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[旧帖] Itunes 11 反调试 0.00雪花
发表于: 2013-4-21 16:41 12619

[旧帖] Itunes 11 反调试 0.00雪花

2013-4-21 16:41
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雪    币: 195
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我处理了isdebuggerpresent,exitprocess,terminateprocess,加载了调试器后仍然会退出,请高手指点
2013-4-21 17:44
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雪    币: 190
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貌似我直接加载可以跑起来。。。
2013-4-21 18:41
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雪    币: 115
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楼上应该是弄过Dbghelp.dll那个溢出漏洞
2013-4-21 19:41
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雪    币: 195
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能具体讲讲么,折腾好几个小时了
2013-4-21 20:23
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雪    币: 195
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你做了什么特殊处理么?我折腾半天都不成
2013-4-21 20:36
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雪    币: 190
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可能是版本问题把,我貌似有一版老的直接是isdebugpresent的,strongOD直接载入了,应该和楼主版本不同把,后面我还试过一款,是11的,它有isdebugpresent检测,但是这个代码貌似没用,应该还有其他的检测手段,当时不了了之了。楼主加油把
2013-4-21 21:10
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雪    币: 115
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在论坛搜索一下VMP溢出漏洞,具体做法是把1M大的dbghelp.dll替换原来的,有机会导致溢出
2013-4-21 21:38
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雪    币: 1839
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没发现有反调试的东西。。。。。。。。。。。。。。
2013-4-23 10:32
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雪    币: 107
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纯净OD + StrongOD 表示无压力...
2013-4-23 10:35
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雪    币: 228
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11
原版OD 加SOD 可以调试,如果不可以可能是插件的问题.
2013-4-23 17:04
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还真有不过是在itunes.dll里面,如果有判断加载调试器,就自动退出。不过老大我查了你的帖子,它计算kbsync还是一头雾水,不知道怎么做的。高手能给讲讲么。非常感谢
2013-4-24 14:34
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还真有不过是在itunes.dll里面,如果有判断加载调试器,就自动退出。不过老大我查了你的帖子,它计算kbsync还是一头雾水,不知道怎么做的。高手能给讲讲么。非常感谢
2013-4-25 09:26
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雪    币: 195
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搞定了,成功计算kbsync
2013-5-18 17:46
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我破了kbsync,如果有需要,可以加qq私聊。 1499785600
2013-5-28 22:17
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卡在kbsync痛苦中
2013-5-31 19:31
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终于搞定了- - 万岁
2013-6-6 11:46
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这样绕过 ptrace

http://www.coredump.gr/articles/ios-anti-debugging-protections-part-1/

iOS Anti-Debugging Protections #1
Many iOS applications use anti-debugging techniques to prevent malicious users from using a debugger to analyze or modify their behavior. In this first part of the iOS anti-debugging series I will describe one of the most commonly used anti-debugging techniques in iOS nowadays and provide ways to bypass it.

Using ptrace with PT_DENY_ATTACH
Ptrace is a system call that is primarily used to trace and debug applications. The ptrace call is defined as:

int ptrace(int request, pid_t pid, caddr_t addr, int data);
The first argument (request) specifies the operation to perform. All valid operations are defined in /usr/include/sys/ptrace.h. One of the operations is called PT_DENY_ATTACH and has the value 31. When the request is set to that value the application informs the operating system that it doesn’t want to be traced or debugged. Any attempts to trace the process will be denied and the application will receive a segmentation violation.

The following block of code contains an example C program that uses the ptrace call to prevent GDB from debugging it. Currently, GDB is the only debugger that works on iOS devices. The following paragraphs contain an analysis of the protection as well as ways to bypass it.

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int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
    ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH, 0, 0, 0);
    printf("Try to attach to me!");
    while (1)
    {
        sleep(1);
        printf(".");
        fflush(stdout);
    }
    return 0;
}
The call to activate the protection is on line 3:

ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH, 0, 0, 0);
When the request is set to PT_DENY_ATTACH all other arguments aren’t used and set to zero.

