HEVD学习笔记目录：
一.前言
HEVD作为一个优秀的内核漏洞靶场受到大家的喜欢，靶场地址 HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver。这里选择x86的驱动来进行黑盒测试学习内核漏洞，作为学习笔记记录下来。
实验环境:
| 操作系统 | Win 7 X86 |
| 调试器 | WinDbg，IDA Pro |
| 编译器 | Visual Studio 2017 |
二.驱动信息
1.WinDbg
装载驱动以后首先使用WinDbg查看驱动的内容
SXS.DLL: Read 0 bytes from XML stream; HRESULT returned = 0x00000000
SXS.DLL: Creating 756 byte file mapping
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HackSys Extreme Vulnerable Driver
Version: 3.00
[+] HackSys Extreme Vulnerable Driver Loaded
2: kd> lm m HEVD
start end module name
98c78000 98cc2000 HEVD (deferred)
2: kd> !drvobj HEVD 2
Driver object (87d68b90) is for:
*** ERROR: Module load completed but symbols could not be loaded for HEVD.sys
\Driver\HEVD
DriverEntry: 98cc00ea HEVD
DriverStartIo: 00000000
DriverUnload: 98cbc000 HEVD
AddDevice: 00000000
Dispatch routines:
[00] IRP_MJ_CREATE 98cbc048 HEVD+0x44048
[01] IRP_MJ_CREATE_NAMED_PIPE 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[02] IRP_MJ_CLOSE 98cbc048 HEVD+0x44048
[03] IRP_MJ_READ 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[04] IRP_MJ_WRITE 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[05] IRP_MJ_QUERY_INFORMATION 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[06] IRP_MJ_SET_INFORMATION 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[07] IRP_MJ_QUERY_EA 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[08] IRP_MJ_SET_EA 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[09] IRP_MJ_FLUSH_BUFFERS 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[0a] IRP_MJ_QUERY_VOLUME_INFORMATION 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[0b] IRP_MJ_SET_VOLUME_INFORMATION 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[0c] IRP_MJ_DIRECTORY_CONTROL 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[0d] IRP_MJ_FILE_SYSTEM_CONTROL 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[0e] IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL 98cbc064 HEVD+0x44064
[0f] IRP_MJ_INTERNAL_DEVICE_CONTROL 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[10] IRP_MJ_SHUTDOWN 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[11] IRP_MJ_LOCK_CONTROL 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[12] IRP_MJ_CLEANUP 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[13] IRP_MJ_CREATE_MAILSLOT 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[14] IRP_MJ_QUERY_SECURITY 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[15] IRP_MJ_SET_SECURITY 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[16] IRP_MJ_POWER 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[17] IRP_MJ_SYSTEM_CONTROL 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[18] IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CHANGE 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[19] IRP_MJ_QUERY_QUOTA 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[1a] IRP_MJ_SET_QUOTA 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
[1b] IRP_MJ_PNP 98cbc5c2 HEVD+0x445c2
驱动装载的地址是0x98C78000，DriverEntry的地址是0x98CC00EA，所以DriverEntry的偏移地址是0x480EA。IRP_MJ_DEVICE_CONTROL的分发函数偏移地址0x44064。
2.IDA Pro
使用IDA对驱动进行分析，可以看到在DriverEntry首先是创建了设备对象
INIT:00448036 push eax ; DeviceObject
INIT:00448037 push edi ; Exclusive
INIT:00448038 push FILE_DEVICE_SECURE_OPEN ; DeviceCharacteristics
INIT:0044803D push FILE_DEVICE_UNKNOWN ; DeviceType
INIT:0044803F lea eax, [ebp+DestinationString]
INIT:00448042 push eax ; DeviceName
INIT:00448043 push edi ; DeviceExtensionSize
INIT:00448044 push ebx ; DriverObject
INIT:00448045 call ds:IoCreateDevice
随后就是对分发函数的赋值以及符号链接的创建
INIT:00448075 push 1Ch
INIT:00448077 pop ecx
INIT:00448078 mov eax, offset DispatchCommon
INIT:0044807D lea edi, [ebx+DRIVER_OBJECT.MajorFunction]
INIT:00448080 rep stosd
INIT:00448082 mov eax, offset DispatchCreateAndClose
INIT:00448087 mov dword ptr [ebx+70h], offset DispatchIoCtrl
INIT:0044808E mov [ebx+38h], eax
INIT:00448091 mov [ebx+40h], eax
INIT:00448094 mov eax, [ebp+DeviceObject]
INIT:00448097 mov [ebx+_DRIVER_OBJECT.DriverUnload], offset DriverUnload
INIT:0044809E or [eax+DEVICE_OBJECT.Flags], DO_DIRECT_IO
INIT:004480A2 mov eax, [ebp+DeviceObject]
INIT:004480A5 and [eax+DEVICE_OBJECT.Flags], 0FFFFFF7Fh
INIT:004480AC lea eax, [ebp+DestinationString]
INIT:004480AF push eax ; DeviceName
INIT:004480B0 lea eax, [ebp+SymbolicLinkName]
INIT:004480B3 push eax ; SymbolicLinkName
INIT:004480B4 call ds:IoCreateSymbolicLink
而根据IDA识别的结果就可以得知符号名，根据符号名就可以完成和驱动的连接与通信
INIT:00448134 aDeviceHacksyse: ; DATA XREF: DriverEntry(x,x)+14↑o
INIT:00448134 text "UTF-16LE", '\Device\HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver',0
INIT:00448182 ; const WCHAR aDosdevicesHack_0
INIT:00448182 aDosdevicesHack_0: ; DATA XREF: DriverEntry(x,x)+25↑o
INIT:00448182 text "UTF-16LE", '\DosDevices\HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver',0
