF_STATE_DATA结构存储写入的内容；
通过NtQueryWnfStateData可以读取之前写入的数据，通过NtDeleteWnfStateData可以释放掉这个对象。NtDeleteWnfStateDat会调用ExpWnfDeleteStateData。
DataSize表示内存中_WNF_STATE_DATA结构的实际数据的大小，并用于NtQueryWnfStateData函数内的边界检查。_WNF_STATE_DATA结构存储写入的内容的内存复制操作发生在函数ExpWnfReadStateData中。
通过堆喷控制内存，使用NTFS的堆溢出越界写_WNF_STATE_DATA中的DataSize，接下来通过NtQueryWnfStateData实现相对偏移地址读写。
PipeAttribute块的大小也是可控的，并且分配在分页池上，因此可以将块放置在与易受攻击的 NTFS 块或允许相对写入的 WNF 块相邻的位置。两个指针AttributeName、AttributeValue 正常情况下是指向PipeAttribute.data[]后面的，通过堆布局，将AttributeValue的指针该为任意地址，就可以实现任意地址读。遗憾的是，windows并没有提供直接更新该数据结构的功能，不能通过该方法进行任意地址写。
使用这个布局，修改PipeAttribute的Flink指针，并将其指向一个伪造的管道属性。
// 使指向下一个属性的指针在用户层
overwritten_pipe_attribute->list.Flink = (LIST_ENTRY *)xploit->fake_pipe_attribute;
分页池创建管道后，用户可以向管道添加属性，同时属性值分配的大小和填充的数据完全由用户来控制。
AttributeName和AttributeValue是指向数据区不同偏移的两个指针。
同时在用户层，可以使用0x110038控制码来读取属性值。AttributeValue指针和AttributeValueSize大小将被用于读取属性值并返回给用户。
属性值可以被修改，但这会触发先前的PipeAttribute的释放和新的PipeAttribute的分配。这意味着如果攻击者可以控制PipeAttribute结构体的AttributeValue和AttributeValueSize字段，它就可以在内核中任意读取数据，但不能任意写。
所以，控制Pipe_Attribute的List_next指针值，使其指向用户层的Pipe_Attribute，也就意味着用户层的PipeAttribute结构体的AttributeValue和AttributeValueSize字段我们可以任意指定，也就可以在内核中任意读取数据数据，即获得了一个任意地址读原语。
释放掉堆喷未修改的其他的Pipe_Attribute结构，使用_WNF_NAME_INSTANCE重新进行堆喷，通过局部地址读写，覆盖掉下一个Wnf结构体里的_WNF_STATE_DATA，将其指向当前进程的EPROCESS，使用NtUpdateWnfStateData操作，即可实现写操作 。
_WNF_NAME_INSTANCE结构的CreatorProcess包含_EPROCESS指针
遍历进程链表,获得pid4的token
修改 WNF的StateData指向当前进程的token
调用NtUpdateWnfStateData替换当前进程的token为 system的
在卡巴发现的在野利用样本中，CVE-2021-31956利用了CVE-2021-31955来解决EPROCESS地址泄漏问题。
CVE-2021-31955漏洞是ntoskrnl.exe中的一个信息泄露漏洞。NtQuerySystemInformation 函数返回的 SuperFetch信息类SuperfetchPrivSourceQuery中包含当前执行的进程的EPROCESS kernel 地址。
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typedef struct _FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION { ULONG NextEntryOffset;
UCHAR EaNameLength;
CHAR EaName[1];
} FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION, *PFILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION;
typedef struct _FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION { ULONG NextEntryOffset;
UCHAR Flags;
UCHAR EaNameLength;
USHORT EaValueLength;
CHAR EaName[1];
} FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION, *PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION;
typedef struct _FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION { ULONG NextEntryOffset;
UCHAR EaNameLength;
CHAR EaName[1];
} FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION, *PFILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION;
typedef struct _FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION { ULONG NextEntryOffset;
UCHAR Flags;
UCHAR EaNameLength;
USHORT EaValueLength;
CHAR EaName[1];
} FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION, *PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION;
IO_STATUS_BLOCKNtfsQueryEaUserEaList( IN PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION CurrentEas,
IN PEA_INFORMATION EaInformation,
OUT PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION EaBuffer,
IN ULONG UserBufferLength,
IN PFILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION UserEaList,
IN BOOLEAN ReturnSingleEntry
)/*++
Routine Description: This routine is the work routine for querying EAs given a list
of Ea's to search for.