First, let’s examine the effects of this protection. We will run the application in one terminal and try to attach using GDB in another:

tl0gic:~ mobile$ ./ptrace
Try to attach to me!........
Now we try to attach with GDB:

tl0gic:~ mobile$ ps ax | grep ptrace
2761 s000 S+ 0:00.05 ./ptrace
2774 s001 R+ 0:00.01 grep ptrace
tl0gic:~ mobile$ gdb -p 2761
/private/var/mobile/2761: No such file or directory
Attaching to process 2761.
Segmentation fault: 11
tl0gic:~ mobile$
As you can see GDB terminated with a segmentation fault.

Next, let’s try to start the application from GDB:

tl0gic:~ mobile$ gdb ./ptrace
Reading symbols for shared libraries . done
(gdb) run
Starting program: /private/var/mobile/ptrace
Reading symbols for shared libraries ...................... done
  
Program exited with code 055.
(gdb)
The application was terminated with exit code 055.

Bypassing ptrace
In the following paragraphs we will describe two different ways to bypass the ptrace protection. In the first, we will modify the arguments of ptrace to invalidate the call, and in the second we will do a memory patch to replace the ptrace call with NOP instructions.

Method 1 – modifying the arguments to ptrace
First, start GDB with the process we want to debug:

$ gdb ./ptrace
Then, setup a breakpoint on ptrace:
(gdb) break ptrace
Function "ptrace" not defined.
Make breakpoint pending on future shared library load? (y or [n]) y
  
Breakpoint 1 (ptrace) pending.
Note that GDB complains that ptrace isn’t defined. This is normal just select“”y” as the answer. The next step is to start the process. It will take some time for GDB to load all the symbols. At the end it will notify us that it resolved the ptrace symbol and was able to setup the breakpoint. Once the process is started the breakpoint is hit and we are back at the GDB prompt.

Starting program: /private/var/mobile/ptrace
Reading symbols for shared libraries ...................... done
Breakpoint 1 at 0x30e6f3a8
Pending breakpoint 1 - "ptrace" resolved
  
Breakpoint 1, 0x30e6f3a8 in ptrace ()
(gdb)
Let’s examine the registers. On ARM CPUs the first four registers (r0 to r3) contain the first four arguments to a function call. Since ptrace accepts exactly four arguments we can just print the first four registers to examine the contents of the arguments.

(gdb) info registers r0 r1 r2 r3
r0 0x1f 31
r1 0x0 0
r2 0x0 0
r3 0x0 0
As you can see, r0 contains the number 31, which is the value of PT_DENY_ATTACH. The other registers are all set to zero. As we discussed above when ptrace is invoked with the request set to PT_DENY_ATTACH all other arguments aren’t used so they are set to zero.

At this point we will replace the first argument with an invalid value. Ptrace will try to execute the invalid request and return an error instead. Most applications don’t really check the return value of ptrace for errors and therefore we can get away with it.

(gdb) set $r0=-1
(gdb) continue
Continuing.
Try to attach to me!.....
As you can see the application is running with GDB attached ?7?2

Method 2 - memory patch
The second way is to do a memory patch when the application is running and remove the call to ptrace completely. We will use otool to disassemble the binary and find the address we need to patch. Then, we will load the application in GDB and patch it.

Lets start by disassembling the application and locating the call to ptrace:

$ otool -tV ./ptrace
  
00002f20 4610 cpy r0, r2
00002f22 4619 cpy r1, r3
00002f24 461a cpy r2, r3
00002f26 e868f000 blx 0x2ff8 ; symbol stub for: _ptrace
00002f2a 019ef240 blx 0x243268
00002f2e 0100f2c0 blx 0x2c3130
00002f32 4479 add r1, pc
From the disassembly above we can see that the call to ptrace in this binary happens at address 0x2f26 (instruction “blx 0x2ff8”). Also, the opcode is 4 bytes long. Therefore, to completely remove the call we need to replace 4 bytes at address 0x2f26 with one or more instructions that don’t do anything (NOP). There are several opcodes for NOP instructions in ARM, in this patch we will use 0xbf00.

First, we will load the application in GDB and examine the disassembly of address 0x2f26 (where the call to ptrace is):

tl0gic:~ mobile$ gdb ./ptrace
Reading symbols for shared libraries . done
(gdb) x/5i 0x2f26
0x2f26 : blx 0x2ff8
0x2f2a : movw r1, #158 ; 0x9e
0x2f2e : movt r1, #0 ; 0x0
0x2f32 : add r1, pc
0x2f34 : str r0, [sp, #16]
Then, we will setup a breakpoint in main() and start our application. We need to do that because GDB doesn’t have write access to the process’ memory unless the application is running.

