首页
社区
课程
招聘
[原创]页切换引起的蓝屏之大公司的程序也不靠谱
发表于: 2017-9-19 19:37 6023

[原创]页切换引起的蓝屏之大公司的程序也不靠谱

2017-9-19 19:37
6023

      今晚回来的时候,刚开电脑启动到用户选择界面处,我还没有输入密码,过了一会就莫名的蓝屏然后重启了,幸好我的电脑设置了核心转储的设置,于是电脑很顺利的把DUMP保存下来了,之后再重启电脑,打开WINDBG看下这个DUMP到底是什么原因倒致蓝屏的。    

 

一般分析内核DUMP,WINDBG会提示你用!anaylze -v来看DUMP的相关信息.在执行上述指令后我们得到了相关的信息

1: kd> !analyze -v

*******************************************************************************

*                                                                             *

*                        Bugcheck Analysis                                    *

*                                                                             *

*******************************************************************************

PAGE_FAULT_IN_NONPAGED_AREA (50)

Invalid system memory was referenced.  This cannot be protected by try-except,

it must be protected by a Probe.  Typically the address is just plain bad or it

is pointing at freed memory.

Arguments:

Arg1: fffff8a002408000, memory referenced.

Arg2: 0000000000000000, value 0 = read operation, 1 = write operation.

Arg3: fffff88001aed3f0, If non-zero, the instruction address which referenced the bad memory

address.

Arg4: 0000000000000000, (reserved)

Debugging Details:

------------------

READ_ADDRESS:  fffff8a002408000 Paged pool

FAULTING_IP: 

nvpciflt+13f0

fffff880`01aed3f0 6642391c49      cmp     word ptr [rcx+r9*2],bx

MM_INTERNAL_CODE:  0

IMAGE_NAME:  nvpciflt.sys

DEBUG_FLR_IMAGE_TIMESTAMP:  52314e29

MODULE_NAME: nvpciflt

FAULTING_MODULE: fffff88001aec000 nvpciflt

DEFAULT_BUCKET_ID:  WIN7_DRIVER_FAULT

BUGCHECK_STR:  0x50

PROCESS_NAME:  svchost.exe

CURRENT_IRQL:  0

TRAP_FRAME:  fffff880043bd720 -- (.trap 0xfffff880043bd720)

NOTE: The trap frame does not contain all registers.

Some register values may be zeroed or incorrect.

rax=fffff8a002407f70 rbx=0000000000000000 rcx=fffff8a002407f80

rdx=fffffa800ab04b50 rsi=0000000000000000 rdi=0000000000000000

rip=fffff88001aed3f0 rsp=fffff880043bd8b0 rbp=fffff880043bdb60

 r8=0000000000000000  r9=0000000000000040 r10=fffffa8003f0f148

r11=fffffa800ab04b50 r12=0000000000000000 r13=0000000000000000

r14=0000000000000000 r15=0000000000000000

iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz ac pe nc

nvpciflt+0x13f0:

fffff880`01aed3f0 6642391c49      cmp     word ptr [rcx+r9*2],bx ds:fffff8a0`02408000=????

Resetting default scope

LAST_CONTROL_TRANSFER:  from fffff80004301be0 to fffff80004283b80

STACK_TEXT:  

fffff880`043bd5b8 fffff800`04301be0 : 00000000`00000050 fffff8a0`02408000 00000000`00000000 fffff880`043bd720 : nt!KeBugCheckEx

fffff880`043bd5c0 fffff800`04281cae : 00000000`00000000 fffff8a0`02408000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt! ?? ::FNODOBFM::`string'+0x4518f

fffff880`043bd720 fffff880`01aed3f0 : 00000000`00000000 fffff880`043bdb60 fffff880`043bda60 fffff880`043bd8f8 : nt!KiPageFault+0x16e

fffff880`043bd8b0 fffff800`0462f460 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 fffff8a0`02407f70 : nvpciflt+0x13f0

fffff880`043bd910 fffff800`04504b34 : 00000000`00000002 fffff880`043bda60 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000011 : nt!CmpCallCallBacks+0x1c0

fffff880`043bd9e0 fffff800`04282e13 : 00000000`00000624 fffffa80`0ab04b50 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!NtDeleteValueKey+0x2b3

fffff880`043bdae0 00000000`77c91e4a : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KiSystemServiceCopyEnd+0x13

00000000`01d3e538 00000000`00000000 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : 0x77c91e4a