Arguments: CurrentEas - This is a pointer to the current Eas for the file
EaInformation - This is a pointer to an Ea information attribute.
EaBuffer - Supplies the buffer to receive the full eas
UserBufferLength - Supplies the length, in bytes, of the user buffer
UserEaList - Supplies the user specified ea name list
ReturnSingleEntry - Indicates if we are to return a single entry or not
Return Value: IO_STATUS_BLOCK - Receives the completion status for the operation
--*/
{ IO_STATUS_BLOCK Iosb;
ULONG GeaOffset;
ULONG FeaOffset;
ULONG Offset;
PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION LastFullEa;
PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION NextFullEa;
PFILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION GetEa;
BOOLEAN Overflow;
ULONG PrevEaPadding;
PAGED_CODE();
DebugTrace(+1, Dbg, ("NtfsQueryEaUserEaList: Entered\n"));
//
// Setup pointer in the output buffer so we can track the Ea being
// written to it and the last Ea written.
//
LastFullEa = NULL;
Overflow = FALSE;
//
// Initialize our next offset value.
//
GeaOffset = 0;
Offset = 0;
PrevEaPadding = 0;
//
// Loop through all the entries in the user's ea list.
//
while (TRUE) {
STRING GeaName;
STRING OutputEaName;
ULONG RawEaSize;
//
// Get the next entry in the user's list.
//
GetEa = (PFILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION)Add2Ptr(UserEaList, GeaOffset);
//
// Make a string reference to the name and see if we can locate
// the ea by name.
//
GeaName.MaximumLength = GeaName.Length = GetEa->EaNameLength;
GeaName.Buffer = &GetEa->EaName[0];
//
// Upcase the name so we can do a case-insensitive compare.
//
NtfsUpcaseEaName(&GeaName, &GeaName);
//
// Check for a valid name.
//
if (!NtfsIsEaNameValid(GeaName)) {
DebugTrace(-1, Dbg, ("NtfsQueryEaUserEaList: Invalid Ea Name\n"));
Iosb.Information = GeaOffset;
Iosb.Status = STATUS_INVALID_EA_NAME;
return Iosb;
}
GeaOffset += GetEa->NextEntryOffset;
//
// If this is a duplicate name, then step over this entry.
//
if (NtfsIsDuplicateGeaName(GetEa, UserEaList)) {
//
// If we've exhausted the entries in the Get Ea list, then we are
// done.
//
if (GetEa->NextEntryOffset == 0) {
break;
}
else {
continue;
}
}
//
// Generate a pointer in the Ea buffer.
//
NextFullEa = (PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION)Add2Ptr(EaBuffer, Offset + PrevEaPadding);
//
// Try to find a matching Ea.
// If we couldn't, let's dummy up an Ea to give to the user.
//
if (!NtfsLocateEaByName(CurrentEas,
EaInformation->UnpackedEaSize,
&GeaName,
&FeaOffset)) {
//
// We were not able to locate the name therefore we must
// dummy up a entry for the query. The needed Ea size is
// the size of the name + 4 (next entry offset) + 1 (flags)
// + 1 (name length) + 2 (value length) + the name length +
// 1 (null byte).
//
RawEaSize = 4 + 1 + 1 + 2 + GetEa->EaNameLength + 1;
if ((RawEaSize + PrevEaPadding) > UserBufferLength) {
Overflow = TRUE;
break;
}
//
// Everything is going to work fine, so copy over the name,
// set the name length and zero out the rest of the ea.