(gdb) b main
Breakpoint 1 at 0x2f0e
(gdb) run
Starting program: /private/var/mobile/ptrace
Reading symbols for shared libraries ...................... done
  
Breakpoint 1, 0x00002f0e in main ()
Now that the breakpoint is hit we are back in GDB and we can perform the memory patch:

(gdb) set *(long *)0x2f26 = 0xbf00bf00
Note that we are casting the address 0x2f26 to a type of long so that GDB knows how many bytes to write at the address. In this case we know that the call to ptrace is 4 bytes long so we are using a long type which is also 4 bytes. Note that the value we are writing is 0xbf00bf00 and contains two NOPs. We need to use two NOPs because each NOP is two bytes. After we execute the command we will examine the disassembly one more time to verify that we patched the application properly:

(gdb) x/5i 0x2f26
0x2f26 : nop
0x2f28 : nop
0x2f2a : movw r1, #158 ; 0x9e
0x2f2e : movt r1, #0 ; 0x0
0x2f32 : add r1, pc
(gdb) continue
Continuing.
Try to attach to me!.........
As you can see the instruction at address 0x2f26 is a NOP instruction and is followed by another NOP instruction. The call to ptrace is completely gone. We can now use the GDB command “continue” to continue execution.

==

http://www.coredump.gr/articles/ios-anti-debugging-protections-part-2/

iOS Anti-Debugging Protections #2
In the previous part (iOS Anti-Debugging Protections: Part 1) we discussed about ptrace and how it can be used to prevent a debugger from attaching to a process. This post describes a technique that is commonly used to detect the presence of a debugger. Note that unlike the ptrace technique this method doesn’t prevent a debugger from attaching to a process. Instead, it uses the sysctl function to retrieve information about the process and determine whether it is being debugged. Apple has an article in their Mac Technical Q&As with sample code that uses this method: Detecting the Debugger

The sysctl call is defined as:

int sysctl(int *name, u_int namelen, void *oldp, size_t *oldlenp, void *newp, size_t newlen);
The first argument name is an array of integers that describe the type of information we are requesting. Apple describes this name as a “Management Information Base” (MIB) style name in the sysctl man page. The second argument contains the number of integers in the name array. The third and fourth arguments hold the output buffer and the output buffer size respectively. These arguments will be populated with the requested information when the function returns. Arguments five and six are only used when setting information.

The following block of code contains an example C program that uses a sysctl call to determine whether it is being debugged. The next paragraphs contain an analysis of the protection as well as information on how to bypass it.

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#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
  
static int is_debugger_present(void)
{
    int name[4];
    struct kinfo_proc info;
    size_t info_size = sizeof(info);
  
    info.kp_proc.p_flag = 0;
  
    name[0] = CTL_KERN;
    name[1] = KERN_PROC;
    name[2] = KERN_PROC_PID;
    name[3] = getpid();
  
    if (sysctl(name, 4, &info, &info_size, NULL, 0) == -1) {
        perror("sysctl");
        exit(-1);
    }
    return ((info.kp_proc.p_flag & P_TRACED) != 0);
}
  
int main (int argc, const char * argv[])
{
    printf("Looping forever");
    fflush(stdout);
    while (1)
    {
        sleep(1);
        if (is_debugger_present())
        {
            printf("Debugger detected! Terminating...\n");
            return -1;
        }
        printf(".");
        fflush(stdout);
    }
    return 0;
}
The call to sysctl is on line 20:

sysctl(name, 4, &info, &info_size, NULL, 0)
First, lets analyze the arguments of the sysctl call. The first argument name is initialized as:

name[0] = CTL_KERN;
name[1] = KERN_PROC;
name[2] = KERN_PROC_PID;
name[3] = getpid();
The item at index 0 is set to CTL_KERN. This is the top-level name for kernel-specific information. All the available top-level names have a prefix of “CTL_” and are defined in the header file /usr/include/sys/sysctl.h. The item at index 1 is set to KERN_PROC. This indicates that sysctl will return a struct with process entries. The next item KERN_PROC_PID specifies that the target process will be selected based on a process ID (PID). Finally, the last item is the PID of that process.