而在DispatchIoCtrl中，程序将IoControlCode取出减去0x222003以后得到下标，在用这个下标从Index_Table中取出函数地址表的下标。在根据这个地址表的下标从Func_Table中获得函数地址以后跳转到该函数执行
PAGE:00444064 ; int __stdcall DispatchIoCtrl(int, PIRP Irp)
PAGE:00444064 DispatchIoCtrl proc near ; DATA XREF: DriverEntry(x,x)+87↓o
PAGE:00444064
PAGE:00444064 Irp = dword ptr 0Ch
PAGE:00444064
PAGE:00444064 push ebp
PAGE:00444065 mov ebp, esp
PAGE:00444067 push ebx
PAGE:00444068 push esi
PAGE:00444069 push edi
PAGE:0044406A mov edi, [ebp+Irp]
PAGE:0044406D mov ebx, STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED
PAGE:00444072 mov eax, [edi+60h] ; 取出CurrentStackLocation指针赋给eax
PAGE:00444075 test eax, eax
PAGE:00444077 jz loc_4444C5
PAGE:0044407D mov ebx, eax
PAGE:0044407F mov ecx, [ebx+IO_STACK_LOCATION.Parameters.DeviceIoControl.IoControlCode]
PAGE:00444082 lea eax, [ecx-222003h] ; switch 109 cases
PAGE:00444088 cmp eax, 6Ch
PAGE:0044408B ja loc_4444AD ; jumptable 00444098 default case
PAGE:00444091 movzx eax, ds:Index_Table[eax]
PAGE:00444098 jmp ds:Func_Table[eax*4] ; switch jump
而这两张表的内容如下，其中的FuncTable中的每一个地址都代表了不同的漏洞
PAGE:004444E0 Func_Table dd offset loc_44409F, offset loc_4440CF, offset loc_4440F1
PAGE:004444E0 ; DATA XREF: DispatchIoCtrl+34↑r
PAGE:004444E0 dd offset loc_444113, offset loc_444135, offset loc_44415A ; jump table for switch statement
PAGE:004444E0 dd offset loc_44417F, offset loc_4441A4, offset loc_4441C9
PAGE:004444E0 dd offset loc_4441EE, offset loc_444213, offset loc_444238
PAGE:004444E0 dd offset loc_44425D, offset loc_444282, offset loc_4442A7
PAGE:004444E0 dd offset loc_4442CC, offset loc_4442F1, offset loc_444316
PAGE:004444E0 dd offset loc_44433B, offset loc_444360, offset loc_444385
PAGE:004444E0 dd offset loc_4443AA, offset loc_4443CF, offset loc_4443F4
PAGE:004444E0 dd offset loc_444419, offset loc_44443E, offset loc_444463
PAGE:004444E0 dd offset loc_444488, offset loc_4444AD
PAGE:00444554 Index_Table db 0, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 ; DATA XREF: DispatchIoCtrl+2D↑r
PAGE:00444554 db 1, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch ; indirect table for switch statement
PAGE:00444554 db 2, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 3, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 4, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 5, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 6, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 7, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 8, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 9, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 0Ah, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 0Bh, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 0Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 0Dh, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 0Eh, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 0Fh, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 10h, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 11h, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 12h, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 13h, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 14h, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 15h, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 16h, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 17h, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 18h, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 19h, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 1Ah, 1Ch, 1Ch, 1Ch
PAGE:00444554 db 1Bh
PAGE:004445C1 align 2
如果取出的函数地址表的下标是0x1C，那么对应的就是最后一个跳转地址，也就是loc_4444AD。而这个地址中的代码是在告知用户，发送的IOCTL是不合法的IOCTL
PAGE:004444AD loc_4444AD: ; CODE XREF: DispatchIoCtrl+27↑j
PAGE:004444AD ; DispatchIoCtrl+34↑j
PAGE:004444AD ; DATA XREF: ...
PAGE:004444AD push ecx ; jumptable 00444098 default case
PAGE:004444AE push offset aInvalidIoctlCo ; "[-] Invalid IOCTL Code: 0x%X\n"
PAGE:004444B3 push 3 ; Level
PAGE:004444B5 push DPFLTR_IHVDRIVER_ID ; ComponentId
PAGE:004444B7 call ds:DbgPrintEx
PAGE:004444BD add esp, 10h
PAGE:004444C0 mov ebx, STATUS_INVALID_DEVICE_REQUEST
PAGE:004444C5
PAGE:004444C5 loc_4444C5: ; CODE XREF: DispatchIoCtrl+13↑j
PAGE:004444C5 ; DispatchIoCtrl+66↑j
PAGE:004444C5 and [edi+_IRP.IoStatus.Information], 0
PAGE:004444C9 xor dl, dl ; PriorityBoost
PAGE:004444CB mov ecx, edi ; Irp
PAGE:004444CD mov [edi+_IRP.IoStatus.anonymous_0.Status], ebx
PAGE:004444D0 call ds:IofCompleteRequest
PAGE:004444D6 pop edi
PAGE:004444D7 pop esi
PAGE:004444D8 mov eax, ebx
PAGE:004444DA pop ebx
PAGE:004444DB pop ebp
PAGE:004444DC retn 8
PAGE:004444DC DispatchIoCtrl endp
这就可以知道，要触发不同的漏洞，IOCTL是从0x222003开始，每次都要增加4，最多可以增加0x1B次。
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最后于 2022-1-20 18:22
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