//
NextFullEa->NextEntryOffset = 0;
NextFullEa->Flags = 0;
NextFullEa->EaNameLength = GetEa->EaNameLength;
NextFullEa->EaValueLength = 0;
RtlCopyMemory(&NextFullEa->EaName[0],
&GetEa->EaName[0],
GetEa->EaNameLength);
//
// Upcase the name in the buffer.
//
OutputEaName.MaximumLength = OutputEaName.Length = GeaName.Length;
OutputEaName.Buffer = NextFullEa->EaName;
NtfsUpcaseEaName(&OutputEaName, &OutputEaName);
NextFullEa->EaName[GetEa->EaNameLength] = 0;
//
// Otherwise return the Ea we found back to the user.
//
}
else {
PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION ThisEa;
//
// Reference this ea.
//
ThisEa = (PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION)Add2Ptr(CurrentEas, FeaOffset);
//
// Check if this Ea can fit in the user's buffer.
//
RawEaSize = RawUnpackedEaSize(ThisEa);
if (RawEaSize > (UserBufferLength - PrevEaPadding)) {
Overflow = TRUE;
break;
}
//
// Copy this ea to the user's buffer.
//
RtlCopyMemory(NextFullEa,
ThisEa,
RawEaSize);
NextFullEa->NextEntryOffset = 0;
}
//
// Compute the next offset in the user's buffer.
//
Offset += (RawEaSize + PrevEaPadding);
//
// If we were to return a single entry then break out of our loop
// now
//
if (ReturnSingleEntry) {
break;
}
//
// If we have a new Ea entry, go back and update the offset field
// of the previous Ea entry.
//
if (LastFullEa != NULL) {
LastFullEa->NextEntryOffset = PtrOffset(LastFullEa, NextFullEa);
}
//
// If we've exhausted the entries in the Get Ea list, then we are
// done.
//
if (GetEa->NextEntryOffset == 0) {
break;
}
//
// Remember this as the previous ea value. Also update the buffer
// length values and the buffer offset values.
//
LastFullEa = NextFullEa;
UserBufferLength -= (RawEaSize + PrevEaPadding);
//
// Now remember the padding bytes needed for this call.
//
PrevEaPadding = LongAlign(RawEaSize) - RawEaSize;
}
//
// If the Ea information won't fit in the user's buffer, then return
// an overflow status.
//
if (Overflow) {
Iosb.Information = 0;
Iosb.Status = STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;
//
// Otherwise return the length of the data returned.
//
}
else {
//
// Return the length of the buffer filled and a success
// status.
//
Iosb.Information = Offset;
Iosb.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
DebugTrace(0, Dbg, ("Status -> %08lx\n", Iosb.Status));
DebugTrace(0, Dbg, ("Information -> %08lx\n", Iosb.Information));
DebugTrace(-1, Dbg, ("NtfsQueryEaUserEaList: Exit\n"));
return Iosb;
}IO_STATUS_BLOCKNtfsQueryEaUserEaList( IN PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION CurrentEas,
IN PEA_INFORMATION EaInformation,
OUT PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION EaBuffer,
IN ULONG UserBufferLength,
IN PFILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION UserEaList,
IN BOOLEAN ReturnSingleEntry
)/*++
Routine Description: This routine is the work routine for querying EAs given a list
of Ea's to search for.
Arguments: CurrentEas - This is a pointer to the current Eas for the file
EaInformation - This is a pointer to an Ea information attribute.
EaBuffer - Supplies the buffer to receive the full eas
UserBufferLength - Supplies the length, in bytes, of the user buffer
UserEaList - Supplies the user specified ea name list
ReturnSingleEntry - Indicates if we are to return a single entry or not
Return Value: IO_STATUS_BLOCK - Receives the completion status for the operation
--*/
{ IO_STATUS_BLOCK Iosb;
ULONG GeaOffset;
ULONG FeaOffset;
ULONG Offset;
PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION LastFullEa;
PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION NextFullEa;
PFILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION GetEa;
BOOLEAN Overflow;
ULONG PrevEaPadding;
PAGED_CODE();
DebugTrace(+1, Dbg, ("NtfsQueryEaUserEaList: Entered\n"));
//
// Setup pointer in the output buffer so we can track the Ea being
// written to it and the last Ea written.