The second argument of sysctl (size) is set to 4 since this is the total number of items in the name. Arguments three and four are set to the output buffer and its size. The output buffer is a struct of type kinfo_proc which is defined in /usr/include/sys/sysctl.h. The struct contains another struct (kp_proc) of type extern_proc that is defined in /usr/include/sys/proc.h. The kp_proc struct contains information about the process including a flag (p_flag) that describes the process state. All the valid values for p_flag can be found in /usr/include/sys/proc.h. The following block contains some sample values from that file:

#define P_TIMEOUT       0x00000400  /* Timing out during sleep */
#define P_TRACED        0x00000800  /* Debugged process being traced */
#define P_DISABLE_ASLR  0x00001000  /* Disable ASLR */
The P_TRACED value is set when the process is being debugged. The following line of code in the sample program checks if the value is set:

return ((info.kp_proc.p_flag & P_TRACED) != 0);
Bypassing the sysctl check
This type of check can be bypassed by clearing the contents of the p_flag variable after the call returns. The following paragraphs contain step-by-step instructions on how to accomplish that with the help of GDB.

First, load the application in GDB:

tl0gic:~ mobile$ gdb ./sysctl
Reading symbols for shared libraries . done
(gdb)
Setup a conditional breakpoint on sysctl:

(gdb) break sysctl if $r1==4 && *(int *)$r0==1 && *(int *)($r0+4)==14 && *(int *)($r0+8)==1
This breakpoint will be triggered only if the size argument of sysctl (in $r1) has a value of 4 and the first three items in the name array (at addresses $r0, $r0+4, and $r0+8) are equal to CTL_KERN (1), KERN_PROC (14) and KERN_PROC_PID (1).

Run the process until the breakpoint is hit:

(gdb) run
Starting program: /private/var/mobile/sysctl
Reading symbols for shared libraries ...................... done
Looping forever
Breakpoint 1, 0x35b60672 in sysctl ()
(gdb)
Save the value of $r2, this is the address of output buffer where sysctl will store the process information: (gdb) set $pinfo=$r2

Continue executing until the sysctl call is complete:
(gdb) finish
Run till exit from #0  0x35b60672 in sysctl ()
0x00002ed6 in is_debugger_present ()
(gdb)
Before we continue to the next step we need to setup a breakpoint at the end of sysctl. We will use that breakpoint later to automate this process (don’t worry about the breakpoint condition for now):

(gdb) break *$pc if $pinfo!=-1
Now we need to find the exact offset of the p_flag value inside the output buffer. There are two ways to accomplish that:

Sum the bytes for each of the struct elements that precede the p_flag
Disassemble the sample application and find how the compiler calculates it.
We will go with the second option. The following block contains the disassembly for the is_debugger_present function:

_is_debugger_present:
00002e68        b580    push    {r7, lr}
00002e6a        466f    mov r7, sp
00002e6c    f5ad7d05    sub.w   sp, sp, #532    @ 0x214
00002e70    f24010c0    movw    r0, 0x1c0
00002e74    f2c00000    movt    r0, 0x0
00002e78        4478    add r0, pc
00002e7a        6800    ldr r0, [r0, #0]
00002e7c        6800    ldr r0, [r0, #0]
00002e7e        9084    str r0, [sp, #528]
00002e80        2001    movs    r0, #1
00002e82    f2c00000    movt    r0, 0x0
00002e86        210e    movs    r1, #14
00002e88    f2c00100    movt    r1, 0x0
00002e8c        2200    movs    r2, #0
00002e8e    f2c00200    movt    r2, 0x0
00002e92    f24013ec    movw    r3, 0x1ec
00002e96    f2c00300    movt    r3, 0x0
00002e9a        9304    str r3, [sp, #16]
00002e9c        9209    str r2, [sp, #36]
00002e9e        9080    str r0, [sp, #512]
00002ea0        9181    str r1, [sp, #516]
00002ea2        9082    str r0, [sp, #520]
00002ea4    f000e8a2    blx 0x2fec  @ symbol stub for: _getpid
00002ea8        2104    movs    r1, #4
00002eaa    f2c00100    movt    r1, 0x0
00002eae        ab04    add r3, sp, #16
00002eb0        2200    movs    r2, #0
00002eb2    f2c00200    movt    r2, 0x0
00002eb6    f10d0914    add.w   r9, sp, #20 @ 0x14
00002eba    f50d7c00    add.w   ip, sp, #512    @ 0x200
00002ebe        9083    str r0, [sp, #524]
00002ec0        4660    mov r0, ip
00002ec2        9203    str r2, [sp, #12]
00002ec4        464a    mov r2, r9
00002ec6    f8dd900c    ldr.w   r9, [sp, #12]
00002eca    f8cd9000    str.w   r9, [sp]
00002ece    f8cd9004    str.w   r9, [sp, #4]
00002ed2    f000e894    blx 0x2ffc  @ symbol stub for: _sysctl
00002ed6    f1100f01    cmn.w   r0, #1  @ 0x1
00002eda        d10c    bne.n   0x2ef6
00002edc    f24000f1    movw    r0, 0xf1
00002ee0    f2c00000    movt    r0, 0x0
00002ee4        4478    add r0, pc
00002ee6    f000e884    blx 0x2ff0  @ symbol stub for: _perror
00002eea    f64f70ff    movw    r0, 0xffff
00002eee    f6cf70ff    movt    r0, 0xffff
00002ef2    f000e878    blx 0x2fe4  @ symbol stub for: _exit
00002ef6    f240103a    movw    r0, 0x13a
00002efa    f2c00000    movt    r0, 0x0
00002efe        4478    add r0, pc
00002f00        6800    ldr r0, [r0, #0]
00002f02        9909    ldr r1, [sp, #36]
00002f04    f4016100    and.w   r1, r1, #2048   @ 0x800
00002f08        6800    ldr r0, [r0, #0]
00002f0a        9a84    ldr r2, [sp, #528]
00002f0c        4290    cmp r0, r2
00002f0e        9102    str r1, [sp, #8]
00002f10        d103    bne.n   0x2f1a
00002f12        9802    ldr r0, [sp, #8]
00002f14    f50d7d05    add.w   sp, sp, #532    @ 0x214
00002f18        bd80    pop {r7, pc}
At 0x2eb6 the base address of the kinfo_proc struct is calculated as $sp+20 and loaded in $r9. Then, at 0x2ec4 the address is copied into $r2 (the third argument of sysctl). Once the sysctl call (at 0x2f02) has returned the p_flag value is loaded as $sp+36. Therefore, the offset of the p_flag is $sp+20-($sp+36) = 16 bytes. However, $r2 contains the address of the kinfo_struct and not the actual contents. To access the value of the p_flag we will have to use a pointer as illustrated below:

(gdb) printf "0x%x\n", *(int *)($pinfo+16)
0x5802
The value of P_TRACED is 0×800. Therefore, a logical end with the current value should return 0×800 (or 2048 in base 10) when the flag is set:

(gdb) print (*(int *)($pinfo+16) & 0x800)
$5 = 2048
The flag is correctly set (since we have a debugger attached to the process). The next step is to clear it:

(gdb) set $pflag = (*(int *)($pinfo+16))
(gdb) set *(int *)($pinfo+16) = $pflag & ~0x800
Let’s print the value one more time to verify that it’s properly cleared:

(gdb) print (*(int *)($pinfo+16) & 0x800)
$6 = 0
Now that the flag is cleared we can continue executing the process:

(gdb) continue
Continuing.
.
Breakpoint 1, 0x35b60672 in sysctl ()
(gdb)
The breakpoint is hit again because the application is running the sysctl check inside a while loop. We need to have GDB execute all the commands we used above every time a breakpoint is triggered. To accomplish that we can use the “commands” gdb command: GDB commands for the sysctl breakpoint:

commands 1
silent
set $pinfo=$r2
continue
end
GDB commands for the breakpoint after sysctl has returned:

commands 2
silent
set $pflag = (*(int *)($pinfo+16))
set *(int *)($pinfo+16) = $pflag & ~0x800
set $pinfo=-1
continue
end
On the above commands make sure to replace the numbers 1 and 2 with the correct breakpoint numbers. GDB prints the breakpoint number every time a breakpoint is set. We can also use the “info breakpoints” commands to display all the breakpoints.

Now we can resume execution.

(gdb) cont
Continuing.
............
The application runs without detecting the debugger :)
2013-6-8 15:16
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