STACK_COMMAND:  kb

FOLLOWUP_IP: 

nvpciflt+13f0

fffff880`01aed3f0 6642391c49      cmp     word ptr [rcx+r9*2],bx

SYMBOL_STACK_INDEX:  3

SYMBOL_NAME:  nvpciflt+13f0

FOLLOWUP_NAME:  MachineOwner

FAILURE_BUCKET_ID:  X64_0x50_nvpciflt+13f0

BUCKET_ID:  X64_0x50_nvpciflt+13f0

Followup: MachineOwner

---------

1: kd> !pcr 1

KPCR for Processor 1 at fffff88004900000:

    Major 1 Minor 1

NtTib.ExceptionList: fffff8800490b540

   NtTib.StackBase: fffff88004904f40

  NtTib.StackLimit: 0000000001d3e538

NtTib.SubSystemTib: fffff88004900000

     NtTib.Version: 0000000004900180

 NtTib.UserPointer: fffff880049007f0

     NtTib.SelfTib: 000007fffff86000

           SelfPcr: 0000000000000000

              Prcb: fffff88004900180

              Irql: 0000000000000000

               IRR: 0000000000000000

               IDR: 0000000000000000

     InterruptMode: 0000000000000000

               IDT: 0000000000000000

               GDT: 0000000000000000

               TSS: 0000000000000000

    CurrentThread: fffffa800ab04b50

        NextThread: 0000000000000000

        IdleThread: fffff8800490afc0

         DpcQueue: 

THREAD fffffa800ab04b50  Cid 0364.050c  Teb: 000007fffff86000 Win32Thread: 0000000000000000 RUNNING on processor 1

Not impersonating

DeviceMap                 fffff8a000008aa0

Owning Process            fffffa80078b4b30      Image:        svchost.exe

Attached Process          N/A            Image:         N/A

Wait Start TickCount      4313           Ticks: 0

Context Switch Count      3239           IdealProcessor: 2             

UserTime                  00:00:00.046

KernelTime                00:00:00.109

Win32 Start Address 0x0000000077c5fbf0

Stack Init fffff880043bdc70 Current fffff880043bd680

Base fffff880043be000 Limit fffff880043b8000 Call 0

Priority 8 BasePriority 8 UnusualBoost 0 ForegroundBoost 0 IoPriority 2 PagePriority 5

Child-SP          RetAddr           : Args to Child                                                           : Call Site

fffff880`043bd5b8 fffff800`04301be0 : 00000000`00000050 fffff8a0`02408000 00000000`00000000 fffff880`043bd720 : nt!KeBugCheckEx

fffff880`043bd5c0 fffff800`04281cae : 00000000`00000000 fffff8a0`02408000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt! ?? ::FNODOBFM::`string'+0x4518f

fffff880`043bd720 fffff880`01aed3f0 : 00000000`00000000 fffff880`043bdb60 fffff880`043bda60 fffff880`043bd8f8 : nt!KiPageFault+0x16e (TrapFrame @ fffff880`043bd720)

fffff880`043bd8b0 fffff800`0462f460 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 fffff8a0`02407f70 : nvpciflt+0x13f0

fffff880`043bd910 fffff800`04504b34 : 00000000`00000002 fffff880`043bda60 00000000`00000001 00000000`00000011 : nt!CmpCallCallBacks+0x1c0

fffff880`043bd9e0 fffff800`04282e13 : 00000000`00000624 fffffa80`0ab04b50 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!NtDeleteValueKey+0x2b3

fffff880`043bdae0 00000000`77c91e4a : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : nt!KiSystemServiceCopyEnd+0x13 (TrapFrame @ fffff880`043bdae0)

00000000`01d3e538 00000000`00000000 : 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 00000000`00000000 : 0x77c91e4a


确实这个过程和用!analyze -v分析的栈信息一致.如果我们还在怀疑的话我们可以读取下当前CPU的CR3寄存器,看下当前CR3这个寄存器里的值是否和这个进程一致

1: kd> r cr3


[注意]传递专业知识、拓宽行业人脉——看雪讲师团队等你加入!

收藏
免费 1
支持
分享
最新回复 (3)
雪    币: 12848
活跃值: (9147)
能力值: ( LV9,RANK:280 )
在线值:
发帖
回帖
粉丝
2
老黄的驱动不是一向各种随意么  之前还被爆出各种内核溢出漏洞
2017-9-19 21:18
0
雪    币: 615
活跃值: (590)
能力值: ( LV4,RANK:40 )
在线值:
发帖
回帖
粉丝
3
学习,原来不以NULL结尾是这个意思。学习了。内核编程比应用层麻烦多了。
2017-9-20 08:36
0
雪    币: 3738
活跃值: (3872)
能力值: ( LV4,RANK:50 )
在线值:
发帖
回帖
粉丝
4
感谢分享分析dump过程!
2017-9-21 13:13
0
游客
登录 | 注册 方可回帖
返回
//