//
LastFullEa = NULL;
Overflow = FALSE;
//
// Initialize our next offset value.
//
GeaOffset = 0;
Offset = 0;
PrevEaPadding = 0;
//
// Loop through all the entries in the user's ea list.
//
while (TRUE) {
STRING GeaName;
STRING OutputEaName;
ULONG RawEaSize;
//
// Get the next entry in the user's list.
//
GetEa = (PFILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION)Add2Ptr(UserEaList, GeaOffset);
//
// Make a string reference to the name and see if we can locate
// the ea by name.
//
GeaName.MaximumLength = GeaName.Length = GetEa->EaNameLength;
GeaName.Buffer = &GetEa->EaName[0];
//
// Upcase the name so we can do a case-insensitive compare.
//
NtfsUpcaseEaName(&GeaName, &GeaName);
//
// Check for a valid name.
//
if (!NtfsIsEaNameValid(GeaName)) {
DebugTrace(-1, Dbg, ("NtfsQueryEaUserEaList: Invalid Ea Name\n"));
Iosb.Information = GeaOffset;
Iosb.Status = STATUS_INVALID_EA_NAME;
return Iosb;
}
GeaOffset += GetEa->NextEntryOffset;
//
// If this is a duplicate name, then step over this entry.
//
if (NtfsIsDuplicateGeaName(GetEa, UserEaList)) {
//
// If we've exhausted the entries in the Get Ea list, then we are
// done.
//
if (GetEa->NextEntryOffset == 0) {
break;
}
else {
continue;
}
}
//
// Generate a pointer in the Ea buffer.
//
NextFullEa = (PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION)Add2Ptr(EaBuffer, Offset + PrevEaPadding);
//
// Try to find a matching Ea.
// If we couldn't, let's dummy up an Ea to give to the user.
//
if (!NtfsLocateEaByName(CurrentEas,
EaInformation->UnpackedEaSize,
&GeaName,
&FeaOffset)) {
//
// We were not able to locate the name therefore we must
// dummy up a entry for the query. The needed Ea size is
// the size of the name + 4 (next entry offset) + 1 (flags)
// + 1 (name length) + 2 (value length) + the name length +
// 1 (null byte).
//
RawEaSize = 4 + 1 + 1 + 2 + GetEa->EaNameLength + 1;
if ((RawEaSize + PrevEaPadding) > UserBufferLength) {
Overflow = TRUE;
break;
}
//
// Everything is going to work fine, so copy over the name,
// set the name length and zero out the rest of the ea.
//
NextFullEa->NextEntryOffset = 0;
NextFullEa->Flags = 0;
NextFullEa->EaNameLength = GetEa->EaNameLength;
NextFullEa->EaValueLength = 0;
RtlCopyMemory(&NextFullEa->EaName[0],
&GetEa->EaName[0],
GetEa->EaNameLength);
//
// Upcase the name in the buffer.
//
OutputEaName.MaximumLength = OutputEaName.Length = GeaName.Length;
OutputEaName.Buffer = NextFullEa->EaName;
NtfsUpcaseEaName(&OutputEaName, &OutputEaName);
NextFullEa->EaName[GetEa->EaNameLength] = 0;
//
// Otherwise return the Ea we found back to the user.
//
}
else {
PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION ThisEa;
//
// Reference this ea.
//
ThisEa = (PFILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION)Add2Ptr(CurrentEas, FeaOffset);
//
// Check if this Ea can fit in the user's buffer.
//
RawEaSize = RawUnpackedEaSize(ThisEa);
if (RawEaSize > (UserBufferLength - PrevEaPadding)) {
Overflow = TRUE;
break;
}
//
// Copy this ea to the user's buffer.
//
RtlCopyMemory(NextFullEa,
ThisEa,
RawEaSize);
NextFullEa->NextEntryOffset = 0;
}
//
// Compute the next offset in the user's buffer.
//
Offset += (RawEaSize + PrevEaPadding);
//
// If we were to return a single entry then break out of our loop
// now
//
if (ReturnSingleEntry) {
break;
}
//
// If we have a new Ea entry, go back and update the offset field
// of the previous Ea entry.
//
if (LastFullEa != NULL) {
LastFullEa->NextEntryOffset = PtrOffset(LastFullEa, NextFullEa);
}
//
// If we've exhausted the entries in the Get Ea list, then we are
// done.
//
if (GetEa->NextEntryOffset == 0) {
break;
}
//
// Remember this as the previous ea value. Also update the buffer
// length values and the buffer offset values.
//
LastFullEa = NextFullEa;
UserBufferLength -= (RawEaSize + PrevEaPadding);
//
// Now remember the padding bytes needed for this call.
//
PrevEaPadding = LongAlign(RawEaSize) - RawEaSize;
}
//
// If the Ea information won't fit in the user's buffer, then return
// an overflow status.
//
if (Overflow) {
Iosb.Information = 0;
Iosb.Status = STATUS_BUFFER_OVERFLOW;
//
// Otherwise return the length of the data returned.
//
}
else {
//
// Return the length of the buffer filled and a success
// status.
//
Iosb.Information = Offset;
Iosb.Status = STATUS_SUCCESS;
}
DebugTrace(0, Dbg, ("Status -> %08lx\n", Iosb.Status));
DebugTrace(0, Dbg, ("Information -> %08lx\n", Iosb.Information));
DebugTrace(-1, Dbg, ("NtfsQueryEaUserEaList: Exit\n"));
return Iosb;
}_QWORD *__fastcall NtfsQueryEaUserEaList(_QWORD *a1, _FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION *ea_blocks_for_file, __int64 out_buf, __int64 a4, unsigned int out_buf_length, _FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION *eaList, char a7)
{ int v8; // edi
unsigned int v9; // ebx
unsigned int padding; // er15
_FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION *GetEa; // r12
ULONG v12; // er14
unsigned __int8 v13; // r13
_FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION *curEaList; // rbx
unsigned int v15; // ebx
_DWORD *v16; // r13
unsigned int ea_block_size; // er14
unsigned int v18; // ebx
_FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION *ea_block; // rdx
char v21; // al
ULONG v22; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-38h]
unsigned int v23; // [rsp+24h] [rbp-34h] BYREF
_DWORD *v24; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-30h]
struct _STRING DestinationString; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-28h] BYREF
STRING SourceString; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-18h] BYREF
unsigned int offest; // [rsp+A0h] [rbp+48h]
v8 = 0;
*a1 = 0i64;
v24 = 0i64;
v9 = 0;
offest = 0;
padding = 0;
a1[1] = 0i64;
while ( 1 )
{ // 索引ealist中的成员，用作下面的查找。
GetEa = (_FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION *)((char *)eaList + v9);
*(_QWORD *)&DestinationString.Length = 0i64;
DestinationString.Buffer = 0i64;
*(_QWORD *)&SourceString.Length = 0i64;
SourceString.Buffer = 0i64;
*(_QWORD *)&DestinationString.Length = GetEa->EaNameLength;
DestinationString.MaximumLength = DestinationString.Length;
DestinationString.Buffer = GetEa->EaName;
RtlUpperString(&DestinationString, &DestinationString);
if ( !(unsigned __int8)NtfsIsEaNameValid(&DestinationString) )// 检查ealist中成员的name是否有效
break;
v12 = GetEa->NextEntryOffset;
v13 = GetEa->EaNameLength;
v22 = GetEa->NextEntryOffset + v9;
for ( curEaList = eaList; ; curEaList = (_FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION *)((char *)curEaList + curEaList->NextEntryOffset) )// 遍历查询的EaList
{
if ( curEaList == GetEa )
{
v15 = offest;
v16 = (_DWORD *)(a4 + padding + offest);
if ( (unsigned __int8)NtfsLocateEaByName(// 根据name查找对应的Ea信息
ea_blocks_for_file,
*(unsigned int *)(out_buf + 4),
&DestinationString,
&v23) )
{
ea_block = (_FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION *)((char *)ea_blocks_for_file + v23);
ea_block_size = ea_block->EaValueLength + ea_block->EaNameLength + 9;// 计算内存拷贝大小
if ( ea_block_size <= out_buf_length - padding )// 防溢出检查
// 两个uint32相减以后发生整数溢出绕过检查
{
memmove(v16, ea_block, ea_block_size);// 溢出点
*v16 = 0;
goto LABEL_8;
}
}
else
{
ea_block_size = GetEa->EaNameLength + 9;// 9=4(next entry offset)+1(flags)+1(name length)+2(value length)+1(null byte)
if ( ea_block_size + padding <= out_buf_length )
{
*v16 = 0;
*((_BYTE *)v16 + 4) = 0;
*((_BYTE *)v16 + 5) = GetEa->EaNameLength;
*((_WORD *)v16 + 3) = 0;
memmove(v16 + 2, GetEa->EaName, GetEa->EaNameLength);
SourceString.Length = DestinationString.Length;
SourceString.MaximumLength = DestinationString.Length;
SourceString.Buffer = (PCHAR)(v16 + 2);
RtlUpperString(&SourceString, &SourceString);
v15 = offest;
*((_BYTE *)v16 + GetEa->EaNameLength + 8) = 0;
LABEL_8: v18 = ea_block_size + padding + v15;
offest = v18;
if ( !a7 )
{
if ( v24 )
*v24 = (_DWORD)v16 - (_DWORD)v24;
if ( GetEa->NextEntryOffset ) // 判断是ealist中是否还有其他成员
{
v24 = v16;
out_buf_length -= ea_block_size + padding;// 总长度减去已经拷贝的长度
padding = ((ea_block_size + 3) & 0xFFFFFFFC) - ea_block_size;// padding的计算
goto LABEL_26;
}
}
LABEL_12: a1[1] = v18;
LABEL_13: *(_DWORD *)a1 = v8;
return a1;
}
}
v21 = NtfsStatusDebugFlags;
a1[1] = 0i64;
if ( v21 )
NtfsStatusTraceAndDebugInternal(0i64, 2147483653i64, 919406i64);
v8 = -2147483643;
goto LABEL_13;
}
if ( v13 == curEaList->EaNameLength && !memcmp(GetEa->EaName, curEaList->EaName, v13) )
break;
}
if ( !v12 )
{
v18 = offest;
goto LABEL_12;
}
LABEL_26: v9 = v22;
}
a1[1] = v9;
if ( NtfsStatusDebugFlags )
NtfsStatusTraceAndDebugInternal(0i64, 2147483667i64, 919230i64);
*(_DWORD *)a1 = -2147483629;
return a1;
}_QWORD *__fastcall NtfsQueryEaUserEaList(_QWORD *a1, _FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION *ea_blocks_for_file, __int64 out_buf, __int64 a4, unsigned int out_buf_length, _FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION *eaList, char a7)
{ int v8; // edi
unsigned int v9; // ebx
unsigned int padding; // er15
_FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION *GetEa; // r12
ULONG v12; // er14
unsigned __int8 v13; // r13
_FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION *curEaList; // rbx
unsigned int v15; // ebx
_DWORD *v16; // r13
unsigned int ea_block_size; // er14
unsigned int v18; // ebx
_FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION *ea_block; // rdx
char v21; // al
ULONG v22; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-38h]
unsigned int v23; // [rsp+24h] [rbp-34h] BYREF
_DWORD *v24; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-30h]
struct _STRING DestinationString; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-28h] BYREF
STRING SourceString; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-18h] BYREF
unsigned int offest; // [rsp+A0h] [rbp+48h]
v8 = 0;
*a1 = 0i64;
v24 = 0i64;
v9 = 0;
offest = 0;
padding = 0;
a1[1] = 0i64;
while ( 1 )
{ // 索引ealist中的成员，用作下面的查找。
GetEa = (_FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION *)((char *)eaList + v9);
*(_QWORD *)&DestinationString.Length = 0i64;
DestinationString.Buffer = 0i64;
*(_QWORD *)&SourceString.Length = 0i64;
SourceString.Buffer = 0i64;
*(_QWORD *)&DestinationString.Length = GetEa->EaNameLength;
DestinationString.MaximumLength = DestinationString.Length;
DestinationString.Buffer = GetEa->EaName;
RtlUpperString(&DestinationString, &DestinationString);
if ( !(unsigned __int8)NtfsIsEaNameValid(&DestinationString) )// 检查ealist中成员的name是否有效
break;
v12 = GetEa->NextEntryOffset;
v13 = GetEa->EaNameLength;
v22 = GetEa->NextEntryOffset + v9;
for ( curEaList = eaList; ; curEaList = (_FILE_GET_EA_INFORMATION *)((char *)curEaList + curEaList->NextEntryOffset) )// 遍历查询的EaList
{
if ( curEaList == GetEa )
{
v15 = offest;
v16 = (_DWORD *)(a4 + padding + offest);
if ( (unsigned __int8)NtfsLocateEaByName(// 根据name查找对应的Ea信息
ea_blocks_for_file,
*(unsigned int *)(out_buf + 4),
&DestinationString,
&v23) )
{
ea_block = (_FILE_FULL_EA_INFORMATION *)((char *)ea_blocks_for_file + v23);
ea_block_size = ea_block->EaValueLength + ea_block->EaNameLength + 9;// 计算内存拷贝大小
if ( ea_block_size <= out_buf_length - padding )// 防溢出检查
// 两个uint32相减以后发生整数溢出绕过检查
{
memmove(v16, ea_block, ea_block_size);// 溢出点
*v16 = 0;
goto LABEL_8;
}
}
else
{
ea_block_size = GetEa->EaNameLength + 9;// 9=4(next entry offset)+1(flags)+1(name length)+2(value length)+1(null byte)
if ( ea_block_size + padding <= out_buf_length )
{
*v16 = 0;
*((_BYTE *)v16 + 4) = 0;
*((_BYTE *)v16 + 5) = GetEa->EaNameLength;
*((_WORD *)v16 + 3) = 0;
memmove(v16 + 2, GetEa->EaName, GetEa->EaNameLength);
SourceString.Length = DestinationString.Length;
SourceString.MaximumLength = DestinationString.Length;
SourceString.Buffer = (PCHAR)(v16 + 2);
RtlUpperString(&SourceString, &SourceString);
v15 = offest;
*((_BYTE *)v16 + GetEa->EaNameLength + 8) = 0;
LABEL_8: v18 = ea_block_size + padding + v15;
offest = v18;
if ( !a7 )
{
if ( v24 )
*v24 = (_DWORD)v16 - (_DWORD)v24;
if ( GetEa->NextEntryOffset ) // 判断是ealist中是否还有其他成员
{
v24 = v16;
out_buf_length -= ea_block_size + padding;// 总长度减去已经拷贝的长度
padding = ((ea_block_size + 3) & 0xFFFFFFFC) - ea_block_size;// padding的计算
goto LABEL_26;
}
}
LABEL_12: a1[1] = v18;
LABEL_13: *(_DWORD *)a1 = v8;
return a1;
}
}
v21 = NtfsStatusDebugFlags;
a1[1] = 0i64;
if ( v21 )
NtfsStatusTraceAndDebugInternal(0i64, 2147483653i64, 919406i64);
v8 = -2147483643;
goto LABEL_13;
}
if ( v13 == curEaList->EaNameLength && !memcmp(GetEa->EaName, curEaList->EaName, v13) )
break;
}
if ( !v12 )
{
v18 = offest;
goto LABEL_12;
}
LABEL_26: v9 = v22;
}
a1[1] = v9;
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